GDR 99 - Missile Systems

The Imperative of Interoperability


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Top: US Army Patriot battery protects Israel during the 1991 Gulf War

By Dr J David Martin, deputy head of strategic relations at the US Ballistic Missile Defense Organisation (BMDO).

The current military strategies and doctrines of the US and its allies demand that we be prepared to fight in a seamless fashion, as a true coalition force. Missile defence, as learned in the Gulf War, brought profound changes in interoperability requirements among service and coalition-operated systems. The evolution of US ballistic missile defence (BMD) programmes, and the important progress made in international BMD acquisition programmes, reinforce the view that there is a need to focus now on the increasingly significant challenge of interoperability.

In the arena of battle management, the traditional boundaries between land, sea, air and space will be less important in future conflicts. Now we must think in terms of battlespace and in this battlespace all geographic environments are integrated. The US is acquiring lower- and upper-tier systems to provide defence in depth that are not owned by just one service. So, assuming the entire family of ground-based missile defence systems is fielded in the battle theatre, as the threat missiles approach their targets the army THAAD and the navy theatre-wide upper-tier systems might take them under fire. As the leakers continue on their ballistic path, the army PAC-3 and the navy area missile might then have a shot at them. The need for an integrated approach is self-evident just from a US-service perspective.

The US has taken important steps in recent years to ensure that its forces can operate efficiently and effectively together in this era of fully integrated battlespace. Most notably, BMDO shares responsibility with the Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense Organization (JTAMDO) set up by the Department of Defense (DoD) in the J-8 on the Joint Staff. This joint responsibility between JTAMDO and BMDO is intended to provide the joint force commanders with an improved capability to defend against air-breathing and ballistic missile threats.

The JTAMDO defines the required system interoperabilities and operational architectures and validates mission capabilities in co-ordination with the regional commanders-in-chiefs (CINCs) and the services. It is the CINCs not the services that are the principal constituency for the missile defence systems. JTAMDO was set up to process operational requirements from the CINCs. BMDO's role is to translate operational architectures into system architectures and to lead programme acquisition activities in co-ordination with the services.


US Army Patriot battery arrives in Israel during the Gulf War

Meeting future missile defence requirements demands a combination of weapons, sensors, and battle management, command, control, communications, and computer and intelligence assets (BMC4I) on land, at sea and in the air and space. The requirements highlight a need to achieve jointness among the services and also a level of co-operation among allies and friends that will allow for effective combined force operations. Acquisition that involves the army, navy, air force and marines, dialogue with battlefield commanders and allies, and participation in joint and combined exercises as BMD systems evolve puts us on the path to deploying interoperable missile defences for the benefit of the coalition warfighter.

Military thinking and doctrines reflect a growing emphasis on co-operation in theatre air and missile defence (TAMD) operations during regional contingencies where the US, its allies and friends could be deployed together against a common adversary possessing theatre ballistic missiles.

Interoperability, broadly understood, means people, procedures and equipment operating in sync, effectively and efficiently under all the stressful conditions of the battlefield to ensure the success of military strategy. US national security strategy holds that the nation's armed forces must be prepared to project power into any region of the world where the US has interests to defend.

Extended battlespace


USAF radar provides support during a NATO BMD exercise in Turkey

The US, therefore, has the burden of bringing to distant theatres a dynamic military capability comprising weapons and associated BMC4I systems that will work together seamlessly among the services of the US armed forces and must also be integrated in an efficient manner into the sensors and command centres of friends and allies. It is not an exaggeration to say that the probability of deploying effective missile defences is directly tied to the ability to achieve a high level of interoperability. The ability to share early warning and cueing data via netted sensor systems and interlinked command centres will be a basic requirement in the quest to deliver timely, reliable and accurate missile defence capabilities to tomorrow's warfighter.

Why is interoperability important? By netting systems with the systems of friends and allies, the battlespace for engaging enemy ballistic missiles effectively is being extended. The missile threat is becoming more complex as it grows in number, extends in range, arrives from all azimuths, and exploits a growing number of countermeasure technologies. This complexity will require the engagement envelope to be enlarged through the deployment of interceptor systems that provide wide-area defences and multi-shot engagement opportunities.

Interoperability will demand operational flexibility. The ability to achieve this will rest primarily on the ability to develop and exercise a joint plug-and-fight C3 capability. The assets brought to the theatre of battle are mixed and will change as the conflict progresses through different phases. We must be able to integrate and co-ordinate all available service and allied theatre air and missile defence assets.


Dutch Patriot battery in training on a NATO exercise

The theatre air and missile defence mission also is highly information intensive. Proper system netting and the establishment of a joint integrated kill chain will be a significant factor in performance. The integrated kill chain concept begins with detection capabilities with netted surveillance systems carrying out the functions of searching, detecting, tracking and handover. Further up the chain is the decision link, and this is where the command centres must rely heavily on deployed BMC4I capabilities. The ability to quickly and seamlessly process the data streaming into the centres will help commanders achieve the required level of battlespace awareness, assess and identify the threat, and assign and release a weapon to attack the threat.

The last link in the kill chain concept is the engagement. Following the decision to intercept the threat missile, there must be the capability to track the missile accurately and to accomplish interceptor handover and seeker acquisition of the target. There are a number of technical, training and operational issues that will have to be addressed. Interface standards must be established with allies. Allied BMD acquisition strategies will have to include procedures that will ensure compatibility with systems of the US and other potential coalition partners. Joint and combined air and missile defence exercises provide an invaluable tool for scoping and assessing the importance of interoperability to successful warfighting. The US participates in a number of such exercises, that, when done realistically, can provide answers to at least some technical, training and operational questions.

Weaving together expertise


Link: BMDO

Joint Project Optic Windmill is a Dutch national exercise conducted by the Royal Netherlands Air Force that is supported by the US, Germany, the UK, Denmark and NATO. The third Optic Windmill exercise, that took place in May 1998, sought to provide a realistic interactive tactical ballistic and cruise missile simulation environment for the deployed joint theatre air and missile defence forces and their command and control organisations. This was the first opportunity for the Dutch navy to participate in a joint exercise with a theatre ballistic missile (TBM) threat.

The successful exercise raised new issues relevant to interoperability, including the need to determine cruise missile rules of engagement, assess kill probability for different TMBs, and establish multinational command-and-control structures. Problems involving equipment incompatibilities during the exercises also may be uncovered.

A separate opportunity involving a NATO live fly exercise encompassing air and theatre missile defence, called Central Enterprise 98, was conducted in June 1998. A key objective was to make the TAMD mission a part of normal operations in central Europe. Interestingly, a US AEGIS ship participated in Central Enterprise and is part of a growing trend to exercise land and sea-based forces together. Among the lessons learned were that link connectivity and interoperability among forces need improvement because of non-standard message formats, unstable networks, and information lost through conversion. NATO air defence procedures may be too slow for effective TAMD operations and there was inadequate protection against fratricide. Early warning did not adequately support NATO's requirements. These findings will help defence planners standardise coalition TAMD procedures, enhance situational awareness and improve sensor-to-shooter information.

Roving Sands 98 is yet another example of a field-training exercise intended to enhance joint and combined interoperability. Held in April 1998 in the deserts of western Texas and New Mexico, Roving Sands participants executed a fictitious scenario designed to assist planners assess challenges associated with planning, establishing and operating a joint integrated air defence system. These exercises are exceedingly useful opportunities for the exchange of experience among nations that one day may be in battle together. In addition to reconciling the competing interests of the services, BMDO has the added challenge of weaving into its acquisition plans the warfighting and industrial expertise and technologies of US allies. International co-operation that is structured to get the right equipment into the field and support the level of interoperability needed for modern joint and coalition warfare will allow BMDO to leverage allied government investments. Such co-operation also results in the necessary interoperability and builds the alliance cohesion essential for fighting together efficiently as one team.

BMDO has a history of co-operating with allies and friends on the development of BMD technologies, components and systems. We welcomed Secretary of Defense Cohen's March 1997 directive recognising that international armaments co-operation is a key component of the DoD bridge to the 21st century. Given the evolving environment of coalition warfare, limited resources and a global industrial and technology base, it is now DoD policy to co-operate internationally to the maximum extent feasible, "consistent with sound business practice and with the overall political, economic, technological, and national security goals of the US".

The monumental task is clear. Because our strategy envisions fighting as part of a coalition, interoperability must be the watchword. If we do not continue on the path toward interoperability, eventually we will have incompatible equipment and incompatible doctrine. BMDO intends to enhance security and improve coalition warfighting capabilities by ensuring that TAMD systems deployed by allies are interoperable with those fielded by US forces, thereby helping to secure forces and homelands against a growing and increasingly ominous missile challenge.