This acceleration in proliferation was analysed in two major international conferences, organised by the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies (RUSI) and the National Institute of Public Policy (NIPP), the latter with a keynote address by the former British Prime Minster, The Rt. Hon. the Baroness Thatcher. (1) Both conferences also considered how the US and its allies in Europe, the Middle East and Asia could counter these proliferation threats, including by deploying missile defences.

This analysis summarises the three most important findings to emerge from these conferences. First, in the next five years the rate of missile and WMD proliferation will be much faster than previously expected. Second, an increasing number of western missile defence systems will be available to help counter these threats. Third, the UK Strategic Defence Review (SDR) policy of deploying British expeditionary forces without their own missile defences will need to be reviewed.

Rumsfeld Commission findings

Then, in August 1998, North Korea test fired a missile that reportedly travelled 1,300km/806 miles and passed over north-eastern Japan before falling into the Pacific Ocean. There has been considerable debate as to whether this missile was a Taepo Dong 1 medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) a two-stage missile (stage one is a Nodong MRBM and stage two is a Scud C SRBM) with a range of 2.000km/1,240 miles or a Taepo Dong space launch vehicle (SLV), a Taepo Dong 1 MRBM with an added third stage intended to put a satellite in orbit. But whichever missile was tested, this test shows that North Korea has mastered the complex technology of multi-staging and may mean that it also has a SLV.

Pyongyang has thus cleared a major technical barrier to developing the Taepo Dong 2, a larger, follow-on, two-stage ICBM (estimated range 6,000km / 3,720 miles), enabling it, as the commission noted, to target parts of the US. Meanwhile, since North Korea sees its missile programmes as a means of acquiring weapons of strategic intimidation and making desperately needed hard currency export sales Taepo Dong 1 exports to the Middle East must now be expected. If Libya acquired Taepo Dong 1s it would pose new and serious threats to NATO population centres and interests along the southern flank. To make matters worse, the North Korean nuclear threat had re-emerged. By December it seemed increasingly likely that Pyonyang was speeding up its development of nuclear weapons in violation of the 1994 Agreed Framework it had negotiated with the US while preparing for another Taepo Dong 1 test.

Missile defenses
These increases in missile threats were driving increased US and allied efforts to develop and deploy missile defence systems. The projected timelines for the deployment of these systems over the next 10 years are shown in Table 2, that also notes two important developments. One is that in October 1998 the Greek government decided to purchase two US-manufactured systems each able to defend against attacks by ballistic missiles and air-breathing systems (aircraft and cruise missiles): the Patriot PAC-3 and the Improved Hawk III. Greece would thus become the third European NATO member to deploy Patriots. Germany and the Netherlands deploy the Patriot PAC-2 and both are now procuring PAC-3 ground equipment and appear committed to procuring PAC-3 missiles when available. The other development was that Israel began deploying the Arrow 2 anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system developed in collaboration with the US (the US pays some 70 per cent of the costs of development). The Arrow 2 was the first western dedicated ABM system (it cannot defend against air-breathing systems) and in 1998 the US agreed to fund an additional third Arrow battery. Israel also deploys Patriot PAC-2s and is considering an upgrade to PAC-3.

These tables and these developments lead to four conclusions about western TMD programmes. First, the large US investment in TMD systems is now paying off. Just how large this investment is can be seen by the US Ballistic Missile Defence Organisation fiscal year 1999 funding of $3.458 bn. This was the result of a bi-partisan consensus in the House and Senate that added over $1bn to President Clinton's proposed funding.

Second, this funding gives the US a spectrum of complementary land- and sea-based missile defence systems that provide increasingly effective defences. On land the US is deploying the Patriot PAC-3 and deployed the Improved Hawk III until the US Marine Corps had to retire it because of budget constraints. The Patriot PAC-3 is the third generation upgrade of Patriot and an improvement over what was used in the Gulf War, that, according to detailed US Army analysis, had a success rate against Iraqi-modified Scuds (Al Husseins) of over 70 per cent in Saudi Arabia and over 40 per cent in Israel. (4)

At sea, the US expects to deploy the first Navy area (lower tier) Aegis radar and Standard missile defence system in 1999. (5) In tests of the land-based theatre high altitude area defence system (THAAD) system two of the three main components, the ground based radar (GBR) and the battle management, command, control and communications (BMC3) system have performed well, although the interceptor missile has experienced problems.

Fourth, these TMD systems are deployed by an increasing number of US allies. In addition to the deployments already noted, in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have acquired Patriot PAC-2s. In Asia, Taiwan is co-producing a modified Patriot, known as the modified air defence system, while Japan deploys Patriot PAC-2s. Also, the US has deployed Patriots to South Korea to defend US military assets there and South Korea is reportedly interested in acquiring Patriots. In NATO, the US, Germany and Italy are collaborating in the development of the medium extended air defence (MEADS) system.

UK SDR
The RUSI conference provided a valuable insight into the official thinking behind the UK SDR presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Defence, the Rt. Hon. George Robertson in July 1998. (6) The SDR committed UK military forces to an expeditionary strategy (deployment overseas to protect the interests of the UK and its allies) but rejected the acquisition of missile defence systems to protect these forces or the UK. As Ranger has analysed elsewhere this SDR policy of "Wait (a long time) and see" before considering acquiring missile defences for UK forces and the UK. We would stress two key points. (7)

First, the SDR policy can be (but was not) justified on grounds of policy priorities and costs. The SDR was a major, successful effort to reorder British strategic priorities but this review process could have been overloaded if it had to also consider the policy implications and costs of acquiring missile defenses. But UK forces deployed overseas will be increasingly placed at risk from attack by ballistic missiles armed with conventional and WMD warheads, and, as RUSI's Assistant Director (Military Science) rightly noted, "a total dependency on the United States [for missile defences for these forces] would severely limit a British government's freedom of action." (8)

The UK also will be increasingly at risk from such attacks, certainly within five years. Our second point would thus be that the SDR policy on missile defences will need to be reconsidered sooner, rather than later. As the Rt. Hon. Lord Chalfont, President, All Party Defence Group, House of Lords warned "This expeditionary force concept…will not be successful unless these [UK] forces, and their home bases are protected against the threat of attack by ballistic missiles". (9)