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The developing imbalance between tank armour in its many new guises and |
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Anti-tank firepower |
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| The development in armour protection that has taken place in recent years and especially during the 90s has raised serious questions about the effectiveness of many existing anti-tank guns and anti-tank guided weapons. Their deficiencies are becoming more and more obvious. Vulnerable to interference and with penetration capability that has difficulty keeping up with developments in armour protection is symptomatic of a weakness that calls for a remedy.
Until this development took place the infantry’s anti-tank armament was considered capable of knocking out any main battle tank (MBT) or other armoured fighting vehicle (AFV) on the battlefield. But with the introduction of supplementary armour, explosive reactive armour (ERA), inert reactive armour (IRA), multi-layer armour and other forms of special armour, it has become doubtful whether man-portable, medium- range, anti-tank weapons have the capacity to penetrate the protecting armour with enough residual (behind armour) effect.
On the battlefield there are a wide variety of targets continuously presenting different attitudes to the weapon site. In offence the armoured fighting vehicles will move fast to their objects. In defence the vehicles will be in defilade or move between prepared defilade positions. These targets are difficult to engage and kill because they move fast or because of the small vertical area exposed. Targets crossing at high speed and/or at very close range are also difficult to hit and disable immediately. All these disadvantages of medium-range, anti-tank systems are advantages to the tank crew and are frequently utilised to avoid being hit by anti-tank weapons. Armoured fighting vehicles The end of the cold war and the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, makes the likelihood of a major confrontation involving mass tanks less likely in Europe or elsewhere. Desert Storm was the last confrontation involving heavy tank forces. The hyper-powered, hyper-protected and hyper-mobile MBT is designed for both assault and defence operations. Its large main calibre gun can deliver accurate fire at long range and the vehicle has good ballistic protection. Cross-country capability is effective even on soft ground. Main battle tanks continue to evolve. There are thousands still in service around the world in spite of the political situation and desire for disarmament. Armour protection will increase, making them even tougher for man-portable anti-tank weapons to defeat. Their fire-power and calibre also will increase with guns up to 140mm. Within the existing 105-120mm smoothbore gun there will be an improvement of the ammunition. The main battle tank will remain the foremost among equals in the combined arms team of the future with its firepower, survival and combat mobility on the modern battlefield. Improved variants of operational MBTs around the world such as M1A2, Leopard 2A5, Challenger 2, T-90S and the Russian Black Eagle will act as force multipliers through the digitisation of the future battlefield. The weight of MBTs has increased to 65 tonnes that many experts regard as the limit. Infantry-fighting vehicles The MBTs normally are supported by IFVs/APCs at close range to keep away the infantry. The fire-power of the IFVs/APCs has grown. Rapid-fire guns up to a calibre of 100mm have replaced the small- calibre machine guns. The IFVs also carry anti-tank missiles. A modern IFV/AFV is a small tank with very good cross-country capability even on soft ground and the speed is higher than MBTs. Older APCs have been provided with turrets holding 30mm chain-guns. The protection of the IFVs/AFVs also has been improved but does not comprise the same protection suits as MBTs. Today IFVs are more like light tanks transporting a number of soldiers than a battlefield taxi. IFVs take a more active role on the battlefield than previously when they followed MBTs ready to take over the captured ground. The weight of IFVs has increased to 32 tonnes. So the questions arise. Will the world see new MBTs and IFVs in the near future? Or is it enough to update existing AFV fleets? Could an advanced helicopter be a third element on the battlefield and fight more closely with the AFV? Future conflicts probably will be affairs in which rapid response is mandatory. This means that the requirements of new MBTs must be more deployable to reduce the build-up and preparation periods. The heavy MBTs indicated above cannot be used with the requirement also stated above. These MBTs must be transported by sea, train or heavy truck to the scene of action, and such transportation takes time. Any increase in deployability must not be achieved at the expense of lethality, survivability or sustainability. The next generation MBTs could capitalise a revolutionary and bold design emphasising a fully integrated, multi-mission, self-sustaining war machine. In the first Chechnya campaign the Russians lost 225-250 armoured fighting vehicles, mostly APCs/IFVs. The heavily protected BMP-2s were rolling coffins. The losses suffered by mounted mechanised infantry units left a huge impression on the Russian military. Any new infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) would have vastly improved armour protection as its design priority. In the 1982 war in Lebanon, inadequately protected Israeli mechanised infantry suffered many combat casualties. The results of these losses were both dissatisfaction with the M113 APC and the development of a new requirement for a more heavily armoured assault carrier. The BTR-T (BoneTransporter Tank) is a result of a significant need. It is based on a turretless, heavily modified T-55 MBT hull, weighs 38.5 tons (6.5 tons more than the T-55 tank), carries five infantrymen and the vehicle’s two-man crew. The new BTR-T is fitted with the same Kontakt-5 explosive reactive armour (ERA) that protects the Russian MBTs. The protection level against chemical energy ammunition has increased from the equivalent of 200mm RHA to 800mm depending on angle of attack. It is an impressive vehicle. A very similar vehicle is the Israeli Achzarit heavy assault carrier (HAC) also based on a turretless heavily modified T-55 MBT hull. It weighs 44 tons, eight tons more than the standard MBT T55 and can carry seven infantrymen plus the vehicle’s three-man crew. 14 tons of the vehicle’s weight is advanced composite armour. Achzarit is also an impressive vehicle. This new design of IFV into HAC probably will be followed by other nations in the next generation of IFVs. Probability of engagement The probability of engagement is an environ-mental factor where general combat conditions are accounted for. Environmental factors influencing surveillance and the possibilities of target acquisition (for example visibility) include terrain features, flight path obstructions by solid objects, vegetation etc and target behaviour in terms of movements and concealment. All these factors are in relation to deployment conditions, time of flight, flight path, ground clearance, target area and time exposure and, equally important, the gunner’s ability to assess correctly these factors in time to open fire. The PE has been very much overlooked in the past because of peacetime training methods and lack of combat feedback. At the training ground targets are prepared, often full-size targets in an open flat field, where they are easily seen and easy to hit. The enemy on the other hand will do everything to avoid being engaged and hit by staying under cover for so long as possible, presenting a small target area, and by moving as fast as possible across open spaces and utilising the manoeuvrability of the tank. On the battlefield the perfectly flat ground will conceal enough depressions and ridges, hedgerows and fences to frustrate almost any gunner. Battle tanks in defilade are very difficult or impossible for horizontal-attacking missiles to hit and defeat. Tanks crossing at short ranges also are very difficult to engage with conventional missile systems. All these disadvantages of medium-range anti-tank missile systems are regarded as advantages by the tank crew and are frequently exploited to avoid being hit. © |
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