an essential weapon
in future conflict
Professor
Martin Edmonds,
director, Centre
for Defence and
International Security
The aircraft carrier offers one of the ideal solutions to peace-keeping, humanitarian support and international crime control
| The aircraft
carrier
an essential weapon in future conflict Professor Martin Edmonds, director, Centre for Defence and International Security |
The aircraft carrier offers one of the ideal solutions to peace-keeping, humanitarian support and international crime control |
Studies, Lancaster University, emphasises the importance of aircraft carriers in conflict scenarios. |
The aircraft carrier has been the
foundation on which the US Navy and those of the UK and France have been built. The
flexibility and mobility afforded by the carrier have proved critical in exercising
command of the sea as well as control over the movements of naval vessels. As Rernard
Brodie observed: "The carrier is a floating aerodrome possessing all the advantages
in mobility and sea-keeping power of a large warship and all the advantages inherent in
the use of aircraft."1 His focus at that time (1944) was on the carrier as an item of equipment in the inventory of navies alone but that emphasis remained throughout the cold war when the primary concern was to exercise command of the sea in the face of the Soviet naval challenge.2 The ability to bring air power to bear provided surface fleets and land targets with air cover, early warning and protection. Equipped also with anti-submarine helicopters, the carrier contributed an effective means of countering the Soviet nuclear submarine threat. |
| The value-added capability of the carrier
task force has been recognised by the US that has built up a fleet of twelve
100,000-plus-tonne nuclear carriers since the 1960s. There is no evidence that US
conviction in the utility of the carrier will diminish. Because of the global nature of
projected conflict, US expectation is that the carrier will only increase in importance
because of its unique characteristic in bringing unencumbered air power to bear quickly.3 The UK is a medium military power and has neither the resources nor the global interest to match those of the US. Nevertheless, until the 1970s the importance of the carrier was recognised.4 In the 1970s the decision was taken to dispense with aircraft carriers. This decision had some merit so long as Royal Navy operations were confined to waters within the range of land-based aircraft and ASW operations were assumed by submarines and surface vessels. |
 The Invicible Class through-deck helicopter cruiser has proved an adaptable platform to accommodate the VSTOL harrier jump-jet fighter |
 The flexibility and mobility afforded by the carrier and its associated aircraft has proved critical in exercising command of the sea and control over the movements of naval vessels |
But in operations farther afield the
situation would be more problematical and RN vessels potentially put at risk.5 The premise that the Royal Navy would operate within home waters or within the range of land-based aircraft soon was challenged. By serendipity rather than policy intent, the Invincible Class through-deck helicopter cruiser proved an adaptable platform to accommodate the VSTOL Harrier jump-jet fighter and ground attack aircraft. Therefore, when defence of UK interests necessitated taking British forces out-of-area during the Falkland Islands war, there was a modicum of carrier-borne air power available. However, it was neither ideal for the purpose nor equipped with the necessary early air-warning capability. In the event, the two carriers and their aircraft deployed in the South Atlantic acquitted themselves with distinction. Had the government of the day recognised the risk it was imposing on the future security of the fleet without sea-borne air cover and the constraints it was placing on the use of military force in out-of-area operations in limited war and operations other than war situations, it would not have cancelled the carrier. |
| In fact, between 1966 and 1970 Britain threatened or
used limited naval force on five occasions. Four of the five operations were successful
and entailed the use of a superior fleet that included aircraft carriers. The reason for
the one failure was political and also was the one occasion that the carrier was not
deployed.' The UK government is in the throes of a strategic defence review. It is acknowledged that the cold war is over and that threats to the UK from eastern Europe are minimal. But the world is recognised to be increasingly unstable and that UK economic interests will require the capability to project force globally and beyond the range of land-based aircraft operating from the UK, even with refuelling.' Host-nation support cannot be guaranteed, nor is it likely to be available within the timescales demanded by pre-emptive defence diplomacy intervention. Any state that claims to support the United Nations and to be a credible force in deterring, preventing, limiting or stopping violent conflict and to bring protection to disadvantaged populations, must have sea-borne air power. This issue is exercising defence decision-makers as they come to terms with the cost of replacing the current Invincible Class carriers by 2010 and deciding on the most cost-effective carrier-borne aircraft. With the projected resources available, one if not two major defence roles will have to be abandoned or diminished. Sea-borne air power may be one of those options, but if the UK government is true to its word that it looks to be a leading international player across the spectrum of conflict, then logic, experience and modern technology brought together on what is becoming a joint maritime operational platform, must be acknowledged. |
1. Bernard Brodie, A Guide to Naval Strategy, (3rd
edition) New York, Praeger, 1944 p40. |
