GDR 99 - European Issues

The UK's Role
on the Ocean Waves


Section Articles
• Slogan or Solution? • AFV Firms in Troubled Times • High Technology: Marconi • The UK's Role on the Ocean • All Systems Go in South Africa • South Africa Backs Europe
The Horizon Frigate is the centrepiece of European naval plans

Michael Codner, assistant director of the Royal United Services Institute, looks at the future role of the Royal Navy.

The UK's recent strategic defence review vindicated years of careful work by the Royal Navy to re-role itself, from the predominantly anti-submarine force of the Cold War, to one that could be an effective instrument to project power ashore in the newly-defined littoral areas of the world in which the large majority of the population lived and worked. For expeditionary one could almost write maritime strategy in the sense that force will be predominantly projected from its bases in the UK (and overspill in Germany) overseas as a principal instrument of British security policy.

Not that the British maritime force structure has yet caught up with this vision. True, there are some enhancements in power projection capability, for instance the newly commissioned helicopter carrier (LPH), HMS Ocean, a land-attack capability for the submarine force in the form of Tomahawk cruise missiles, and replacements in five years' time or so for the ageing Fearless and Intrepid with two new assault ships, Bulwark and Albion.

For the time being, however, the firepower that the Royal Navy on its own can deliver ashore is very modest compared with US forces of comparable size. The frigate force, new as it is, is one designed for force anti-submarine warfare in the north Atlantic. As yet, there are no contracts to build the replacement in the form of the Project Horizon common new-generation frigate, planned to be in service from 2002 but now as much as four years behind.

Nevertheless, the prospects are good. Orders for the Astute-class of nuclear submarines, the Batch II Trafalgar-class as they were known, to replace the remaining Swiftsure-class, are other elements of the complete rebuilding of the Royal Navy's core capabilities of carriers, amphibious shipping and submarines that is underway and should culminate in new carriers.

The problem that the strategic defence review presents to the Royal Navy is one of definite short-term sacrifice with the less-certain promise of long-term gains. The two new carriers, we understand, were the navy's share of the bargain that allowed the army to keeps all of its Challenger 2 tanks and the Royal Air Force the full order of Eurofighters. In payment, the navy's frigate and destroyer numbers are to be cut from 35 to 32, a less savage reduction than the seven predicted by some commentators, but significant nonetheless. Nuclear attack submarine numbers are to be cut from 12 to 10.

As the House of Commons' defence committee has mentioned in its report on the defence review, the programme for the next 10 years is very tight. The defence budget has been reduced. There is the prospect of less money from the government if economic growth falters as expected.

Navies are particularly vulnerable in these situations. For the Royal Navy there is the possibility that the new carriers could fall victim to changes in the political or economic climate. There would be huge political loss of face for a Labour government if it were to cancel these symbols of national grandeur, and a Tory government is likely to find a carrier cut an expediency too far. If the carrier purchase cannot be realised in the timescale of the review, that is by 2015 at the latest, the nation will have been sold a pup. One of the ways that the Royal Navy has protected its core capabilities in the past is by sacrificing frigates and destroyers. The status of a major navy has, since the demise of the battleship, been defined first by its carriers, and then its nuclear-attack submarines and amphibious shipping. Escort numbers frequently have been used as adjusters. Sea control is rather unfashionable.


Boeing's joint strike fighter concept visualised at take-off from an Invincible-class carrier

There are, of course, other uses for frigates and destroyers particularly outside major war and there are other ways of calculating the number of destroyers/frigates needed in a force structure based on the number of expected tasks. The chart shows the destroyer/ frigate conundrum. It projects the annual decline in British escort numbers in the 1990s through until 2015, assuming that the mean rate of decline in recent years was maintained.

Nuclear sub numbers (including the ballistic missile submarines) are also shown. On these projections by 2005 Britain would have only 24 destroyers/frigates and 12 submarines. It is not a difficult matter to build a notional programme of early pay-offs and delayed completion around these figures. In the year 2010 there could be just 17 destroyers/frigates and nine submarines, but only five attack submarines. One can produce remarkably similar rates of decline by plotting rising unit costs against a fixed proportion of a steady defence budget, except that the submarine curve falls rather more steeply.

Long-term prospects
In the longer term, 2015 and beyond, rising unit costs will mean that the scale of joint rapid reaction force, that today is just enough to meet national aspirations and needs, will be unaffordable. Therefore one has to ask whether the expeditionary strategy of the strategic defence review is only a medium-term concept. Just as the new carriers come on line, will Britain fall off its expeditionary perch?

There is a very simple solution and that is greater integration in the longer term either with US or European forces. While integration with the US Navy may be a preferred choice for the Royal Navy, the subordination that this would entail would not suit political objectives. The policy aim is to have forces that count in US eyes and that bring influence, not merely to be worthy underlings. The autonomy that is necessary to bring influence can be achieved only in a European context where British expeditionary capability alongside that of France can continue to provide leadership in expeditionary operations.

Interestingly, although European naval capabilities fall woefully short of the US in most categories, Europe does have a surplus of destroyers and frigates. Many of these are old and poorly-equipped. But if we do a comparison of the major naval units of the principal European nations with genuine capability or aspirations, namely the UK, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands, numbers of European frigates and destroyers are still high.

Comparison of Number of European (Expeditionary) and US Major Naval Units*
	Exped' Europe	USA
Carriers	6 small	12 large
Fast Attack Subs	20	48
Large Amphibious Ships	25	43
Destroyers / Frigates	152	97
Underway Support Ships	29	39
*Based on Today's figures

Clearly, within a more integrated European expeditionary force structure that could exist in the longer term there could be enough frigates and destroyers for the number of task groups that could be formed. A UK or France that specialised on core expeditionary capabilities within such a force structure might need to rely on allies for part of its integrated defences, as NATO's British-led anti-submarine warfare striking force did during the Cold War. By the same token there would be mutual dependence for many tasks for which a major combat-capable task group would not be required, for sanctions enforcement and humanitarian operations, for instance. There would of course need to be greater integration of European security and defence policy for a more integrated force structure to evolve. It is likely in the longer term, however, that force-planning considerations such as those outlined here will have increasing significance in the political process.