100mm Compact Mk2 naval turret on Malaysian frigate
	Dr Greg Mills examines the maritime security requirements of nations bordering the Indian Ocean Rim basin
			Maritime security building in the Indian Ocean Rim
			Last September the South African government boosted the capabilities of the 90,000-strong South African national defence force (SANDF) by agreeing to purchase three Type 209-class submarines, four Meko corvettes, nine Gripen fighter-aircraft, 30 Augusta light utility helicopters and 12 Hawk jet-trainers in a R23bn procurement package. Clearly Pretoria regards maritime security as important, especially the Indian Ocean Rim (IOR) basin. The IOR region The IOR is one of the largest and potentially most attractive of the regional identities that has emerged since the end of the cold war. It comprises a market of 1.8 billion people with a combined GNP of US$1.5 trillion. The IOR process is the product of a coincidence of international, regional and domestic events. These include a growing global trend towards regionalism; the emergence of a liberal international trading environment with the conclusion of the GATT Uruguay round and the establishment of the World Trade Organisation; the adoption of market-based economic policies by an increasing number of countries including the 920 million people of India; the end of apartheid and of South Africa’s international isolation; the conclusion of the cold war and the collapse of socialism in the Soviet bloc; and the emergence of a range of new security concerns, centred around the environment and trans-national criminal issues. There are, however, a number of problems with this approach that, paradoxically, require and yet make more difficult, security interaction. First, the IOR process is currently split between an inter-governmental initiative and so-called second-track diplomacy. The 14-nation Indian Ocean Rim association for regional co-operation (IOR-ARC) that was established in March 1997 in Mauritius, represents the formal inter-governmental group. This initiative, led by South Africa, Australia and India, was the result of dialogue begun in 1995. Current members are Australia, India, Kenya, Mauritius, Oman, Singapore, South Africa, Indonesia, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Yemen, Tanzania, Madagascar and Mozambique. IOR-ARC summits are now staged at a ministerial level every two years. At the same time, two parallel second-track meetings are held – the IOR Academic Group (IORAG) and the IOR Business Forum (IORBF). Second, within the IOR-ARC, there has been much debate about the definition of the region and the eligibility of candidates and the means whereby they may seek membership. The principal problem resides around Pakistan’s status given the key role played by India in the association. A workable balance between an inclusive approach to membership expansion and organisational practicality needs to be found. Third, related to the above, there has been a debate about whether security issues should be included or excluded from the ambit of the IOR-ARC. Both areas have proven sensitive given the nature of the Indian-Pakistan relationship. This issue was exacerbated by the Indian nuclear tests in May 1998 and the Pakistani response, and more recently by the military coup in Pakistan that brought General Pervez Musharraf to power. Despite these problems of definition and diversity, the IOR initiative contains a number of explicit advantages, including: It constitutes an important initiative for regional and global co-operation, through the facilitation of free trade and investment flows. It counters the risk of marginalisation of IOR states as a major geographic region without a substantial economic grouping. It provides a means for closer relations (and, potentially, greater access) to the previously closed Indian market. Finally, it encompasses a set of wider concerns, beyond trade and investment facilitation, that are shared by states of the Indian Ocean. Given its oceanic foundations, Rim states should be especially concerned with maritime linkages and vulnerabilities. USS Kitty Hawk (CV-63) Naval (in)capacity As the table opposite indicates, the levels of staffing and equipment among the navies of the littoral states of the IOR vary dramatically. Few of the littoral states possess principal or sub-surface combatants. The majority of IOR navies consist of patrol and amphibious craft with a few corvettes; and only some of these are armed with modern missiles. Among these, Australia has maintained a modern, credible naval force, unsurprising given its circumstances and the natural protection offered by its strategic geography. Indeed, in the recent past the maritime flavour of Australia’s defence has been emphasised. The Dibb Report of 1986 stressed the importance of maintaining the security of the maritime environment in the face of the expected numerical superiority of opposing ground forces. The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) has benefited from the procurement of six Anzac-class frigates and six Collins-class submarines. India’s ambitions to be a determinant player in the Indian Ocean and among the countries of the south, has been supported, in part, by the size and strength of its naval forces. The acquisition process has involved a mix of local procurement (often with Soviet/Russian technological assistance), as well as purchases from abroad. In May 1998 the Indian Navy ordered three Krivak 3 frigates from Russia, and at the start of the year took delivery of its ninth Russian Kilo 877-class submarine. Two Type 209 submarines are due to be delivered in 2003 and 2005 respectively. The Indian Navy has, however, experienced major financial difficulties. Around 50 per cent of scheduled refits had to be postponed in 1997 due to a resource crisis, with less than 30 per cent of ships serviced on time. The cost of replacing items of naval hardware deemed essential such as frigates, submarines and the aircraft carrier (as a replacement for the decommissioned INS Vikrant), was estimated at around $5.4 billion, though the Indian capital budget for 1996/7 was around just $71.8 million. The difficulties in the production of the INS Delhi, the first of three indigenously built 6,500-tonne destroyers that was finally commissioned in November 1997, 10 years after work started, is indicative of the financial plight. The Pakistani Navy has followed the course taken by a number of south American nations, preferring to purchase secondhand equipment. With its force structure aimed at countering the perceived Indian threat, the Pakistan Navy has, over the past decade, acquired secondhand six Type 21-class frigates and two Leander-class frigates from the UK. These vessels are complemented by a combination of French, Chinese and US equipment. Three new Agosta-class submarines are on order, with the third to be produced entirely in Pakistan. Indonesia has taken an unusual acquisition route, purchasing no less than 39 former East German craft in 1992. Although the cost of modernising these vessels and providing infrastructure support is estimated at US$1.1 billion, major operational difficulties have arisen, relating partly to spares problems. By comparison, the Royal Malaysian Navy has planned an extensive re-equipment and upgrade programme including the offshore patrol vessel project (for up to 27 vessels), delivery of four Assad/Laksamana-class and two UK-built Lekiu-class corvettes, plus the possible purchase of up to three submarines.
	Gripens of the South African airforce will soon beon patrol over the Indian Ocean
			Addressing (in)security Some have suggested that IOR-ARC security issues should best be left to UN structures. Others have proposed that a model of the Asian Regional Forum (ARF) be used to manage the comprehensive IOR security agenda in a manner that does not inhibit economic growth. Given the sensitivities that exist in the IOR, security co-operation probably will have to involve a two-stage search process, first for areas of common interest, and second for mutually acceptable approaches to addressing those interests. Any security interaction will have to be handled in a manner that does not threaten nor upset the IOR-ARC process. Conversely, if security issues are not addressed, they could undermine the initiative. The maritime-naval domain offers a benign, least-threatening catalyst for regional security co-operation. The importance of maritime-naval co-operation is underscored by the extent of regional inter-dependence, the need for good governance, as well as the potential for disputes and illegal activities. Given the dependency on fishing and other marine resources of many of these states, EEZ management and policing can be regarded as critical. This link with the maritime domain is underscored by the importance of sea-trade to these economies. Here the bi-annual Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) could provide a useful model to follow in the IOR. Initiated in 1988, the WPNS is aimed at creating an environment to assist in building confidence and enhancing co-operation through, inter alia, personnel contacts, transparency, exchange of fleet programmes, observation and prior notification of fleet exercises, seminars, prevention of incidents at sea, joint training and exercises, information sharing, port visits, the creation of a maritime information exchange directory (MIED) as a means of providing time-critical information, and the exchange of information on naval procurement and retirement programmes. If the Indian Ocean Rim process is to develop further, it is clear that its members will have to build on non-controversial areas of common concern. Greater regional engagement could follow on from the development of naval and functional maritime links. ©