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The Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Force (JSDF) acquiredfour modified |
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Jeremy Stocker MA and Robin Ranger PhD examine why international sea-based ballistic missile defence programmes are larger and more effective than they appear at first glance |
Re-thinking ballistic |
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| The 1998 UK strategic defence review policy on British ballistic missile defence (BMD) deployment was, as stated at a 1998 Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) conference, a case of wait (a long time) and see. But in 1999, this policy came under increasing and responsible criticism.
From the Labour Party, the Chairman of the House of Commons Defence Committee, Bruce George MP, cautioned on BBC Radio 4 that, “Sooner or later – hopefully sooner – we’re going to have to get off the fence and co-operate with the Americans in developing such a [BMD] system”. From the Conservative Party, the Shadow Secretary of State for Defence, Ian Duncan-Smith MP, called for European BMD deployment in a speech to the Washington-based American Enterprise Institute. He warned: “to remain vulnerable to multiple missile threats from states with ruthless and unstable regimes, and to do so as a matter of policy, makes no sense whatever. I am glad that America now appears to be in the process of moving away from that position. I wish that in its own interests, Europe would emerge from its present mood of introspection to recognise the dangers that it faces”. Looking ahead, the UK-based missile proliferation study group is expected to publish its report in the near future. The group is bipartisan and chaired by Lord Chalfont, a former Labour cabinet minister and chairman of the all-party defence group in the House of Lords.
The British government does consider that there is a real threat to UK forces deployed overseas from potential attacks by weapons of mass destruction (WMD-armed missiles), though not yet to the UK itself. These forces could be protected perhaps most effectively by sea-based BMD. As William Graham, President Ronald Reagan’s science advisor, explained to a 1997 RUSI conference: “The UK is a sea-faring island nation. It ... is natural for you to consider a sea-based (BMD) capability. One that you can operate at home by pulling it back in toward the island or away if you deploy forces elsewhere”. United States Navy’s BMD plans Indeed, there is an increasing number of countries acquiring sea-based BMD systems or naval air defence systems with BMD potential. The large US sea-based BMD programmes have been analysed extensively, most recently in Sea-Based Ballistic Missile Defence (see below). To summarise, the United States Navy’s plan is to modify its existing and future Aegis cruisers and destroyers for BMD. Eventually, the USN will have as many as 79 of these. The Aegis combat system, with its associated SPY-1 passive phased array radar and standard SM-2 surface-to-air missiles, first entered service in 1983. Originally intended for the air defence of carrier battle groups, the performance of combat system, radar and missiles has been upgraded since and further improvements will take place over the next 10 years or so. These upgrades enhance the Aegis ships’ ability to counter existing and future air-breathing threats (aircraft and cruise missiles), and ballistic missiles. The BMD role is divided into lower and upper-tier defence. The lower tier capability will enter service from 2003 on, using the Standard SM-2 Block IVA missile. This navy area defence (NAD) capability will intercept ballistic targets in their final descent phase, within the lower half of the appreciable atmosphere, and provide protection to vital areas ashore such as ports, airfields and cities within range of the defending ship – up to about 100 nautical miles. The upper tier capability will be based on the new Standard SM-3 missile. This navy theatre-wide (NTW) system will be capable of ascent- and mid-course phase intercepts of ballistic targets outside the atmosphere, and in so doing will provide much wider protection (hence theatre-wide). NTW could be deployed from 2007 on, subject to a continuing test-and-development programme, and future funding decisions. It is competing with the US Army’s THAAD system to be the first upper tier system to be deployed, the other to follow later, perhaps by 2010. Sea-based BMD capability Until recently, no other nation had made a definite commitment to acquisition of a sea-based BMD capability, though a number have been pursuing land-based capabilities for some years. However, several countries have, or are acquiring, new-generation naval air defence ships with varying degrees of adaptability to the BMD task. A BMD requirement is moreover being recognised by a greater number of governments every year.
Most notable of these is Japan. The Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Force (JMSDF) acquired four modified, licence-built Arleigh Burke-class Aegis destroyers between 1993 and 1998. Though not originally intended for BMD, these ships were built expressly with the air defence of Japan in mind, as well as of naval task forces at sea. The potential ballistic missile threat from North Korea and China is very evident to the Japanese, and was highlighted by the North Korean test-firing of a Taepo-Dong missile over Japan itself on 31 August 1998. A year later, the Japanese government signed an agreement with the US providing for joint development of the Block II variant of the SM-3 missile. According to threat characteristics and ship stationing in relation to launch-point, just one or two of these ships could protect all the Japanese home islands, according to modelling already done in the US. Japan is also acquiring from the US the land-based Patriot PAC-3 missile for a lower-tier BMD capability. Unorthodox intimidation Given that Japan is separated from all possible ballistic threat origins, it is a textbook example of the utility of naval BMD systems. This is true also of Taiwan. In 1995 and again the following year, mainland China conducted several test firings of M-9 ballistic missiles into waters adjacent to Taiwan. The intended coercive effect was evident, if largely unsuccessful, and was described by the International Institute for Strategic Affairs in London as: “unorthodox attempts to intimidate Taiwan”. The nationalist Chinese government of the island was already concerned by China’s forthcoming acquisition of advanced ex-Russian destroyers with supersonic sea-skimming cruise missiles. To this worry was now added that of missile diplomacy, or even actual use of ballistic missiles against Taiwan, in some future crisis. The government of Taiwan therefore has requested the sale of four US-built Aegis destroyers to meet both air defence needs, a request that is likely to be met. Taiwan is also acquiring both indigenously produced and American Patriot land-based BMD systems. South Korea is also building Aegis ships, this time to an indigenous design called KDX-3. For the moment, South Korea does not foresee a BMD role for these ships. Once in service, however, a modest adaptation of missile and radar systems would allow them to take on that role. Europe awakes? In Europe, BMD efforts are rather more tentative; perhaps because the region has not seen the dramatic use of ballistic missiles that has taken place in the middle and far east – at least not since the German use of V-2s in 1944-5. The NATO alliance as a whole, and many of its individual members, have studied, and continue to study, BMD issues. There have been no high-profile announcements of missile defence policies, but nonetheless several nations are now acquiring land and sea-based air defence systems with BMD potential. In a number of cases acquisition of a BMD capability is expressly an option for the near future. Spain is building four F-100 class air defence frigates based around the US-supplied Aegis/SPY-1/Standard combination. The Spanish Navy had stated: “Although TBMD is considered to be a future capability, we’re taking all necessary measures so that in future it can be added ... at minimum expense”. This appears to be an eminently sensible approach for any country not yet ready to make a strong political commitment to BMD. The German and Dutch navies are pursuing a trilateral frigate co-operation (TFC) project for new air defence ships. This loose collaborative project that may be a model for future international ventures, will produce two very different designs, but based on a common anti-air warfare system. Though Spain, an original partner, has decided to opt instead for an American system, it still collaborates with the other countries in other areas. The TFC also will use the Standard SM-2 missile, and the BMD-capable Block IVA version is stated by both navies to be an option for the future. The ships have a Dutch combat system, however, and a Signal active phased array radar (APAR). An active array has substantial advantages over the earlier passive arrays such as SPY-1 in terms of reduced signal loss in both transmitter and receiver resulting in better detection ranges and target discrimination. The USN is likely to follow this lead in future. Both countries also are upgrading their existing Patriot batteries to PAC-3 standard to give them a land-based capability. Project Horizon The other collaborative naval air defence programme in Europe was Project Horizon. With British withdrawal from the project early in 1999, France and Italy continue with plans to procure jointly new AAW ships. These, like the British Type 45, will be based around PAAMS, the principal anti-air missile system (see Jeremy Stocker’s related article on the Royal Navy’s new Type 45 destroyer). PAAMS is an all-European system. It is superior in many respects to American systems in its intended role, defence of ships against high-performance cruise missiles, particularly through its use of highly agile active-homing Aster 15 and Aster 30 missiles. The penalty is that, with the exception of the multi-function radars (MFRs), the various PAAMS components have rather less potential, at present at least, for the BMD task. The Aster 30 missile does come in a Block II variant with a lower tier BMD capability, but this is at present planned for land-based use only by France and Italy as part of the SAMP/T system. Obviously it could go to sea and with a larger booster as well (Aster 45) could have a lower tier capability approaching that of Standard SM2 Block IVA. Currently there are no plans for an upper-tier variant, development of which would be likely to be expensive. Moreover, the selection of the French Sylver vertical launch system (VLS) for PAAMS gives much less flexibility than its American alternative, the Mk41. Selection of the latter would be necessary for the UK ships in particular to embark Standard, or indeed Tomahawk land-attack missiles, in the future. Italy also is upgrading two existing air defence ships, this time with the Standard SM-2 missile. It is also a partner, with Germany and the US, in the much-troubled MEADS land-based BMD system. France apparently prefers to rely on the nuclear deterrent effect of the Force de Frappe, but is getting a limited land-based BMD capability with SAMP/T. This leaves the UK’s current position looking increasingly isolated, especially as regards the protection of deployed forces. In the absence of a land-based surface-to-air missile, and in view of its expeditionary strategy, adaptation of the Type 45 destroyer to BMD is an obvious option. Within about 10 years, more than 110 ships, three quarters of them American, will be at sea with a BMD role and capability, or with the potential for adaptation to the task. An increasing number of governments are recognising the need to address this growing asymmetric threat. One can only hope that the UK soon will be among them. © The issues covered in this article are analysed in detail in Jeremy Stocker, Sea-Based ballistic Missile Defence, Centre for Defence and International Security Studies (CDISS), University of Lancaster (January, 2000). Full details can be found at: www.cdiss.org, or from CDISS, Cartmel College, University of Lancaster, LA1 4YL, UK. |
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