Nigel Vinson questions the commitment of some armies to the concept of a rapid reaction force

The beginning of 2002 saw two significant events for future land operations. First, the deployment of the International Security Assistance Force to Afghanistan for a campaign against the Taliban regime and al-Qaida terrorist cells. Second was Belgium’s decision to fold its air force into the army while cutting the latter’s armour and artillery elements to become specialists in direct fire.

Andre Flahaut, the Belgian defence minister, said: “This was so that the armed forces could specialise in humanitarian activities”. First impressions indicate that the armed forces of many states are mere political adjuncts to US foreign policy and that land forces are being eclipsed by land and sea-based airpower.

The 1999 Kosovo and the 2001 Afghanistan campaigns were waged with US airpower, admittedly with assistance from special forces on the ground and later by utilising local tribal groups. Moves that were made by Belgium, Canada and New Zealand show that ground forces will provide a stabilisation force after a military conflict has been successfully prosecuted predominately from the air.

However, military realities suggest a complex scenario where land forces evolve with strategic circumstances and play a significant role in everything from humanitarian disaster relief to full-scale warfighting. Land forces face a capability gap between highly deployable but weak light forces and capable but strategically ponderous heavy warfighting formations. An effort is being made to enhance the utility of ground forces and to re-balance the options available to future component commanders.

The US Army is setting the agenda in terms of this transformation. In its armed forces’ Joint Vision 2020 document, the country has re-equipped a number of its warfighting brigades for rapid effect on global operations. In addition to this, the US Army also has split its manoeuvre formations into three sections; the legacy, objective and interim forces.

The legacy force will consist of heavy and light formations including the US III Corps with its armoured cavalry regiment, supporting higher headquarters and reserve components. Primarily this will consist of recapitalising the big five from the Reagan military build-up of the 1980s. The M1A2 Abrams tank is being updated as part of the system-enhancement programme; the M2 Bradley infantry-fighting vehicle to A3 standard; the AH-64A Apache to the D model; the UH-60A and L Blackhawk utility helicopters to the M variant and the Patriot surface-to-air missile system to the new PAC3 version.

The legacy force also will be digitised over the coming years to maximise lethality and situation awareness but this will do little to enhance strategic mobility. However, from 2008 the legacy force will begin a gradual transformation to the objective force.

It will introduce new equipment such as the future combat successor to the Abrams, the RAH-66 Comanche helicopter, the Crusader self-propelled artillery system and Land Warrior soldier-fighting equipment. The harnessing of technological increases in firepower, mobility and force protection means that, for the first time, the US will be able to deliver warfighting elements over strategic distances very rapidly, marking a significant shift in capabilities.

There is international scepticism that questions whether a strategically deployable warfighting capability is achievable technically in the 2012 timeframe of the FCS. The UK’s belief is that while forces can be deployed rapidly with a degree of force protection and lethality, less mobile heavy forces will be required up to 2020-2025 in order to provide what the US Army has termed full- spectrum dominance. However, the US Army is committed to its timetable and has formulated the interim-force concept to provide some degree of rapid-entry capability and a hedge against delays in deploying the objective force.

Developing rapid effect To achieve rapid effect over strategic distances in the near term, the US has embarked on the interim-force concept that is often described as medium-weight forces.

Designed to equip up to eight brigades, including at least one from the Army National Guard, these formations will be entirely C-130-Hercules deployable and largely based around the 8x8 Piranha III.

This should increase the strategic mobility of a force, reduce the logistical drag and also allow forces to deploy globally within hours. Dedicated medium-weight forces are seen as something of a luxury, given the tight fiscal realities of many defence budgets. However, a number of armed forces are forming rapid-reaction units that at least have a modicum of force protection as well as rapid strategic effect.

Outside the US, the UK is probably at the forefront of many of these developments, having created the joint rapid reaction force as a lead element for any intervention operation. Initially equipped with light utility vehicles and crew-served weapons, 3 Commando Brigade recently accepted into service the Viking all-terrain vehicle to compliment the unarmoured BV206 fleet. Studies also have been undertaken to assess the merit of procuring a medium-weight vehicle for other JRRF units deployed on intervention operations, such as 16 Air Assault Brigade or light infantry battalions.

To a greater or lesser degree, the situation is being pursued by other armed forces such as the NATO alliance. It is acutely aware that over the past few years its operations in the Balkans have exposed its forces as lacking in responsiveness, strategic mobility and sustainment of forces in theatre.

The allied Rapid Reaction Corps always has been viewed as a unique capability, and when it was deployed to Kosovo in 1999 plans were drawn up to provide a follow-on headquarters from within land forces central Europe. Current moves to create an immediate reaction force for more rapid deployment could lead to a re-invigorated ACE mobile force.

Some quarters have criticised these concepts in the light of recent experience that revealed combined operations work best with willing coalitions formed for specific missions. This is opposed to formal alliances that tend to move at the speed of the most reluctant member.

Of course this is especially true of NATO, given that the alliance was conceived essentially as a defensive organisation. This placed great strains on certain partners during offensive operations against Yugoslavia in 1999. More emphasis may be placed on finding ways to achieve quicker coalition building and force packaging when assets are required, rather than forming a dedicated capability that may prove politically impossible to deploy rapidly.

Of greater concern is the belief among some states that their armed forces will be required only for humanitarian and disaster- relief operations. This, in many ways, is a reflection of the dominance of US policy-making on foreign affairs and also highlights an increasing unwillingness by some states to fund their armed forces sufficiently.

Some countries such as the UK and Australia, seem to be committed to increasing their defence budgets in order to make up for a decade of underfunding. At the same time, others have become very comfortable with even lower spending. Indeed, recent terrorist events are more likely to see further cuts in traditional defence spending.

This is because governments will seek to shift resources from defence budgets to interior ministries for homeland security purposes. Ironically, this has resulted in a surge in the number of armed forces procuring vehicles for rapid intervention, but for operations at a very low level within the spectrum of conflict.

For example, the recent order for 18 Mowag Piranha IIIs from the Spanish Marine Corps brings to over 1,300 the number of sales of the latest variant of this versatile, wheeled, fighting vehicle from countries such as Canada, Denmark, New Zealand, Ireland, Sweden, Switzerland, as well as the US.

Although these and similar capabilities might allow a number of armies to specialise in providing continuation or follow-on forces in theatres where coalitions find themselves engaged for years or even decades, it also reduces the options available for early conflict prevention or warfighting missions. Moreover, some nations seem to have assumed that future military operations will be relatively risk free. The narrow utility of these paramilitary-type forces may mean that if peacekeeping duties degenerate into peace-enforcement or even warfighting operations, then a catastrophic political and military disaster could befall them.

Although it is apparent that armed forces are evolving to make their land forces more relevant in the current strategic environment, it is also apparent that states are drawing many lessons from both the post cold-war security environment and their response to international terrorism.

Defence budgets remain tight, and airpower, including carrier-based assets, and special forces continue to provide the preferred method for projecting force on expeditionary operations. Conventional land forces have not yet harmonised rapid strategic projection with battlefield dominance although this remains the objective of the FCS programme.

It is imperative that other states continue to invest in land platforms with these characteristics and do not seek to exploit the current weakness of land platforms to justify permanent cuts in land forces. That would dangerously unbalance overall military capability.