Dr Lee Willett analyses the leading long-range cruise missiles, and looks at potential development.
UK strategic defence policy emphasises equipment capabilities on systems that are adaptable, versatile, deployable and able to keep pace with changes in future operating environments. The two leading systems in the field of long-range cruise missiles are Raytheon’s Tomahawk land attack missile (TLAM) and MBDA Missile Systems’ emerging Scalp Navale.
TLAM is moving from its Block III variant to Tactical Tomahawk (TacTom). Scalp Navale is a longer-range, navalised version of the air-launched Scalp EG/Stormshadow. Thus, long-range cruise missiles will continue to provide deterrence and war-fighting options for the UK armed forces.
TacTom for the UK
The TLAM family has proven itself by displaying a fair amount of adaptability. Even the current UK variant, the conventional Block III, is very different from the variants used in Desert Storm and TacTom appears to be suited to British purposes. While retaining the core capabilities of its predecessor, and also maintaining the tanks dry range of over 1,000 miles, TacTom brings capabilities that have greater utility for tactical uses, at a lower cost than the Block III. Future improvements in the weapon’s responsiveness, loiter abilities and sub-munition capacities will enable a greater accuracy in the attack of re-locatable, mobile and time-urgent targets.
When it comes to strategic coercion and net-centred operational and tactical use, the re-targetable TacTom is a useful option. This is because it meets the requirements for using real-time intelligence, for broader information exploitation, for faster sensor-to-shooter-to-target data-processing and real-time decision-making. As with the Block III, TacTom will be guided by a prospective combination of the global positioning system (GPS) and the digital scene matching area correlation (DSMAC) mapping, that is the most jam-resistant guidance package available. The under-developed potential of GPS technology may provide longer-term capabilities than other forms of guidance, and the data-link provides a detailed mission status feedback and battle damage assessment.
TacTom is only the first phase in a broader range of improvements that potentially will include: improved sensor capabilities, in particular through the use of laser imaging for a seeker warhead; improved data usage; better connectivity and in-theatre control to provide closer integration with other forces; hard-target penetration; stealth; a broader range of lethal and non-lethal capabilities; and appropriate target selection for a larger number of weapons. The US Quadrennial Defense Review has recommended the development of hypersonic cruise missiles to dramatically improve the ability to attack mobile targets.
The UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) is considering a wider TLAM fit. The move to TacTom and beyond is essential in maintaining a TLAM capability for the UK and interoperability with the US. Britain’s concept of operations for TLAM is evolving as more becomes known about its capabilities and relevance to UK operational requirements. A widely-held view is that 65 rounds deployed on SSNs is insufficient for evolving British purposes.
In Kosovo and Afghanistan, British TLAMs were used more for enabling entry into theatre of other air assets than for strategic coercion. After Kosovo, Britain procured a further 20 Block IIIs, arguably to replace expended rounds. During the Afghanistan conflict, Britain procured 48 more to ensure that the UK retained sufficient rounds in its inventory to underwrite requirements for the national strategic co-ercive policy. Two main areas of discussion exist: how large an inventory should the UK hold; and upon what platforms would these rounds be best deployed?
Rounds
The US has fired over 1,200 rounds, with an average of over 100 per year, since Desert Storm. If the UK is firing 10 per cent of US force levels, then over the 30-year life-span of the weapon, the UK may require significantly more weapons than in the current inventory. The Astute-class nuclear attack submarine (SSN) will have a greater weapons load and the potential to carry more TacToms. Due to time delays when re-loading, the UK would probably wish to send an SSN to sea with its maximum load-out of missiles and to have a maximum number of weapons available for all SSNs (there will be 10).
The US is planning for only one procurement window for TacTom, starting in 2005. If only one such window is available, the UK would need to consider procuring enough rounds to permit sustenance of the required force level through the weapon’s life-cycle. It may require an arsenal as large as 350 sea-based long-range cruise missiles. The cheaper TacTom airframe will permit, in principle, procurement of more rounds. There is no firm indication from the MOD as to any precise number under consideration.
Platforms
What platform is appropriate to deliver the required capability into theatre? With Astute’s larger weapons load-out, the UK will have an improved coercive capability with its SSNs. US decisions on TLAM affect Britain’s own choices.
TacTom was intended originally for VLS launch. The VLS-launched version would be appropriate for UK submarines if the UK was to consider extending later Astute hulls to include a VLS section, or if the UK followed US plans to re-fit four of its Ohio-class fleet ballistic missile submarines with large numbers of rotary-launched rounds by considering a fit of Trident missile tubes to later Astute hulls.
As far as a torpedo-tube version is concerned, the US realised the strategic value of an SSN with a maximum load-out of land attack weapons. Britain and the US are conducting a joint feasibility study for the development and procurement of an encapsulated, torpedo-tube launched TacTom, and new weapons control and mission planning systems.
TLAM also can be fitted to the new UK Type 45 air defence destroyer. The MoD’s re-evaluation of its long-range cruise missile requirements could see TacToms fitted to the Type 45 from the second hull of the class if a requirement can be established.
Scalp Navale
The UK is buying around 900 Stormshadow air-launched cruise missiles. Based on the French Scalp EG, it is proving to be highly capable. With the potential for deployment on attack and large non-penetrating transport aircraft, its penetrability and accuracy, its rapid mission planning capabilities, and its larger numbers, the Stormshadow will bolster the flexibility of air power while providing a complimentary capability with TLAM. Potential improvements to Stormshadow include greater in-flight re-targeting, greater data-link connectivity, improved warhead penetration and increased reach.
At a technological level, Stormshadow’s main limitation is its 250km range. This is being addressed in the development of a navalised version of Scalp EG, Scalp Navale, that provides Stormshadow’s capabilities in sea-based form. Europe has a shortfall in precision-guided and cruise missile capabilities. TacTom, Stormshadow and Scalp Navale provide a range of options for the UK and other European nations.
Among other nations of the world, it is understood that a French request to procure 50 TLAMs from the US was rejected, while interest expressed by the Dutch, Italians and Spanish have been turned down or not followed up. The European countries must look at other options. For France, there is the need for a cruise missile that is a flexible, multi-role weapons system that can bridge the sea-land gap. Perhaps it was US rejection that inspired MBDA and the French Ministry of Defence to look at an indigenous sea-based long-range land attack cruise missile option in Scalp Navale.
On 31 July 2001, French defence minister Alain Richard revealed the French Navy’s blueprint for the 2015 timeframe. The French Navy plans to procure 240 Scalp Navale, at a cost of FF4bn, for fitting onboard eight of the 17 new multi-role French frigates (by 2011) and the six Barracuda-class SSN (by 2013). Each frigate will carry 24 weapons, with 12 on each SSN. The triad of the new frigates, the SSNs and Scalp Navale will provide France with a cutting edge when other forms of air power are unavailable.
The deployment aboard two separate platforms will also serve to maximise missile and platform flexibility. Scalp Navale will fit in with the national emphasis on joint operations. The French Navy has funded several studies on Scalp Navale, and currently is actively lobbying the French Ministry of Defence. At the time of writing, MBDA awaits a project definition contract from the French MoD.
Certainly, the French Navy is aware that the changing nature of warfare today predicates a growing requirement for precision long-range land attack. The UK MoD is in the middle of assessing whether, in the longer term, 21’ should remain the standard size for sea-based weapons launch tubes. The fact of the matter, however, is that Scalp Navale’s key advantages that are a more powerful warhead and better sensor capabilities, will have to be re-packaged into an airframe that will have to fit standard 21’ launch tubes.
This will require what amounts to a re-design of the missile. Moreover, broader strategic imperatives may have an impact here. Kosovo and Afghanistan, as land-locked countries, have highlighted the fact that maritime power projection may well, in many future combat scenarios, require long-range reach ashore.
The upshot of these debates is that, for Scalp Navale, while retaining the accuracy of Scalp EG, the payload is likely to be traded away for improved range. From the UK’s perspective, it is quite unlikely at this stage that Scalp Navale would be able to meet the MoD’s timeframes for the Type 45. However, it will remain an option for any future surface combatant.
Conclusion
Long-range cruise missiles give the UK a capacity to punch above its weight, a unique capability, strategic independence in Europe, and the ability to stand alongside the US in political, strategic and equipment terms. Such equipment capabilities will constitute a large part of the UK future offensive air capability (FOAC), provided they can bring the adaptability to meet the changing requirements of modern combat.
