The Netherlands and Germany deploy patriot
TMD systems.
There were two strong arguments in favour of such an expeditionary strategy. First, this was a strategy British forces had practised for almost four centuries and developed very effectively.
| Theatre missile defences |
| UK strategic defence review poses difficult questions |
| Robin Ranger, Ph.D., Honorary Research Fellow, CDISS, Lancaster University, UK and Senior Associate, NIPP, Fairfax, VA, USA, analyses the implications for a British expeditionary strategy of deploying British forces within range of missile attacks without and with missile defences and summarises the defences available. |
The Netherlands and Germany deploy patriot TMD systems. |
Shortly after the May 1997 election, the new UK Labour Party
government announced that it would conduct a strategic defence review to be completed this
year. By late 1997 it seemed likely that this review would favour an expeditionary
strategy, that is, a UK commitment to support British interests, including support of
Britain's allies in the Middle East and elsewhere, with small but highly effective
expeditionary forces. These would consist of land and air forces supported by a Royal Navy
that would include three new aircraft carriers, replacing the three existing ageing
carriers. These carriers would operate the joint strike fighter (JSF) being developed for
US and allied procurement by two major US consortia, one led by Boeing that had purchased
McDonnell Douglas, and one led by Lockheed Martin that was in the process of purchasing
Northrup Grumman, partnered by British Aerospace. There were two strong arguments in favour of such an expeditionary strategy. First, this was a strategy British forces had practised for almost four centuries and developed very effectively. |
| Second, this strategy would yield the greatest political and economic
dividends for the UK either in support of US and allied expeditionary operations,
including operations under UN auspices such as the 1991 Gulf war and current operations in
former Yugoslavia, or in support of British allies. These arguments were recently
developed in the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies (RUSI) Journal and
a Centre for Defence and International Security Studies (CDISS) Bailrigg Memorandum.1 TMD and expeditionary strategy If this review were to result in the British government choosing an expeditionary
strategy, then the question of British requirements for theatre missile defence (TMD)
systems to defend its expeditionary forces would become politically significant in light
of the experience with TMD systems in the 1991 Gulf War. During this war, Iraqi dictator
Saddam Hussein attacked Israel and Saudi Arabia with Iraqi- modified Scud (Al Hussein)
theatre ballistic missiles (TBMs) armed with conventional, high-explosive warheads.
Saddam's Al Hussein attacks on Saudi Arabia targeted its population, armed forces and
allied expeditionary forces that included the UK contingent. These forces were defended by
US-manufactured Patriot Advanced Capability 2 (PAC-2) theatre ballistic missile defence
(TBMD) systems operated by the US Army. According to detailed US Army analysis, these
systems had a success rate of over 70 per cent in Saudi Arabia and over 40 per cent in
Israel.2 Fortunately, the combination of Patriot TBMD systems and allied
counterattacks on Al Hussein mobile transporter erector launchers (TELs) kept military and
civilian casualties in Saudi Arabia and Israel to minimal, and historically negligible,
levels. The allied counterattacks did not destroy any Al Hussein TELs but limited the
nature and extent of their attacks significantly, forcing them to be launched at night and
as quickly as possible. |
 The standard missile 2 block IVA, the interceptor for the navy area (lower tier) Aegis/Standard TMD system. |
This experience showed that in future operations by a British
expeditionary force, a successful missile attack on its port of entry could result in
heavy casualties and jeopardise domestic UK political support for such operations. It
could also split whatever coalition the British forces were supporting, whether led by US
or other powers. These could include the UK and major regional powers UK policy
options |
Hawk launch sequence. |
British policy also has assumed that technologically crude
ballistic missiles armed with conventional warheads would be used in such attacks. Because
these missiles would be relatively inaccurate and their warheads would cause damage to
limited areas only, British policymakers could hope that such attacks on British
expeditionary forces would cause few casualties and little damage, similar to those
experienced in the Gulf War. Also, since missile accuracy is necessary for effective attacks on military targets but is not necessary for effective attacks on civilian targets, mainly population centres, British policy-makers could expect that an attacker with relatively limited numbers of relatively inaccurate missiles would follow Saddam's policy of using them to attack population centres to achieve political objectives. For example, missile attacks could be launched against the population centres of the country or countries hosting British and allied forces to force them to ask for the withdrawal of these forces. Thus, it could be hoped that an attacker would probably use most, or all, of its missiles to attack the population centres of the host country/countries but would cause only minimal casualties as a result of US and allied counterstrikes and missile defences. If missile attacks were launched on British expeditionary forces, they would necessarily be small and militarily ineffective. Thus far, this tacit British policy also has avoided the need to consider the difficult questions that could be posed by any British consideration of acquiring TMD systems within limited post-cold-war defence budgets. For example, if TMD systems were to be acquired what other systems might have to be sacrificed and which service would man land-based TMD systems, the Royal Air Force that traditionally has been responsible for air defence, or the Army? This policy also avoids the difficult issue of a potential enemy holding British political interests hostage to theatre missile attacks against the UK itself. However, this policy has become questionable for two reasons. One is that US-manned and allied-manned TMD systems, for whatever reasons, may not be in the best place to protect British forces. The other reason is that rogue states such as Iran, Libya and North Korea, together with other potential regional aggressors, have continued to acquire ballistic missiles and are now acquiring cruise missiles as well as weapons of mass destruction (WMD) such as nuclear, biological, chemical and radiological (NBCR) warheads for their missiles. The November 1997 revelations by the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) on the extent of Saddam's WMD programme underline the extent of the proliferation of WMD. Saddam had acquired a variety of BW agents, including aflatoxin, anthrax, botulinum toxin, chlostridium perfringens and ricin, as well as VX nerve gas. Before the Gulf war Iraq had "filled 16 [Al Hussein] missile warheads with botulinum toxin, five with anthrax, and four with aflatoxin".3 This proliferation of ballistic and cruise missiles and WMD was detailed in publications for CDISS and on the CDISS website.4 |
 The use of Patriot TMBD systems helped keep casualties to a minimum in the Gulf War. |
If the UK government were to chose an expeditionary strategy it would have to consider the implications of deploying British expeditionary forces within range of attacks by ballistic and cruise missiles armed with conventional and possibly WMD warheads. The danger posed by WMD-armed missiles is that they could be technologically crude and inaccurate but still damage large areas and cause major casualties. In theory, British forces could be deployed without TMD defences against missile attacks, as at present; they could be deployed with TMD systems; or not deployed within range of missile attacks. In practice, choices between these three options may not be quite so clear-cut. |
| But if the government wants to keep the option of deploying British expeditionary forces within range of missile attacks, then it will have to consider the implications of deploying them without or with their own TMD systems. Clearly, the first option of deploying British expeditionary forces without TMD defences is cheaper than the alternatives but carries significant strategic risks. The military risk would be that if British and allied forces were deployed with US forces but without TMD and relied on US-manned TMD systems, then such forces could be the preferred targets for early missile attacks. The attacker would hope that US defences might not cover the British and allied forces as effectively as they would cover US forces and would hope to cause casualties, disrupt their deployment and undermine British and allied political support for their deployment. The political risk would be that in such circumstances there would be considerable British criticism, whether justified or not, of the US forces' failure to defend British forces. Also there would be British doubts about the political wisdom of deploying forces without their own missile defence systems. Similar considerations would apply to a British deployment where British and allied forces relied on other allied forces for defence against missile attacks, for example from NATO, the Netherlands and Germany that deploy Patriot TMD systems, as well as from a regional ally with TMD systems. Comparable considerations could arise in the eventuality of a potential enemy holding British political interests hostage to theatre missile attacks against the UK and the UK had to rely on US missile defences. |
 The THAAD launcher |
The second option, acquiring TMD systems to defend British expeditionary forces, would be costly and the opportunity to acquire other military systems could be lost, but this option needs to be carefully explored as part of the informed public debate the UK government is promoting as part of its defence review. To assist in this exploration, Table 1 summarises western TMD systems and Table 2 shows projected timelines for the deployment of these systems over the next 10 years. A more detailed discussion of western and allied TMD is contained in the published proceedings of an international conference on extended air defence and the long-range missile threat organised by the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies (RUSI). |
| Four highly significant points about western TMD are worth noting. First,
the large US investment in TMD is now paying off in the form of TMD systems currently
deployed or projected for deployment during the next decade. Second, these systems are
deployed by a significant number of US allies. As noted in Global Defence Review 1997:
"In NATO, the Netherlands and Germany deploy Patriot PAC 2s ... and the US, Germany
and Italy are collaborating in the development of the medium extended air defence (MEADS)
system. In the Middle East, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have acquired Patriot PAC-2s. Israel
has also acquired Patriot PAC-2s and is developing, with considerable US assistance, the
Arrow TMD for deployment in 1998. "In Asia, Taiwan is co-producing, with the US, a modified Patriot known as the modified air defence system (MADS). Also, the US has deployed Patriots to South Korea to defend US military assets there and South Korea is reported as being interested in acquiring Patriots." 6 Third, the US investment in missile defence systems is substantial. A bi-partisan consensus in the House of Representatives and the Senate recently added approximately $1.1 billion to President Clinton's requested funding for the ballistic missile defence organisation (BMDO). Thus for fiscal year (FY) 1998, BMDO funding will be almost $3.7 billion, of which $978.1 million will be spent on the national missile defence (NMD) of the US and presumably most of the balance of $2.7 billion will be spent on TMD systems.7 Fourth, these TMD systems have proved increasingly effective in tests, as noted by Dr. J. David Martin, Deputy for Strategic Relations, BMDO: "The February 1997 Willow Dune tests carried out by BMDO and the US Army successfully employed PAC-2 and PAC-2 GEM (guidance enhancement missiles) to intercept a theatre ballistic target missile. The target SCUD missiles were fired from Bigen Island, Aur Atoll, toward the Kwajalein Atoll from which the interceptor missile was fired. A number of systems were used in this integrated test, including a defence support programme (DSP) satellite, airborne and sea-borne sensor packages, and a theatre high-altitude area defence (THAAD) system radar. We have confidence in our upgraded PAC-2 system and, building on this success, the army will begin developmental testing of the PAC-3 (with the new hit to-kill round) within the next few months. |
 Radar in the field. |
"The last success to report involved the successful intercept of a Lance missile target at White Sands missile range in New Mexico by a modified Standard Missile 2 Block IVA. (This missile will be the interceptor for the Navy area (lower tier) Aegis/Standard TMD system)." 8 |
 Patriot advanced capability 2 missile defence systems were used by the US Army in the Gulf War. |
TMD and maritime strategy Interestingly, the UK also may be acquiring some potential components of a sea-borne TMD system as part of the Horizon common new-generation frigate (CNGF) UK-French- Italian project. Although the Horizon staff requirement does not have a ballistic missile defence (BMD) role written into it, many of its anti-air warfare system components, including the Sampson radar and the Aster 30 missile, have "(as a future-growth option) theatre missile defence (TMD)".9 Initially this TMD option would provide point defences for ships or a port. The Horizon's vertical launch system VLS) is reported as being compatible with the US standard missile (SM) SM-2 and SM-3 missiles, that combine with the Aegis/SPY-l(D) radar to form the basis for the US Navy area (point) defence and theatre-wide TMD systems, but the Horizon is too small to carry the SPV-l(D) type radars. |
| However, the Horizon project is experiencing considerable difficulties in reconciling conflicting national requirements. If it fails, the UK might have to consider an interim and/or long term adaptation of the US Aegis/Standard TMD system, perhaps using the UK multifunction electronically-scanned adaptive radar (MESAR) that is based on the Horizon's Sampson radar. At a later stage this could be developed into a system similar to the Navy theatre-wide or a marinised THMD, or adapted to provide a land-based BMD using MESAR and a THMD interceptor. These sea-based options will be analysed in a Bailrigg Memorandum on sea-based TMD by Lieutenant-Commander Jeremy Stocker RN (ret.). For the UK, a sea-based option for protection of forces deployed overseas would be attractive, given the expeditionary focus of current joint doctrine. Also it would be especially effective if it were combined with US and allied sea and land-based TMD systems and could help ensure British forces were fully defended by land-based TMD. Moreover, when states in North Africa and the Middle East acquire ballistic missiles with sufficient range to reach the UK, especially London, their missiles will have to cross the Mediterranean and the English Channel to reach their target. When the UK government's strategic defence review is completed, these missile defence questions will have to be considered. |
To Missiles Contents
Global Defence Review
NOTES
1. See Rear Adm Richard Cobbold, Director, RUSI, "A Joint Maritime-Based
Expeditionary Capability" and Michael Codner, Assistant Director (Military Sciences)
RUSI, "The United Kingdom's Strategic Defence Review: Strategic Options" RUSI
Journal August, 1997, pp 23-30 and pp 44-50, and Rear Adm RTR Phillips RN, Nick
Hooper, Professor Martin Edmonds, Malcolm Bird (BaeSEMA), Sir Moray Stewart and others,
Professor Martin Edmonds (Editor), British Naval Aviation in the 21st Century,
Bailrigg Memorandum 25, CDISS, Lancaster University, UK, May, 1997.
2. As reported by Maj Gen (now Lieut Gen) Jay M Garner, then Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, in Congressional Hearings on April 7, 1992, as quoted by Robin Ranger and Humphrey Crum Ewing, "Defences Against Missiles: Accelerating Response to World Concerns", Defence and Security Review 1996, p77.
3. R. Jeffrey Smith, "Iraq's Drive for a Biological Arsenal: UN Pursuing 25 Germ Warheads It Believes Are Still Loaded With Deadly Toxin," Washington Post, November 21, 1997, ppA1 and A48-49.
4. See, for example, Robin Ranger and David Wiencek, The Devil's Brews II: Weapons of Mass Destruction and International Security, Bailrigg Memorandum 17, CDISS Lancaster University, UK, May, 1997 and the CDISS website at www.cdiss.org.
5. Robin Ranger, Editor, Jeremy Stocker & David Wiencek, Rapporteurs, Extended Air Defence & The Long-Range Missile Threat, Bailrigg Memorandum 30, CDISS in association with the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, Lancaster University, UK, December, 1997.
6. Robin Ranger and David Wiencek, with Humphrey Crum Ewing, "Missile Defence: Options for UK/US Co-operation", Global Defence Review 1997, p54.
7. Floyd D. Spence, Chairman, House National Secuity Committee, Summary of Major Provisions H.R. 1119 National Defence Authorisation Act for Fiscal Year 1998 (Conference Report), press release, October 23, 1997, p15.
8. Dr J. David Martin, "The Current Situation in Ballistic Missile Defence: The View from Washington", Extended Air Defence & The Long-Range Missile Threat, Bailrigg Memorandum 30, p9.
9. See David Foxwell, "Trouble Over the Horizon", Jane's International Defence Review 6, 1996, p39 and also Richard Scott, "Horizon back on an even keel?" Jane's Navy International, July/August 1996, pp17-25 and Richard Sharpe (ed), Jane's Fighting Ships 1997-9, p766.
Table 1. Western Theatre Ballistic Missile defence (TMD) Systems Summarised.
Table 2. Availability of Western Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence Systems.