IN OCTOBER 2002 President Bush signed into law a $355.1bn defence spending bill, giving his forces the largest increase in two decades as the US braces for war with Iraq. Apart from funding for national missile defence and for shipbuilding, including $2.3bn for two Aegis destroyers, there is $3.3bn for 15 C-17 transport aircraft; $3.2bn for 46 Navy F/A-18 fighters; $4bn for 23 F/A-22 fighters and $3.5bn for continued development of the multi-service F-35 joint strike fighter.

The war on terrorism continues to drive US national security and foreign policy. The US has had to adapt to a war on several fronts. After the nightclub bombing on Bali and the Mombasa attacks, each thought to be linked to al-Qaeda, it looked set to extend to the far east and Africa. With Bin Laden still at large, the CIA warned of a dramatic escalation of al-Qaeda actions at home, including strikes on middle-east oil shipments and on US economic targets. Information remained too generalised to pinpoint actual targets.

In Afghanistan the US has kept a small military force focused on rooting out remnants of the Taliban and al-Qaeda while insisting that the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) remains confined to Kabul. That policy shifted in August 2002 following ISAF expansion to operate beyond Kabul with more emphasis on training the Afghan national army and supporting reconstruction efforts. The US contributes air power, transport and emergency evacuation for ISAF, but no European country is willing to donate extra peacekeepers. Washington also is playing a lead role in building a new Afghan army that will diminish warlord power. However, experts say it will not be effective until America stops supporting and funding warlords in the US military search for al-Qaeda that is scattered around Afghanistan as well as re-grouping in Pakistan.

Meanwhile Bush's plans for regime change in Iraq has met with setbacks. UN stalling over the wording of a revised resolution calling for strengthened weapons inspections gave Iraq more time to hide its WMD. When Iraq did accept UN Resolution 1441 that allowed UN inspectors unimpeded access to about 700 sites suspected of weapons-of-mass- destruction (WMD) development (first inspections for four years began in November 2002) war plans were being formulated and a build-up of US forces was under way. Inspections could take months, pushing a start date for US military action well into 2003, but evidence of Iraqi non-compliance could provide a trigger for US intervention.

Congress approved an Iraqi war resolution in October 2002, setting the stage for Bush's regime-change operation. But while US hopes for a speedy UN approval of a new Iraq inspections resolution diminished, Pentagon officials said they would have to adjust their timetable for a military build-up in the Gulf. Military planners, eager to avoid moving thousands of troops to the Gulf, are primed to strike, but might wait months for an order to attack. At the same time they must take account of new inspections quickly breaking down because of renewed Iraqi resistance.

Getting heavy equipment in place is a top priority. While diplomatic and political uncertainties dragged on through late 2002, the Pentagon considered continuing the build-up of military equipment while delaying dispatch of troops and allowing some forces to proceed with normal rotations home. Aircraft carriers Lincoln and George Washington currently within striking distance of Iraq, have faced the likelihood of their stays extending past the regular six-month tours to provide added air power for an invasion.

Last October Pentagon orders to the Army's V Corps and 1st Marine Expeditionary Force to deploy HQ staffs to Kuwait were given, marking the first non-routine dispatch of conventional ground forces to the Gulf in anticipation of military action against Iraq. HQ elements of the Navy and Air Force are already in place and a US Central Command contingent arrived in November, so the addition of ground-force groups completes the command structure to manage an invasion. The deployment order helps to shorten the time required to mount an invasion of Iraq if President Bush decides to attack and underscores the administration's resolve to take military action if necessary. So, although a light force was ready to go into battle by early December, Pentagon planners preferred to launch a closely co-ordinated air and ground offensive early in 2002 when over 200,000 US troops were in the region. By then the US Gulf War naval strength was up to seven aircraft carriers ready for a January offensive.

The US foresees an air phase to soften up Iraqi air defences, communications and HQs as being much shorter than the 1991 bombing campaign. Preparations for B-2A stealth bombers to strike the first blows from overseas bases in Diego Garcia and RAF Fairford in Gloucestershire for the first time were made. Attacking Iraq's mobile Scuds is more important than it was in the Gulf War because an invasion of Iraq would be aimed at removing Saddam Hussein from power, a factor that could make the Iraqi leader more likely to use chemical or biological weapons in any missile attack. The Pentagon's Scud hunt would involve manned and unmanned reconnaissance aircraft, fighters and attack helicopters.

US combat aircraft have been optimised since the Gulf War to fire precision weapons at targets designated by Special Operations forces on the ground, a tactic employed with success in Afghanistan. Global Hawk and Predator drones that became operational in recent years, now give US military persistent reconnaissance over a battlefield not available to commanders a decade ago. Eliminating western Iraq as a launching pad for Scud attacks also would enhance the ability of US and Israeli anti-missile batteries to combat whatever missiles Iraq might try to fire from farther east.

The US has continued to have problems in putting together a Gulf War coalition. In October Security Council permanent members France and Russia raised objections to the revised US draft resolution calling for strengthened weapons inspections. Britain remained firmly on side, its Iraq WMD dossier lending further support to possible military action.

Other allies' assessments of the dangers posed by Iraq and Iran differed and there are strong European doubts about President Bush's axis-of- evil concept. Nato is under mounting US pressure to fight terrorism and deploy forces rapidly, but there is little sign of European readiness to increase defence spending to close the transatlantic gap. As US defence spending has grown further from a staggering $46bn early in 2002 (3.4 per cent of GDP), including $10.5bn on military construction, the strategic imbalance between Europe and America has become a hot political issue. Most European allies spend just over half that. EU governments are struggling against the imbalance between US warriors and European wimps - Americans fight and Europeans do the dishes afterwards.