To appreciate the Republic of South Africa's (RSA) defence policy, it is necessary to recognise where it has come from and what has had to be addressed as a matter of political priority since the end of apartheid and the election of the Government of National Unity (GNU) in April 1994. On the eve of that election, the South African Defence Force (SADF) was replaced by the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). In forging national unity, the statutory and non-statutory forces who had been at war for 37 years were expected to form the foundation of the new defence forces of the Republic. The crafting of a defence posture for the new South Africa had to be achieved within a demanding new political and ideological framework.
| The National Defence Force headquarters in Pretoria |
Arguably the most potent and hated symbol of apartheid was the SADF. It was an institution that largely had been able to operate outside any obvious democratic processes, define its own priorities and agenda and, within practical reason, set its own budget. The SADF would be a target for early reform and would have to merge with non-statutory forces, creating a new SANDF from a minority traditional white defence force and a majority black guerrilla force.
The integration of the former combatants into a single defence force and its subsequent rationalisation and reduction to a manageable and affordable size had to be the new government's primary task.1 For political reasons, the past image and role of the defence forces had to be excised and trust in them restored. For economic reasons, the burden of defence on a fragile economy had to be scaled down to manageable and realistic limits.2
| Forging a new integrated defence force for South Africa |
The principles governing the integration of the two parties into the new SADF were outlined in a paper presented by Joe Modise, Commander of the African National Congress (ANC) military wing, the MK, in May 1992. Those principles were adopted by the Sub-Council on Defence of the Transitional Executive Committee (TEC) in its task to create a SANDF that would be "affordable, effective and legitimate". And they were incorporated in 1996 into the first post-apartheid South African Defence White Paper.3
| Rt.Hon. Joe Modise, MP, Minister of Defence for South Africa |
Military merging and force restructuring was a priority. It met a political symbolic need of bringing two sides together in a manifestation of national unity and the practical expedient of coping with thousands of armed ex-guerrillas. However, these requirements were not just military matters. Once merging and integration had been achieved, the task would be to transform the SANDF's attitudes and procedures and restructure the South African armed forces in a way that maintained their combat integrity and was consonant with the new South African GNU's defence policies. The exercise of merging and transformation was undertaken as a political imperative, independent of the processes of defence policy formulation and the exercise of SANDF force structure and operational review.4
The task of merging has almost been accomplished but the transformation process will not be completed until entrenched attitudes have been excised. The exercise of downsizing and restructuring the armed forces is underway, driven by a five per cent reduction in the defence budget during the past seven years to today's level of 2.4 per cent of GDP.
| Early hostility to the National Defence Force and the idea of defence has been largely eroded |
Outside the organisational considerations of merger, transformation and representivity, the two processes of defence policy formulation and force restructuring that should be related have taken place independently. One consequence is that there remains uncertainty and dislocation within the defence establishment and a need for clear, decisive leadership.
| The first National Defence Force parade held in November 1994 |
The reason for this sense of dislocation is straightforward. A change of regime and of political power within it requires a new constitution and changes to the structure and process of government. Furthermore, those processes had to reflect the principles and philosophies of the new political elite and their supporters. For the RSA this has meant a new democracy that reflects the wishes of the majority and the way government and parliament should go about business. When applied to the field of defence this has meant openness in decision-making, accountability and close political control over the armed services and defence policy.
| Civilians are an important element of the full-time force of the National Defence Force |
These strictly structural and procedural requirements have taken time to introduce. In some respects they have yet to operate efficiently or effectively, even though the SANDF have a constant requirement for clear decisions. As a large and complex organisation experiencing internal change and working in a new operational environment, they cannot be kept on hold for any length of time without disruption.
There are two main elements to this aspect of South African defence: one is the mechanisms and procedures of political control within the new regime; the other is the restructuring of the central defence organisational apparatus. As regards the former, the principal organ for political control has been the establishment of the parliamentary joint standing defence committee (JSDC) that has extensive powers of oversight, consultation and investigation and is as much a defence decision-making body as one of parliamentary accountability and control.5 Complementing it are the national assembly's portfolio defence and the senate's defence committees and the national conventional arms control committee (NCACC) that oversees arms export and import.
| Maintaining military discipline and standards: junior leaders at a passing-out parade |
A consequence of these structural innovations is that the content of South African defence policy and the speed with which policy decisions and content can be decided is dependent on these political bodies. In turn, their efficiency and effectiveness are dependent on their composition, style of business and party political priorities. For most committee members the novelty of having insight into defence matters and their wariness of military and security affairs born of past experience has meant they have been very active and involved in defence policy debates and planning discussions. This has had implications for future South African defence within the context of the government's electoral commitment to the country's reconstruction and development programme (RDP).
Restructuring the central organisation of defence had to meet constitutional requirements and the political imperative of transparency and overt political control. The immediate problem was that those who had defence planning and experience were associated with the SADF and the apartheid years. The first attempt at central defence organisational restructuring was undertaken by the SANDF under the new Minister of Defence Joe Modise. The outcome in March 1995 was the establishment of a new Ministry of Defence headed by the minister. Also there was to be a new Department of Defence divided between the armed forces headed by the Chief of Defence Staff and a civilian Defence Secretariat headed by a defence secretary. The two sides would act as executive and operational branches responsible for military operations, training and readiness and for administration, finance, procurement, and policy.6
| Division of the defence budget for the financial year 1994/95 |
These arrangements differ from the previous regime and they still have not been completed. Two problems have dogged progress: the need to find trained and experienced personnel and conducting changes while in a policy vacuum. In the absence of policy guidelines, the civilian and military arms of the Defence Department have had to work on an ad hoc basis with a constant turnover of personnel and they have been politically constrained by the requirements of parliamentary committees and financial stringency. The effectiveness of the new defence organisation remains to be seen and it is too soon to make any clear assessment.
| Maintaining conventional capabilities is an integral component of the transition; a 35 mm anti-aircraft gun in action during field exercises |
The establishment of a new integrated SANDF, the creation of a new central organisation of defence and of new constitutional provisions for political oversight and control over defence were considerations born out of necessity as the nature of the regime changed with the collapse of apartheid. The definition and content of defence policy and a decision as to what defence forces are for are products of these practical developments. But without policy goals and guidelines, the defence posture of the state cannot be coherently defined.
The country is going through a period of trans-formation and the armed forces need to keep in step. The absence of clear pointers as to what is expected of the defence forces and how much by way of resources it can expect has been a handicap. It is here that the GNU has been found wanting, more because of inexperienced decision-making procedures and meeting competing priorities than because of a lack of appreciation of the needs of the SANDF.
Several attempts were made to draw up a defence policy guideline and on May 8, 1996 the final draft went to the Cabinet and was approved, with some last amendments for presentation to Parliament.
The thrust of the Defence White Paper, Defence in a Democracy, was closely orientated towards the roles and functions of the SANDF and South African Police Service (SPS) and to the new strategic environment within which RSA found itself. Of particular note is the emphasis placed on civil-military relations and the constitutional and legal provisions for control over the SANDF and its operations.
Working concurrently with the consultative process on the drafting of the Defence White Paper was the defence review, arguably a more important process since it bore directly on the future capability of the SANDF. Although politically the latter depended on the former, there was sufficient by way of proposals in earlier drafts for the defence review process to proceed. The task was to come up with recommendations for an investment in defence capabilities for the next 10 to 15 years and determine the missions, roles and tasks, and define capabilities and their resource implications.7
| With over 3,000km of coastline to monitor and safeguard the South African navy provides a vital service |
The defence review began its work in July 1995 with the formation of an ad hoc defence review working group (DRWG) under the Minister of Defence. Membership included ministers and members of the Ministry and Department of Defence and also parliamentarians, civilian defence experts and academics. A DRWG consultative conference was convened in February 1996 and agreed a draft of procedures to be followed including the establishment of six sub-committees to work on such issues as force structure, force posture, resources, the arms industry, the strategic environment, the legal environment, personnel and part-time forces.
The target was for the review to be completed by the end of August 1996 for submission to Cabinet in September 1996. The sub-committees first reported in April 1996, only to find they had "definite and different opinions on a range of issues". One difficulty they encountered was the synchronisation of the content of their review with the progress of the SANDF's transformation and military merger of former MK and other non-statutory forces with former SADF personnel. A further problem stemmed from the "absence of a clear definition of defence policy objectives and guidelines" against which to define practical requirements.
The DRWG and the defence review process has been the closest that the new South Africa has come to defining force posture and capability for the coming decade. It has defined what it understands the SANDF is for, as distinct from against, within the framework of the new RSA constitution and the MOD's 1995 annual report. This it expressed in terms of self defence, peace-support operations, support for the SPS and collateral utility roles.8
A model was developed to guide the work of the sub-committees and provide a focus for their collective deliberations. One problem that exercised the group was the conviction contained in the Defence White Paper that no external threat existed to the Republic and that the classic threat-based approach to defence planning was limited in its ability to explain the range of responsibilities for which SANDF forces could be called upon to meet in time of crisis. Instead the approach was one of defining national interests, the constitutional responsibilities the SANDF were expected to fulfil and the capabilities of the SANDF.
As a result, a number of defence functions and tasks were isolated on which the sub-committees could focus deliberations. These were self defence, peace-support operations, support for the SPS and utilisation of the SANDF's capabilities in a collateral utility role. The tasks attached to these functions then required an assessment of the probability of a crisis emerging, its likely impact on the country and the cost of budgeting for those tasks to counter or deter the potential crisis emerging. Once these tasks had been defined, the DRWG could address the type of force design and structure required for each function and the means that should be allocated. As regards force structure, the DRWG had in mind three main elements: a core force, a collateral capability and a support structure.9
At its meeting at the SA Intelligence College on April 28-30, 1996 to review progress, the DRWG agreed the establishment of six sub-committees on the strategic environment; roles, missions tasks and posture; part-time forces; human resources; the arms industry; and the defence legal environment. The strategic environment and human resources committees were required to report with proposals within a month, the others later. A provisional frame-work for the final review was suggested, the significant elements of which was the linking of the process to the Defence White Paper, the SANDF Transformation Project and the strategic environment. The DRWG also recognised that the Ministry of Defence, the Department of Defence and parliamentarians were stakeholders in the exercise whereas interest groups would be involved only through a consultative process "but their decisions were not seen as absolutely critical to the outcome of the project".10
In June 1996, the DRWG enlarged on the notion of the defence of South Africa in a position paper to include the promotion of international security by participation and co-operation in support of RSA's foreign policy; participation in defence co-operation within the Southern African Development Community; the provision of a core defence against external threats; and assistance in safe-guarding internal law and order.11 Each of these four areas were elaborated on but the importance of the document relates more to the parameters of the force design for the country's core defence capability, national defence posture and conventional deterrence as part of a defensive defence posture. The core defence capabilities required were seen as intelligence, landward defence, air defence, maritime defence, CBW defence, interdiction, counter-attack, command and control, force preparation and training, and logistic support.
| Computer instruction just one element of the broad training process |
The position paper on domestic security and collateral utility roles of the SANDF recognised there was considerable scope for growth in numbers, capability and roles, particularly as South Africa is responsible for a vast territory, a substantial and heterogeneous population and extensive off-shore mineral and fishing assets. Regarding the former, the DRWG position paper showed a reluctance to see the SANDF becoming too committed in combating crime or maintaining law and order, a task that is primarily the duty of the SAPS. However, the extent to which South Africa was characterised by high levels of crime and violence indicated the SANDF would have to be involved, but only as part of a national strategy on crime.
Against a backdrop of constitutional change, a new political regime, a government of national unity and a commitment to the reconstruction and development of the country, South African defence and its armed forces have made progress. They have done so at a time of reduced defence funding and a political requirement to embrace and absorb those against whom they have been fighting for over 25 years.
The new SANDF has had to accommodate the procedural and structural requirements of the new regime requirements that have meant transparency and accountability in the debates on future defence policy and force posture. This has been a marked departure from previous practice where defence and military matters were primarily a matter for the armed services, and state security was left unchallenged.
But openness and transparency carries a toll, principally the timeliness and competence of decisions. For two years South African defence has been bereft of strong leadership and clear decisions regarding its defence policies and what military forces it needs to make those policies credible.
| The Roolvalk attack helicopter |
However, South African defence has not stood still and the various parts of its future defence policy and posture are beginning to emerge. Once these have been finalised, the force structures, human resources and equipment needed to meet future defence obligations will emerge and the informed decisions taken as to what is needed.
At this juncture the important message concerning South African defence policy is not what the content of its policy is, but the fact that a consensus on defence has been achieved that will enable the recommendations of the defence review to move forward with confidence.12
FOOTNOTES
