The Type 45 represents a new level of air defence capability for the Royal Navy			Type 45 destroyer
				After much speculation, in April 1999 the UK finally withdrew from the trinational Project Horizon collaborative plan for a new air defence ship. Instead the Royal Navy (RN) is to pursue a national programme to be known as the Type 45, details of which are now starting to emerge. Horizon, otherwise known as the common new generation frigate (CNGF) began way back in 1992 with the signing of a tripartite staff requirement by the governments of the UK, France and Italy. In the wake of the failure of the seven-nation NFR 90 project within NATO, the three countries were left with similar, though not identical, requirements for new naval air defence platforms. Collaboration appeared to offer cost savings as well as being an example of European defence consolidation, a popular political objective. By the mid-1990s outline sketches appeared of the proposed design, an impressive-looking vessel of about 6,300 tons, disingenuously referred to as a frigate. The new ship was to have been built around the principal anti-air missile system (PAAMS), still the centrepiece of all three countries’ replacement projects. PAAMS comprises the Aerospatiale Aster 15 and Aster 30 active homing surface-to-air missiles, a vertical launch system (VLS), the central combat system and a multi-function radar (MFR). PAAMS was run as a separate but related project and was the principal cause of many of the early delays to the always-troubled CNGF programme. The difficulties stemmed mainly from differing operational requirements as well as national work-share concerns.
	The Type 45 represents a new level of air defence capability for the Royal Navy
					French escorts The RN’s air defence needs are more challenging than the French or Italian, requiring more assured defensive cover over a wider area. This is because French ships were intended primarily as escorts for the new carrier Charles de Gaulle that carries the Aster 15 missile for self-defence. By contrast, the current and future British carriers and the RN’s new amphibious ships, do not have their own missile system, and so are more dependent upon accompanying air defence ships for survival. This dilemma was largely resolved by adopting differing MFRs within the PAAMS project. The UK’s version of PAAMS, for which Matra BAe Dynamics is Britain’s main contractor, will have the BAe Systems Sampson active phased array, while the Franco-Italian variant will have the less-advanced, though still capable, Empar passive phased array radar. PAAMS also includes a second three-dimensional radar, the Anglo-Dutch S1850M Smartello long-range surveillance set. By 1996 when PAAMS was looking more secure it was the ship itself that was giving concern. The original in-service date for the three national first-of-class (FOC) vessels slipped from 2002 to 2004, and then to 2005/6. Cost, timescale and performance problems continued to plague the project, all of concern to Britain. The UK was planning to buy 12 units, considerably more than France (two or four), or Italy (possibly six but probably two). A block obsolescence problem with the RN’s Type 42s, for which Horizon was the planned replacement, was also a growing worry. When UK defence secretary George Robertson announced the UK’s withdrawal from CNGF, he said: “International procurement must follow the same logic as national procurement, defence can afford only projects that are delivered cost-effectively on time.” The substitution of a national design for the tri-national project is almost certainly good news for the Royal Navy and for British industry. The RN will get a ship better tailored to its needs and industry a larger share of the work. Britain’s share of Horizon never reflected the UK’s proportion of the total buy. However, the switch does entail a further delay. A long-term consequence of this is that there will be a frigate/destroyer building holiday between 2002 when the last Type 23 enters service, and 2007 when the first Type 45 is due. Even with a much-reduced frigate and destroyer total of 32 ships in the RN, one would have expected between six and eight ships to be commissioned within that time-frame, given a nominal 20-year service life. Knock-on effects will be a delay to the next class, the future surface combatant (FSC), and an extension in service, with modernisation, of the Type 23s that may remain operational for more than twice as long as the recently disposed, 13-year-old Batch 2 Type 22s. Horizon design No illustrations of the projected design have been released, but MoD sources report that, logically enough, the Type 45 will look much like the UK’s preferred option for the original Horizon design. The ship may be a little larger – up to 7,000 tons – but otherwise efforts are being made to keep unit costs firmly under control. The initial operational capability of the first ship is likely to be substantially short of what the RN wants, but later ships should be fitted to a higher standard as funds and equipment are made available. The earlier units would then be brought up to the same standard. This is a path the RN has followed before with varying degrees of success according to whether the required funds and equipment actually materialise. Interin equipment Ships therefore may be fitted but not with some capabilities, and in other areas receive interim equipment fits. The main gun is a example of this. Though the RN’s clear preference is for a new five-inch gun with extended range ammunition for naval fire support of troops up to 75 miles inland, the early batches of ships are likely to get the existing 4.5 inch Mark 8 Mod 1 weapon now going to sea in place of the 1970s-vintage Mod 0. In addition to PAAMS, Horizon was to have had an inner layer missile system (ILMS) that, confusingly, could have been a missile or gun-based close-in, last-ditch defence against anti-ship cruise missiles. Given the high performance expected of Aster 15 against just this threat, the ILMS is a likely casualty of cost-saving measures. Another important trend is working in opposition to the need to reduce costs. The original requirement as foreseen 10 years ago was for an anti-air replacement for the Type 42s. That remains the primary function of the Type 45. However, the RN increasingly sees a wider role for the new ships. The service no longer talks of escorts, but of surface combatants. This is in line with the RN’s current operational concept, the maritime contribution to joint operations (MCJO). The focus is now mainly on conducting operations against the land and supporting operations on the land, rather than fighting potential blue-water opponents at sea. The recent acquisition and use of Tomahawk land-attack missiles is but one manifestation of this shift in strategic thinking. Expanding the utility of the new ships, however, will increase, not reduce, unit costs. This dilemma has been expressed as aspiration versus reality. There are indications that the RN may get what it can in the Type 45 as soon as it can, given the urgency of replacing the Type 42s, but focus on getting what it really wants in the FSC later, from about 2012 onwards. The coincidence of the introduction of FSC with the new carriers, however, means funds are unlikely to be any more available then than now. There are two key roles in re-focusing surface combatants in a landward direction. One is land attack, the other extended air defence. For the moment the RN’s land attack capabilities reside in the nuclear attack submarines. However, these have limited weapon capacities and do not carry a VLS that most future land attack missiles are likely to require. The new carriers will be joint operating platforms with a predominant focus on operations over the land, but for a stand-off capability the RN would want to follow the USN’s example with a surface-launched capability. RN air defence ships always have had a role in the defence of the UK as well as ships at sea. The USN, previously unconcerned with air defence of assets ashore, has now taken on the theatre air defence mission with a vengeance. American Aegis air defence ships are getting an impressive capability to defend points ever-farther inland from both air-breathing and ballistic threats. For the UK, with an overtly expeditionary strategy, and not having a land-based medium-range surface-to-air missile, such a move is an obvious one. However, both land-orientated tasks raise the important issue of the choice of VLS. PAAMS includes the French Sylver system that at present takes only the Aster missile. Sylver meets the existing PAAMS requirement but no more. A wider role for the Type 45 would require the substitution of the larger and more expensive – but much more flexible – Lockheed Martin Mk41 VLS. This may also have to await the introduction of the FSC. Despite these delays and shortfalls, however, the Type 45 clearly will be a much more capable air defence system than its predecessor the Type 42 and represents a new level of air defence capability for the Royal Navy. ©
		Concept drawing of the new Type 45 destroyer
	"The RN’s air defence requires more assured cover over a wider area than the French or Italian"
	Originally, the Type 45 destroyer was required as an anti-air replacement for the Type 42, seen here in 1979