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Humphrey Crum Ewing, Research Fellow at the Centre for Defence and International Security Studies at Lancaster University, outlines the British approach to the proliferation of ballistic and cruise missiles and of weapons of mass destruction |
The British view on |
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| It is of interest to look at the British view, as distinct from a United States, allied or international view, of the proliferation of ballistic and cruise missiles and of weapons of mass destruction and of responses to these. The route to the British view is by way of a series of stepping stones: Where should it be sought? What does Britain perceive as its contribution to diplomatic efforts towards non-proliferation as distinct from counter-proliferation? What are the distinctions between the British view and other views? What is Britain looking to do, by way of self-defence and to add force to its diplomatic efforts in this respect?
Where to begin? We should begin perhaps in 1993 with the government’s decision to commission a pre-feasibility and other studies, into what countermeasures could be taken. This was well described in the 1995 Statement on the Defence Estimates. The new government of 1997, and before that Michael Portillo when he succeeded Malcolm Rifkind as secretary of state, moved this concern onto the back-burner. And it was of real concern to many that the threat received so little attention in the Strategic Defence Review published in July 1998. Very recently however a new awareness has emerged. With hindsight this can be seen to have been foreshadowed in papers by Jon Day, Director of Defence Policy, Ministry of Defence (MoD) and Dr Michael Rance Director of Science (Ballistic Missile Defence), Ministry of Defence, given at the RUSI/CDISS Conference in September 1998. More specifically in July 1999 George Robertson, then the Secretary of State for Defence, told the House of Commons that the MoD had set up a new Central Staff Directorate in the Ministry of Defence to co-ordinate and take forward further work on nuclear biological and chemical defence issues. At the same time he announced the establishment of a joint NBC Regiment and an NBC Headquarters, and the publication of Defending against the threat of biological and chemical weapons. We now know that this Central Staff Directorate is where the British view presently will be found, subject always to how this unit fits into the MoD’s structure, and we know too that the MoD is seeking in its publication a way of alerting the public to the reality of new threats without being alarmist. Next, on 26 July 1999, in an answer to an opposition question, Robertson released unclassified texts, dated June 1998, of the UK ballistic missile defence (BMD) pre-feasibility programme (PFP) that started in November 1994 and was completed in August 1996. So the MoD can be perceived as having fortified its lead position (in relation to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO)) on counter-proliferation. But government, as analytical outside observers are sometimes reminded, is a seamless web with everyone, including the prime minister and the cabinet office, singing from the same hymn sheet, even if they can sometimes be heard to sing different words to the same tune. Non- or/and counter-proliferation? Given the fundamental political attitudes of this government, we should take into account the question of what does Britain perceive as its contribution to international diplomatic effort towards non-proliferation, as distinct from the more military processes of counter-proliferation. Without going into detail this may be summed up as having two main lines. One is through permanent membership of the UN Security Council and working to make it more effective. The other is through adhesion to a range of specific agreements, contributions to their work and positive pressure to make them work better and more effectively. British views and other views Although the British position differs at a number of significant points from that of our ally, the US, our European neighbours and those of other countries, it also includes a number of significant similarities. Differences from US views include, for instance, the opposite positions taken by an all-party majority in the House of Commons, and a blocking group in the US Congress over the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Differences from the US views further reflect a systemic difference in our respective intelligence appraisals of the likelihood and effective extent of proliferation. We share a common apprehension of the dangers, but we attach a lower probability to them. Compared with our European allies, however, we take a more concerned view about the reality of the missile threat, while the mainstream of British opinion, although certainly not every cross current, regards missile defence as being, in principle, a stabilising factor rather than the destabilising factor some others elsewhere in the world would argue it to be. British action on missile defence We then come to the next question: What is Britain looking to do by way of self-defence and to add force to its diplomatic efforts in this respect? The clues, and they are no more than that, are to be found in the pre-feasibility study documents previously mentioned, and in provisional costings and projected in-service dates. These are found in three separate documents produced by the government’s Defence Evaluation and Research Agency (DERA), not by the contractors for the project. PFS: statement of work This was prepared by the MoD to direct the UK BMD Pre-Feasibility Study. It extends to 60 pages, including a four-page contents index at the beginning and a five-page glossary at the end, and is divided into 25 sections each with between two and, in one case, 13 sub-sections. Although it is not explicitly stated, this document, notwithstanding that the unclassified published version is dated June 1998, may be taken to be in substantially the same terms as the original classified version of the requirements document endorsed in 1993. The classified version had wide circulation within the MOD and so, despite the disclaimer, probably reflects policy assessments within the MoD at that date, i.e. some six years ago. PFS: report This report was prepared by the MoD for information and guidance. It extends to 42 pages, of which one is deliberately blank and of which six constitute a glossary of acronyms, plus four introductory pages, another one of which is deliberately blank. It is divided into 140 numbered paragraphs arranged in eight chapters that are not sub-divided. PFS: executive summary This was prepared by the MoD also for information and guidance. Its four pages are divided into 18 numbered paragraphs, three with sub-paragraphs, arranged under six headings: background, requirement; aim; methodology; findings; conclusion. The costings The study concluded, on the basis of modelling work undertaken, that: a) the defence of deployed forces [against ballistic missiles] could be provided; b) this would require both an upper-layer architecture and a lower-layer architecture, with the lower layer designed to intercept within the earth’s atmosphere (endo-atmospheric) and the upper layer being designed to intercept at the edge of that atmosphere or beyond it (exo-atmospheric); c) the acquisition cost for these two architectures taken together would be between £1.4 bn and £2.6 bn to acquire and between £45 million and £90 million annually to support and operate; d) that satisfactory [emphasis added] defence against attacks on the UK would be possible; e) such homeland defence also would require two layers of architecture – lower and upper; f) in the case of homeland defence the lower level would be at the edge of the atmosphere or slightly beyond it (endo/exo atmospheric) and upper level beyond that (exo-atmospheric); g) the homeland defence systems would cost a separate £2.1 to £2.3 billion to acquire and approximately £60 to £65 million a year to operate and support; h) there was a possibility, but no more, that defence for deployed forces and for the homeland could be provided together for a total cost of slightly less than the cost of the two systems separately; i) the study had not found a system that could perform both roles simultaneously; j) costs within brackets would depend on particular system(s) chosen. Possible in-service dates The earliest in-service dates would be: Deployed forces:
Homeland defence:
Proviso Many BMD weapons systems [as assessed by the study] are still in development and have not yet been tested in action. The British view, in short So what then, to come to our destination, is the British view of how best to respond to the threat from the proliferation of ballistic missiles and how best to counter it? From research and analysis in which I and others have undertaken I believe that it is something like this: (1) The present government and its advisers distinguish between the threat to deployed forces from weapons of mass destruction delivered by ballistic missiles and any such threat to the homeland. (2) The former, that to deployed forces, they now recognise as real and immediate. (3) They do not yet see the possible future threat to the homeland as being as real, and they certainly do not see it as so immediate. (4) There is a new determination on the part of the government to alert informed opinion and the public more widely to the extent and nature of future threats. (5) The government is concerned to convey this warning as fairly and as accurately as possible, if only to gather the necessary popular support from taxpayers and electors for undertaking such precautions as they – the government and its advisers – may come to see as appropriate. But with this goes a considered intention to avoid causing undue alarm. This involves walking a tightrope. (6) In this scheme of things non-proliferation is the preferred path, the first objective. The Foreign Office and diplomatic procedures of one sort or another have the lead on this. Diplomacy, in this respect, includes defence diplomacy in the strict sense of that term as defined in the Strategic Defence Review. But the military also have a further contribution to make through their role in verification and through defence intelligence. (7) Counter-proliferation, in its various forms, comes next – a necessary adjunct. In this the MoD has the lead responsibility but the FCO also has a major role to play. (8) That said, non-proliferation activity is an essential element within the counter-proliferation package as a whole. Both are required; they are not alternatives. (9) But most important of all is the message that the government sends out, or rather the perceptions that British signals generate among potential opponents. We should not forget that it was General Galtieri’s belief, nourished by signals British ministers and officials put out, that we would not fight for the Falklands, that led him to invade them. (10) Hence the importance of the signal that George Robertson, as the British Secretary of State for Defence and now NATO Secretary General, gave out when he published the MoD’s CBW document that I mentioned above: “No potential adversary should believe that the use of, or threatened use of, biological or chemical weapons would determine the outcome of a conflict or deter this government from taking action it believes is right.” If I may say so, he got it absolutely right. © |
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"Differences from the US views further reflect a systemic difference in our respective intelligence appraisals of the likelihood and effective extent of proliferation" |
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