THERE CAN BE NO argument that Operation Desert Storm provided the
US-lead coalition with a resounding victory regarding the stated aims of the
conflict in the liberation of Kuwait. State-of-the-art weaponry and the best
possible training, gave the coalition a great advantage over a foe that was
adequately equipped but plagued by poor leadership.
The conflict provided the US military with a chance to test and validate its
weaponry and tactics in a post-cold-war environment. Among the headline grabbers
were the USAF's F-117 Nighthawk, F-15 Eagle and the venerable F-111, as well as
the various precision-guided munitions (PGMs).
In fact, Desert Storm showed that
the USAF was in great shape to re-act to such a war, operating from bases in
countries allied to the cause. However, the same could not be said of the US Navy,
as Desert Storm veteran and former boss of Carrier Air Wing One, Rear Admiral
Pat Walsh, explains: "In the cold-war, blue-water Navy, we taught ourselves to
work autonomously. This was because we did not expect to have allies fighting
alongside us in any conflict with the Soviet Union. We expected to use their
infrastructure and their bases, but we never dreamed that they would take up
arms and fight alongside us.
The real lesson the Navy learned in the 1991 conflict
was what you can do when you work with an ally, whether in the joint ranks or
the coalition ranks. We had not put together architecture that would allow us to
become more effective in our unilateral operations. Prior to 1991, we worked
autonomously in this region."
The Navy's carrier-based weaponry and systems also reflected its cold-war
mentality. Naval aviators such as Adm Walsh were surprised when they watched the
imagery being shown to them on TV screens aboard ship.
"Like all naval aviators involved in Desert Storm, I was astounded by the TV
pictures released by the USAF of precision munitions striking targets. We had
nothing like this in the fleet. Part of our problem in this area was the way we
traditionally evaluated our mission success. Our strike aircraft had no equipment
that allowed such vivid imagery of bombs hitting targets to be brought back to
the ship in real time for post-mission analysis. We had to rely on a dedicated
reconnaissance platform for this imagery - TARPS-equipped F-14s in Desert Storm.
The Tomcat could not capture imagery of bombs hitting targets as was the case
with the USAF's LANTIRN-guided smart bombs. We had no way of conducting proper
bomb-hit analysis, or subsequent bomb damage assessment."
Although a valuable reconnaissance platform, the aircraft that proved to be most
ineffective during Desert Storm was the F-14 Tomcat. Built exclusively as a
fighter interceptor, and tasked with repelling missile-carrying Soviet bombers
hell bent on sinking US Navy carriers, the two-dozen Tomcat units sent into
action had to resign themselves to flying combat air patrols (CAP) over the
Persian Gulf, hundreds of miles south of enemy territory.
The Iraqi air force's reluctance to attack naval ships meant F-14 crews saw
little action.
Primarily this was because the Navy had failed to develop the necessary systems
and procedures required to integrate carrier air groups as part of a joint air
component command. Key among these procedures was the ability to conduct
non-co-operative target recognition (NCTR) utilising various classified radar
techniques to identify enemy aircraft by type. Such techniques enable fighters
with beyond- visual-range (BVR) air-to-air missiles like the AIM-7 and AIM-54 to
fire their ordnance at long range, safe in the knowledge that no friendly
aircraft in the area would be shot down.
USAF F-15s had NCTR systems and the F-14s did not, so it was the Eagle that was
used against the Iraqi air force over its homeland, shooting down 35 enemy aircraft.
The post-Desert Storm years were bleak ones for the Navy's fighter community
with swingeing budget cuts seeing close to a dozen Tomcat units decommissioned
due to the aircraft's astronomical maintenance costs. But just when it looked
like the F-14's ocean-going days were numbered, a reprieve came via the sudden
demise of another Grumman 'Ironworks' product. The all-weather long range A-6
Intruder bomber was hastily chopped also due to high maintenance costs and the
supposed evaporation of its mission in the post-cold-war world.
With the Intruder pensioned off, and the potential retirement of the Tomcat
rapidly looming, the Navy found itself facing a shortage of tactical carrier
aircraft to fulfil its global policing mission. When the F-14 was developed in
the late 1960s, Grumman built it with the capability to drop bombs, although
this requirement had not been specified by the Navy. Experimentation with gravity
bombs hung beneath standard Tomcats had taken place just prior to Desert Storm,
although it was realised that the F-14 would not be a viable fighter/attack
platform without some kind of precision weapons delivery capability. Little
funding was available to develop such a system, so an off-the-shelf pod was
acquired following modest financing through the GPS-guided joint direct-attack
munition (JDAM) programme in 1994. The equipment chosen was the LANTIRN
(low-altitude navigation and targeting infra-red night) pod, developed by what
is now Lockheed Martin.
The Bombcat got the chance to prove its worth during Operation Allied Force when,
in September 1995, two F-14As from VF-41 dropped LGBs (then designated by F/A-18s,
the Tomcats lacking LANTIRN) on an ammunition dump in eastern Bosnia. The
ultimate F-14 bomber, equipped with a LANTIRN pod, had to wait until December
1998 when the US Navy spearheaded Operation Desert Fox. Tomcats from VF-32 were
involved in the first wave of attacks against Iraqi air-defence installations.
Dropping self-guided GBU-12 and GBU-24 PGMs, Tomcats also 'lased' for
accompanying F/A-18 Hornets.
Since the limited strike on Iraq in late 1998, Tomcats units have been integral
to almost all combat operations involving the US Navy over Iraq as part of
Operation Southern Watch (OSW). Indeed, on every carrier deployment to the
Persian Gulf since Desert Fox, the F-14 unit on station has ventured into The
Sand Box over southern Iraq and prosecuted targets such as radar, missile, AAA
and communications sites operating in contravention of United Nations security
council resolutions.
The Tomcat also returned to action over the Balkans in March 1999 when VF-14 and
VF-41 were committed to Operation Allied Force. Flying from the USS Theodore Roosevelt,
the units expended close to 800,000lbs of PGMs and iron bombs. Crews from both
squadrons also functioned as forward air controllers (airborne) (FAC(A), for
other assets involved in Kosovo. An operational first for the Tomcat, VF-14's CO,
Cdr Ted Carter, explained how the FAC(A) mission was carried out: "We flew in
sections, one aircraft serving as an escort for the other. Each F-14 usually
carried four bombs that we used for both striking a target ourselves or for
marking a target for other strike aircraft. The FAC (A) is like a quarterback on
a football team, seeking out an identifying targets, ushering strike aircraft to
the scene, recommending the type of ordnance for a particular target, ensuring
they recognise potential terrain hazards, and providing run-in and recovery headings."
The Tomcat also was in the vanguard of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), launched
in October 2001 in the wake of the 11 September terror strike on New York's World
Trade Center. Flying marathon missions from the Arabian Gulf into Afghanistan, the
Tomcat proved to be an ideal weapons platform thanks to its legendary long range
and now-proven mission effectiveness with the LANTIRN pod.
Operating hand in glove with F/A-18s, F-14 units dropped, or guided, all manner
of PGMs, as well as JSOW (joint stand-off weapon), SLAM-ER and JDAM. The jet's
FAC (A) capability also was used once again, as was its upgraded TARPS system.
With the completion of the Navy's commitment to OEF in mid 2002, the theatre
emphasis for naval aviation returned once again to Iraq, and the build up to a
seemingly inevitable conflict. As part of OSW, the duty battlegroup in the
Persian Gulf has carried out strike missions against Iraqi targets within the
southern no-fly zone. These sorties have seen Tomcats drop GBU-10, GBU-12, GBU-24
PGMS and JDAM from mid-2002. Literally thousands of TARPS and FAC (A) missions
also have been flown, and the jet continues to function as the Navy's primary
long-range fighter asset.
Now a truly multi-role fighter-bomber with more mission taskings than any other
aircraft embarked in a US carrier, the venerable Tomcat is set to take a leading
role in any conflict that takes place over Iraq rather than being the bit-part
player it was in Desert Storm.