As with the CV(F), the combined operational effectiveness and investment appraisal (COEIA) process demands that other options be considered and contenders include the CTOL carrier version of the joint strike fighter (JSF), a navalised Eurofighter Typhoon fitted for STOBAR operations, the Dassault Rafale M, the Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, or even a further Harrier-based development. Of these, the Rafale is almost certainly politically-unacceptable, the F/A-18, even in its developed form, is an elderly design and the Harrier, that is approaching the end of its design life, is probably capable of accepting only limited further refinements.

As the largest warship to be laid down in a British yard since the end of World War II, a 30-40,000-ton CV(F) will pose something of a challenge to the British shipbuilding industry. Hermes, the last of the previous generation of medium-sized carriers, was completed in 1959 and now few shipyards have the capacity or requisite design and construction skills for a project of this size.

Only one naval shipbuilder, Vickers Shipbuilding and Engineering Ltd, a subsidiary of GEC-Marine, has the necessary facilities and recent experience of constructing large warships, in particular the RN's Ocean-class LPH, Albion-class LPD, and Wave-class Auxiliary Oiler programmes. VSEL is, therefore, a front-runner in the CV(F) competition. Alternative facilities, likely to be considered under the competitive-tendering process, are Belfast-based Harland & Wolff, the Tyneside Swan Hunter yard and Cammell Laird at Birkenhead. However, each has certain limitations in terms of draught, length or beam restrictions, or in the means of construction employed locally. Moreover, the latter two yards have been employed mostly on commercial refit and repair work in recent years. Much of their shipbuilding facilities have been retained on a care-and-maintenance basis only and their skilled workforce has been drastically reduced. While government policy mandates that the ship be built in a British facility, significant investment in yard infrastructure will be required whichever yard is selected.

Invitation to tender
Under the CV(F) COEIA process and in parallel with the forthcoming RASD studies, the MoD is also considering the feasibility of extending the life of two of the three existing Invincible-class CVS(G) from 2012 to 2022. An invitation to tender for the further special refit (FSR) study contract is likely to be made in the first quarter of 1999 with the work to be completed by year's end. Potential contractors might include Portsmouth-based Fleet Support Ltd, a joint venture between GEC-Marine Ltd, and Vosper Thornycroft Plc, and Babcock Defence Ltd in Rosyth. The FSR feasibility studies will address various issues including the costs of a life-extension refit; the operational costs of the converted vessels; adaptation costs to enable the ships to operate JSF-class aircraft; and an appropriate refit programme.

A similar study for a 30-year ship life-extension programme was undertaken by BAe-SEMA during the pre-feasibility stages of the CV(F) programme. A further option, the conversion of a merchant vessel, was abandoned at this stage as unsatisfactory on grounds of cost and operational effectiveness. It was concluded that the SLEP was technically risky on account of existing hull fatigue and the problems of inserting an additional hull section to increase capacity. Apparently, the hull may be cut safely at one point only and is disproportionately expensive given the limited capability improvement conferred by the SLEP modifications over a relatively short additional lifespan. While the CVS(G)s could be stretched, their comparatively narrow beam and constricted hangar layout would continue to pose operational problems and, moreover, would not provide the dramatic increase in air wing capacity offered by the larger new-build CV(F).

Adoption of the FSR option is, therefore, regarded as unlikely by both defence and industry officials and the significance of the study is being played down by both. However, it has been suggested that the MoD aims to utilise the study as a means of pre-empting Treasury pressure to accept the refit option by demonstrating at an early stage that the FSR is not a cost-effective solution to the CV(F) and capable of producing only short-term savings. Nevertheless, given the financially-vulnerable nature of the CV(F) programme as a single, indivisible outlay in an era of defence stringency, at least some opposition, particularly though not solely from the Treasury, probably can be anticipated.