GDR 99 - Airborne Systems

Up, Up & Away


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• Up, Up & Away: UK Airlift • Eagle on Patrol • Turbine High Performance • HACT Control • Romania's Military Specialists • Longer Life for Protected Machines • Wear-Debris Analysis Made Easy
Above & Below: Boeing's C-17 Globemaster

The UK MoD has devised a subtle procurement strategy for its expanded airlift capability as part of SDR, says Alan Bonderud, director of UK programmes for Lockheed Martin Aeronautical Systems.

"For two reasons the problem of supply has assumed much greater importance in modern warfare. First, armies are now much larger than those of the Middle Ages, or even of the ancien regime. The second is still more important, and more characteristic of our own day: a war now tends to be more of one piece, and the fighting forces are in constant readiness for action."

So wrote Clausewitz in On War in 1832. In the chapter on maintenance and supply, he highlighted the critical influence of logistical support on a political leadership's choices about the fighting of wars in general and on a military leadership's choices about operations in particular.

Poor supply management, Clausewitz indicated, would lead to the sort of disaster suffered by Napoleon in Russia in 1812. Revolutionary ardour is a poor substitute for bread.

In fact, this was a reiteration of ideas known for well over 2,000 years before Clausewitz, and probably longer. Alexander the Great between 334BC and 323BC carved out a massive Mediterranean and Asian empire, destroying the armies of the Persian emperor Darius in the process. Alexander the Great achieved this feat in large part because of his detailed attention to logistics; and was revered by his troops for ensuring they never went into battle hungry, whilst also, much to their delight, paying off their debts.

After Clausewitz, provision of logistics remained at the core of strategic calculation. Fighting on multiple fronts in June 1944, Hitler, rather optimistically, was relying on bad weather in the English Channel to sever the lines of supply for Operation Overlord and to prevent the allies, as Lord Mountbatten said, from "getting ashore and staying there".

Storms there were, but by 29 June the British were landing 11,000 tons of material per day at the one surviving Mulberry artificial harbour, and the Americans 7,000 tons and 13,500 tons per day respectively directly onto Utah and Omaha beaches.

Ironically, the Wehrmacht's last great gamble, the Ardennes offensive in December 1944, failed for reasons of logistics. It was designed to split the American, British and Canadian armies and capture the port of Antwerp that Hitler had persuaded himself was vital for supporting the allied assault into the Rhineland, but it ground to a halt through the lack of adequate supply of fuel for the advancing panzers.

Present

The 1990-91 Gulf War that took place immediately after the collapse of communism was important because it showed that the west, operating with the appropriate authority, would have to deploy decisive force and support it, it also had to do this quickly and at short notice. This gave rise to a move away from the defensive orientation of NATO in Europe to a new focus on power projection. It also validated the concept of AirLand battle with its expanded logistical demands.

The initial deployment in August 1990 of forces from the US demonstrated the scale of both airlift and sealift assets necessary for rapid reaction. The first division ready brigade (DRB) of the 101st Airborne flew from Fort Campbell, Kentucky, on 17 and 18 August 1990 to establish a deterrent to an Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia. The DRB, consisting of a brigade HQ, three battalions of paratroops, special reconnaissance units, a helicopter taskforce and support elements (a total of 2,742 soldiers, 117 helicopters and 123 pallets of stores), required 50 C-5 and 60 C-141 sorties. The force concentrated in-theatre in 13 days.

US Navy fast sealift ships and vessels of the Ready Reserve Force carried the remainder of the 101st Airborne Division, accounting for 5,258 items of equipment, including utility helicopters and artillery systems. Approximately 95 per cent of all cargo used to equip and supply US forces in the Gulf was carried by sea, including 2,000 main battle tanks (MBTs), 2,200 other armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs), 1,000 helicopters and several hundred self- propelled guns. The UK deployed 45,000 personnel and 400,000 tons of freight, of which 80,000 tons were munitions, for Operation Granby. Almost 55,000 tons of the total, or 89 per cent, went by sea. At the start of the land offensive, the 1st Armoured Division was consuming 3.5 million litres of fuel, 350 tons of rations, and 2.8 million litres of water a week. The British Army deployed 180 MBTs, 2,611 other AFVs, and 12,069 engineering and logistics vehicles.


The C 130-J at the 1998 Farnborough airshow

Once in-theatre, General Schwarzkopf's war plan required that US VII Corps, including the British 1st Armoured Division and US XVIII Airborne Corps, consisting of 255,000 troops and 65,000 vehicles, be moved about 300 miles between 17 January and 24 February 1991 to new concentration areas prior to launching the deep left-flank attack into Iraq.

C-130s supported the move: on average, a Hercules took off every seven minutes, 24 hours a day, for the first 13 days of the redeployment. There were 83 C-130s of all types deployed by the USAF to the Gulf.

Despite the stunning success of the coalition in ejecting Iraqi forces from Kuwait, it was recognised that the six months taken to build up forces free from Iraqi interference before the initiation of the air war had been vital. The natural conclusion was that the coalition's capacity for power projection and rapid reaction in the post-Cold War world was less than that required. It was also understood that effective power projection by air and sea could act as a powerful conventional deterrent, particularly to rogue states, in place of the nuclear deterrence that operated between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

Future


C 130-J under construction

Having accepted the need for power projection, the future of force deployment and logistics has been made more complicated by the so-called revolution in military affairs (RMA). The Gulf War was fought at the threshold of the introduction into service of a range of military information technologies and weapons systems that seems likely to change warfighting radically in the event that deterrence fails in the 21st century. In theory, the detection-data fusion-decision-execution cycle will become shorter.

The main result of this will be a faster tempo. It is thought that armed forces incorporating RMA will be capable of warfighting tempos well beyond that achieved in the Gulf conflict. This, however, creates problems. It will be necessary to plan for rapid reaction forces capable of being moved quickly and at short notice, and also the increased tempo of RMA will see their consumption of expendables, not least of all ammunition, relative to time rise sharply. Realisation of RMA runs the risk of failure without adequate lift.

Airlift procurement strategy
In February 1997 the House of Commons Defence Committee signalled in its report on heavy lift that the then Joint Rapid Deployment Force would need dedicated heavy airlift, and suggested that a lease of the Boeing C-17 as a stop-gap measure might be appropriate. The committee also stated that a replacement operational-tactical airlifter, either more C-130J Hercules or the European future large aircraft (FLA), in addition to an air-to-air refuelling replacement, would be necessary to project strength overseas rapidly. Following the Labour election victory in May, the strategic defence review (SDR) was launched and defence ministers, quite reasonably, referred to the need to fill the strategic lift gap on a number of occasions.


Airlift is essential in global operations

The MoD faced a difficult task in generating a procurement strategy for increasing lift. A balance had to be struck between the operational needs of the renamed Joint Rapid Reaction Force and budgetary resources. Attention also would have to be paid to the fact that decisions on lift would be seen as a test of the success of the SDR as a whole and the need to be sensitive regarding European aerospace and defence industrial restructuring. In the event, a subtle procurement strategy was developed.

First, the MoD would acquire four additional roll-on/roll-off (ro-ro) vessels to augment the two already on order. This made eminently good sense given the proportion of equipment lifted by sea in the Gulf War.

Secondly, a short-term strategic airlifter competition that would evaluate the C-17 and its equivalents, would be set in motion. This too was sound, recalling the rapid deployment of the helicopters and soldiers of the DRB of the 101st Airborne Division in Operation Desert Shield.

Thirdly, a parallel multinational future transport aircraft (FTA) competition would be conducted to replace the second tranche of the elderly C-130K Hercules fleet. The FTA competition would be trans-European and incorporate France, Germany, Italy and Spain. Germany, however, distanced itself relatively early in pursuit of the Antonov-70 aircraft.

In testimony to the Commons defence committee as part of its inquiry into SDR, the assistant under secretary of state (programmes) said it was MoD's expectation that the RAF's transport fleet would be larger than today by about four C-17s, or their equivalents. And that is the point reached to date. The final challenge will involve creating an optimum balance of sealift and airlift, with the airlift supported by the replacement tanker fleet. More than four C-17s or their equivalents would provide greater heavy lift but at high cost and with limitations arising from the need to operate from prepared airbases.

Backing the FLA might bring industrial advantages but at uncertain cost and risk. From initial observations, the limited number of FLAs that reasonably could be afforded would hamper the MoD's ability to provide robust logistical support in two simultaneous contingencies as set out in the SDR.

Opting for further C-130Js would represent the most economical solution but clearly the Hercules is not a heavy airlifter. A fleet mix of C-17s or their equivalents, and C-130Js, however, would fully satisfy the European staff requirement for airlift. But we must await the outcome of the MoD's complex operational analyses, financial, and programmatic calculations to inform the final decision.

Whatever the end result, lift and logistics are complex matters. Perhaps industry might permit itself the indulgence of a real debate about the issues, and in doing so put the customer first.