On its way out or still ready to go? Aaron Scholer ponders the uproar surrounding the future of the traditional carrier.
Bolstered by its performance to date in the Arabian Sea, United States Navy (USN) development programmes continue to focus on post-cold war ideas of flexibility, power projection, jointery and the ability to respond to assymetric and littoral threats.
At a time when debate is raging among US naval analysts over the design of the next generation of USN aircraft carrier (CVNX), proponents of a large-deck carrier are using current military actions in the Middle East as an example of the power only large-deck carriers can sustain. By 12 November, USN and United States Marine Corps (USMC) F/A-18 Hornets and F-14 Tomcats from Carrier Air Wing One (CVW-1) had conducted an average of 60 sorties per day and had dropped over 350 tonnes of ordnance on targets in Afghanistan.
Improvements in USN equipment, air-to-air and surface-to-air co-ordination and mission-planning have allowed a four-fold increase over the last decade in the volume of firepower that a current on-station aircraft carrier can provide. As smaller, lighter, and more potent air-to-surface weapons emerge from the development and procurement pipeline, the number promises to increase further.
In the immediate future for the USN’s carrier fleet is CVN-77: the tenth and last of the Nimitz-class super-carriers and the navy’s stepping-stone to CVNX-1. In February of 2001 the USN awarded a $3.8bn contract to Newport News Shipbuilding for the design and build of CVN-77; a clear sign the USN has committed to large-deck carriers, at least for the forseeable future.
Although at first the CVN-77 appears to be an increment in the USN’s carrier fleet, she incorporates design changes which, represent a steady transition by the USN towards what will eventually be the CVNX design. Intended to replace the USS Kitty Hawk (CV-63), CVN-77 will boast an integrated warfare system incorporating new multifunction radar and volume search radar systems, involving flat plane antennas conformal with the island’s superstructure. Additionally, the CVN-77 is being designed specifically with the USN’s network-centric approach to warfare in mind. An advanced C4I system will allow rapid installation of follow-on software and hardware to weave the warship into the very fabric of a fully networked battlespace. CVN-77 will lead into CVNX-1, which is due for delivery in 2013 and is slated to replace USS Enterprise (CVN-65). CVNX-2 will incorporate new hull and flight deck designs as well as an electromagnetic aircraft recovery system and will be likely to establish new class design parameters. CVNX-2 is due to begin construction in 2013.
The apparent committal by the USN and DoD to keeping the super-carrier as the centrepiece of USN operations well into the 21st century is not without its critics. Given that even if the USN ceased production of any new carriers this year, it would still retain nine CVBGs beyond 2025, a point past which military analyst Tom Donelly said: “The survival of surface ships, let alone huge aircraft carriers, will be in doubt”. However, until a viable alternative emerges the USN’s super-carriers offer the US an unparalleled capacity to force access into regions where for lack of forward basing the United States Air Force (USAF) may not be able to extend an umbrella of air-power with a sufficient operational tempo.
Although development plans for the CVN-77, CVNX-1 and 2 generate much attention, they are not the only current surface programmes under development or evaluation. They are also not the only ones hotly debated. With the Arsenal Ship concept recently cancelled outright, it was the turn of the DD-21 Zumwalt next-generation land-attack destroyer programme to face its critics. The Zumwalt-class destroyers, intended to replace the USN’s current Spruance (DD-963) destroyers and OH Perry (FFG-7) frigates, finally succumbed to pressure from both within and without the USN and on 1 November 2001 the USN announced that the DD-21 programme had been replaced by the DDX programme.
While mission requirements for the DDX have not been explicitly defined, it is expected the programme will draw heavily on the work already done on the DD-21 programme, including the Zumwalt’s SPY-3/volume search radar (VSR) suite, the integrated power system (IPS), the vertical launch system (VLS), and the electromagnetic signature reduction design work.
Work done for the now-modified DD-21 programme will also benefit the planned next-generation cruiser programme (CGX) and the controversial stealthy, small and agile littoral combat ship (LCS). Until the DDX can be launched, the USN plans on purchasing up to six additional Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) Aegis guided-missile destroyers and possibly folding two-dozen OH Perry-class (FFG-7) frigates into a modernisation programme in an attempt to keep hull numbers from dropping too low across the fleet.
In late 2001 the USN announced that it would go ahead with its plans to purchase the first three joint maritime command and control capability (JMCC(X)) ships in FY 2007, although no decision had been made as to the final number or composition of the class. The JMCC(X) will allow commanders and their staff to manage and control the ever-increasing torrent of information that the network-centric way of war has produced, resulting in the agile manipulation of joint assets in real-time.
Other questions concerning the composition of future USN surface forces include the fate of US amphibious landing capabilities generally, and the fate of the Wasp-class (LHD-8) amphibious assault ship and the San Antonio-class (LPD-17) amphibious landing ship specifically. A recent decision by the House Appropriations Committee to cut all funding for the former programme in FY 2002 as well as most of the funding for the latter casts the USN’s ability to project its marine assault forces ashore into doubt. The big programme for the USN aviation community is, without a doubt, the F-35 joint strike fighter (JSF). With the recent awarding of the JSF contract to Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman (with an estimated price-tag of $200bn), the JSF has formally moved from the design and proposal stage to system development and demonstration status.
The JSF, which will be produced in variants for the USN and United States Marine Corps (USMC) is designed to eventually work in conjunction with the USN’s F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and is slated to replace the USMC’s F/A-18 Hornets and A/V-8 Harriers. While moving ahead in its determination to procure approximately 480 navalised variants of the JSF, the USN has also moved the retirement date of its venerable F-14 from 2016 to 2010, citing untenable cost/flight hour ratios. The USN’s Tomcats are not the only ageing airframes in the inventory and some in the naval air community are beginning to raise the question of whether or not a dedicated electronic warfare (EW) variant of the Super Hornet is on the drawing board to replace the vintage
EA-6B Prowler airframes. Additionally, some unmanned air vehicles (UAVs) such as the Global Hawk are expected to begin to assume some of the elderly P-3 Orion fleet’s surveillance duties.
For the rotary-wing naval air community of the USN, the summertime 2001 loss of approximately $170m from the FY 2002-2004 budgets previously targeted for the SH-60R Seahawk programme is a hard one indeed, but optimists look forward to possible navalised versions of the US Army’s RAH-66 Comanche helicopter in the mid-to-distant future.
In an age of decreased budgets and increased demand for flexibility and multi-role capabilities, perhaps no other branch of the USN has been forced to re-evaluate what its missions are more than the submarine force. With the Seawolf-class of SSN now capped at a total-class quantity of three Seawolf (SSN-21), Connecticut (SSN-22) and Jimmy Carter (SSN-23) attention has turned to the smaller, cheaper and more versatile Virginia-class of future attack submarine. In addition, the USN plans to start work in October 2003 on a $2 billion project to convert its Ohio-class nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) into conventionally armed submarines (SSGNs) capable of delivering either conventional cruise missiles or special operations forces (SOF). The conversion process involves re-engineering the current ballistic missile tubes to being able to offer a mix of canisters of cruise missiles or SOF stowage containers. Extensive work to the submarines’ navigation centre and hull will also be performed.
The USN is also actively pursuing a more versatile warhead for its Tomahawk missile forces, and it seems likely that the roles envisioned by the USN for the Tomahawk missiles will include hardened target penetration and/or the dispersal of ‘smart’ submunitions. Other weapons and countermeasures programmes currently under development or analysis include a new joint supersonic cruise missile (JSCM) and the stand-off land attack missile-expanded response (SLAM-ER) which gives operators an enhanced ability to positively identify and then attack targets at increased ranges.
While the naval component of theatre ballistic missile defence (TBMD) pushes ahead into the next phase of testing and as such dominates USN naval countermeasure/counterforce news, it is worth noting that the USN has also moved to address the issue of torpedo defence in a rather novel way. In late autumn of 2001 the USN announced the commencement of its first hard-kill counter-torpedo programme. The programme is designed to produce a subsurface close-in weapons system (CIWS) with a ‘bolt-on’ capacity for larger ships, such as carriers and replenishment vessels. The system, known as the AN/WSQ-11 torpedo defence system (TDS) will not be fielded for at least a decade.
As the USN fights its first war of the new millennium, the lessons being learned are further reinforcing the calls for jointery, co-operative engagement, multi-mission capability, and the ability to respond to the stealthy, littoral and unconventional threats all in keeping with an austere budget that leapt off the pages of the post-cold war defence reviews in the US. As such the USN is poised to deliver on its promises of guaranteeing US maritime interests well into the next few decades and even beyond.
