On October 23, 1996, the UK Secretary of State for Defence, the Rt. Hon. Michael Portillo, presented, in his speech to the Belgian Royal Institute of International Affairs, the strongest case made to date by a senior British minister for the deployment of defences against ballistic missiles armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD), that are defined as nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons. He warned that: "Twenty countries outside NATO possess ballistic missiles now.... Some NATO territory is already within the arc of threat from the Middle East. If North Korea exports its more advanced systems other nations could be threatened.... Over a dozen countries have either the capability to deploy chemical or biological weapons, or they have development programmes at an advanced stage. Already a few of these countries can produce chemical or biological warheads for ballistic missiles.... Dictators impress and intimidate their populations and their neighbours by acquiring weapons of mass destruction.... We must take into account the risk of ballistic missiles spreading over the next few years. The threat for our NATO allies may grow. And none of us will want to deploy forces within range of hostile ballistic missiles without affording them the best possible protection. [Thus] we need ballistic missile defence, and we need to develop it jointly in NATO, with Europeans and Americans deciding together how best to respond to threats to our shared security interests."1
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Hawk missile launch RAYTHEON |
Mr. Portillo's speech was a significant indication of the evolution of British policy on the threats posed by WMD and ballistic missiles and the need to counter them. In the context of British policy on ballistic missile defences, his speech was significant for four reasons. First, he made it before the British government had announced officially its decision on the follow-up to the UK prefeasibility study (PFS) that was the centrepiece of current UK missile defence policy. The PFS was commissioned by the government in autumn 1994 and led by British Aerospace. Its objective was, in the words of the 1995 Statement on the Defence Estimates, "to identify practical defensive architectures against a range of scenarios, taking account of costs, risks and timescales as well as technical and industrial considerations...also [to] take account of current and past American and British research in this area."2 The PFS and a number of associated studies assessed the scenarios involving missile threats to British forces deployed abroad, to British sovereign territory and to the British Isles, and examined the feasibility of a range of possible responses that might be adopted to defend against these threats. This comprehensive review of the issues was completed during the summer of 1996 and was delivered to the Secretary of State for Defence in autumn 1996; a decision on the follow-up was expected during the spring of 1997. This PFS also reflected the UK collaboration in studies into missile threats and responses with the US and France and its lead of a 1994 study into possible European missile defence architectures and its participation in a number of studies initiated by the NATO Air Defence Committee.
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US Army Patriot >missile system
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The second reason why Mr. Portillo's speech was significant is because it would have required clearance by the Prime Minister's office under the conventions of collective cabinet responsibility as applied by Prime Minister John Major, and thus it represented a significant statement of British government policy. Third, his speech may be seen as his personal adoption, after due reflection, of the argument made by the Minister for Defence Procurement, the Rt. Hon. Roger Freeman in his June, 1995 interview with the defence correspondent of The Times shortly before his promotion to the cabinet. Mr. Freeman said: "I think there is a prima facie case for having a ballistic missile defence system. The threat comes from the Club Mad countries [in North Africa and the Middle East, including Libya and Iran].... We have a ten-year window before the UK effectively could be targeted from the Mediterranean and the Gulf."3 Fourth and lastly, Mr. Portillo's speech suggested that the British government was preparing to commit some of its scarce post-cold-war defence resources to missile defence.
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Hawk air defense 2000 RAYTHEON |
In a broader context, Mr. Portillo's speech also reflected the British government's increasing concern with the proliferation of WMD in general and chemical and biological weapons (CBW) in particular. Generally, the accepted categories of WMD are nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons, but to these must be added radiological weapons whose effects are more like those of CBW than those of nuclear weapons. An important 1996 US government study stressed the threat posed by the proliferation of WMD and drew attention to the potential threat posed by radiological weapons: "...that employed conventional explosives or other means to scatter radioactive material. Such a weapon would not produce a nuclear yield; however, it could spread contamination. While such weapons would have less military significance than devices that result in nuclear detonations, radiological weapons have enormous potential for intimidation."4
The increasing official UK concern with these threats was also reflected in two government statements to the House of Commons and by unusually blunt public statements by Admiral Sir Peter Abbott, UK Commander-in Chief, Fleet, NATO's Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Atlantic. In October 1996, the UK Armed Forces Minister, Nicholas Soames, provided a written answer to a parliamentary question on Iran's BW capability that included the statement that: "Iran has a developed biotechnology industry that would be capable of sustaining a biological warfare programme".5 Then, shortly afterwards, the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, the Rt. Hon. Malcolm Rifkind, made a major speech in which he warned that: "There is the ever-present threat of weapons of mass destruction, and I do not mean only nuclear weapons, on which most attention has been focused. The increasing threat from chemical and biological weapons [CBW] is introducing an entirely new dimension into the world, and is relevant not only as a threat from states but as a potential threat from terrorist organisations."6
Admiral Abbott's first statement was a speech in October to the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in which he stressed: "We need to address the awful truth that someone who cannot be coerced or dissuaded by diplomatic or economic means may one day wish to threaten and possibly use force against our people."7 He then gave an interview to Defense News in which he made it clear that: "British military officers are urging Britain and its NATO allies to develop a new pre-emptive strike policy to project power and, if necessary, take decisive action to deal quickly with potential military problems...the idea would be to use preemptive strikes to take out chemical or biological weapons facilities if a threat was perceived from a country such as Libya or Iraq." Abbott told Defense News that the Mediterranean region particularly is at risk, with 90 per cent of the wealth centred on the shores of European countries. Abbott said: "Early and decisive action in certain circumstances will be much more cost-effective and efficient in terms of lives and cash. It will have to include more pre-emptive measures...rather than waiting for adversaries to grow and become strong."8
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All of these statements by senior British policy-makers suggest that they see pre-emption and missile defence as a means of deterring both the proliferation of WMD and the escalation that would result from a regional aggressor's use of WMD in a conflict, while also seeing missile defences as a form of extended air defence, to protect British expeditionary forces from attacks by conventionally-armed ballistic and cruise missiles. But these statements underline the point made in the recent Centre for Defence and International Security Studies' (CDISS) Bailrigg Memorandum, The Devil's Brews II: Weapons of Mass Destruction and International Security, where it was stated that the security environment of north Africa, the Middle East (including the Persian Gulf) and Europe, as well as the relationship between the US and its allies in these areas, is being transformed by the proliferation of WMD, ballistic (and cruise) missiles. The authors agree on this point with the recent RAND Corporation study that, at best, the proliferation of WMD-armed missiles will make it much more difficult for the US and its allies to conduct multinational operations in north Africa and the Middle East. Over the next decade, the vulnerability of European cities to attacks by WMD-armed missiles may make it difficult, if not impossible, for some European governments to support US operations in support of its allies in these areas. Indeed some states, especially the rogue states in these areas, may see WMD-armed missiles as a way of driving a wedge between the US and its NATO allies. Given the particularly strong ties between the US and the UK, such states also are likely to see the UK as a particularly valuable target for strategic intimidation by their WMD-armed missiles once these missiles have the range to reach London.9
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US Army Patriot launcher CRAYTHEON |
Accordingly, there are three questions that might be posed and answered that were suggested during Mr. Portillo's speech, as well as by the statements of Mr. Soames, Mr. Rifkind and Admiral Abbott. First, what are the strategic threats posed to UK and European interests by the proliferation of WMD, as well as ballistic and cruise missiles to deliver them? Second, what ballistic and/or cruise missile defence systems may be available to the UK and Europe over the next few years, as a result of the large US investment in the development and deployment of what are known as theatre missile defence (TMD) systems? Third, what are the strategic implications for the UK that, with France, will likely be one of the two major contributors of European forces for any future US and European expeditionary force, of a decision to deploy, or not, defences against ballistic (and cruise) missiles, including missiles armed with WMD?
The authors have, with colleagues at the Centre for Defence and International Security Studies (CDISS), Lancaster University, published widely these threats, so a summary will suffice. In addition to the five declared nuclear weapons powers (the US, Russia, the UK, France and China) approximately 31 other countries possess ballistic missiles, most of which are short- to-medium-range theatre ballistic missiles (TBMs). As many as 74 countries possess cruise missiles, most of which are short-range anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) but, as noted these ASCMs "provide the technologies needed to develop long-range, land-attack missiles" and there is a "rapidly increasing threat to US forces deployed overseas and its allies posed by cruise missiles in the hands of rogue regimes and potentially hostile governments."10 Israel, India and Pakistan are believed to be undeclared nuclear weapons powers while North Korea is believed to have enough fissile material for four to six weapons. It appears that in 1991 Iraq was only about a year away from assembling a nuclear weapon. According to Jane's Intelligence Review, in 1995 between 10 and 12 countries were believed to possess programmes to develop biological weapons (BW), and up to 20 countries were believed to possess programmes to develop chemical weapons (CW) including Libya, Iran and North Korea.11 The authors believe that many of these countries may have CBW.
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Saddam Hussein used CW on a large scale, including the first wartime use of nerve gas CW against Iranian forces and the civilian Iraqi population between 1980 and 1988. Saddam deployed, but did not use, about 25 Iraqi-modified Scuds (Al Husseins) armed with BW in the 1991 Gulf War. He did attack Israel and Saudi Arabia with conventionally armed, Iraqi-modified Scuds (Al Husseins) in the 1991 Gulf War. These attacks were neutralised by a range of countermeasures taken by the US-led coalition, including air strikes and special forces operations against the Al Hussein launchers plus active and passive defences. The active defences were US-manufactured Patriot PAC-2 missiles with an ATBM capability, and their success rate according to detailed US Army analyses was over 40 per cent in Israel and over 70 per cent in Saudi Arabia.12
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However, the main threat to Europe is posed by the group of rogue regimes that collaborate to develop WMD and ballistic and cruise missiles, notably Libya, Iran and North Korea. Also Iraq appears to retain approximately 85 Al Hussein missiles and may retain some CBW stockpiles despite the efforts of the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) to enforce the terms of the cease-fire that ended the Gulf War and included a prohibition on Iraqi ballistic missiles and WMD. As head of UNSCOM, ambassador Rolf Ekeus warned: "It is a matter of life and death for the states in the region and there-fore we cannot rest until we have accounted for them."13
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These rogue states are developing capable ballistic and cruise missiles, including what are known as autonomous missile capabilities. These are the capabilities to assemble missiles provided by suppliers together with limited technical guidance. Two of the most striking examples of the growing missile threat are provided by Iran and North Korea.
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Iran's ballistic missile inventory consists mainly of North Korean-supplied Scud Bs that have a 320km range (200 miles) and Scud Cs with a 550km range (340 miles). Also China has supplied Iran with more than 200 160km-range (100 miles) CSS-8 tactical ballistic missiles. However the pattern of Iran's missile technology acquisitions since the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988 suggests that its ultimate goal is the establishment of an autonomous TBM manufacturing capability. Chinese and North Korean assistance has given Iran the capability to assemble complete Scud B and Scud C TBMs from knock-down kits imported from North Korea. North Korean-built plants at Isfahan and Sirjan can produce liquid fuels and structural components, while a Chinese-built production facility near Semnan is the centre of Iran's efforts to develop and produce the Mushak-series of TBMs with ranges between 120 and 200km (75-125 miles). Iran also may be following the Iraqi model by attempting to increase further the range of its Scud Bs and Cs through modifications. However, North Korea remains Iran's key missile technology supplier. Indeed, Iran is likely to acquire the 1,000km-range (620 miles) No-Dong 1, for which it has provided substantial development funding already.
For its part, Pyongyang is pursuing an aggressive ballistic and cruise-missile development programme. It has extensive holdings of short-range FROG rockets and Scud missiles, including the indigenously produced Scud C, a long-range and more accurate derivative of the ubiquitous Soviet-made Scud B. Beyond this, North Korea is close to deploying a new, even longer-range ballistic missile, the 1,000km (620 mile) No-Dong 1. If sold to Iran or Libya, the No-Dong 1 would pose serious threats to NATO's southern flank and to other western friends and allies in the Middle East. The No-Dong 1 is a mobile system that may be able to carry a WMD warhead. North Korea is also developing the Taepo Dong 1 and 2, a new series of indigenously produced and developed two-stage ballistic missiles. US intelligence agencies have assessed the Taepo Dong 2 as having a range of 4,000-6,000km (2,500-3,720 miles). This system could be available for deployment and export after the year 2000 and would pose new, long-range threats to the US and its allies in Europe and elsewhere.
Clearly, as these and other programmes indicate, the strategic threats to Europe and to European interests from missiles in the Mediterranean and the Gulf are real and growing. The main threat is that, as Mr. Portillo suggested, rogue regimes, or other hostile regimes, see ballistic missiles, especially WMD-armed missiles, as their preferred weapon of strategic intimidation to achieve economic, military and ideological objectives. These objectives will include control of oil revenues, either indirectly by levying tribute, or directly, by taking over oil fields. Such regimes also see WMD-armed missiles as their most effective means of intimidating the UK, France and other NATO-Europe members into not supporting their allies in the Middle East and the Gulf and assisting US attempts to support its allies in the area.
Summarised in Table 1 are the basic characteristics of US and allied theatre missile defence (TMD) systems and in Table 2, the time lines for the deployment of these systems. These TMD systems are designed to defend US and allied forces and allied cities against attacks by ballistic and cruise missiles armed with conventional or WMD warheads. From the British perspective, the three most relevant points illustrated by these tables are first that the very large US investment in TMD, especially since the Gulf War, is paying off in the form of effective TMD systems that are already deployed, or will be deployed, within a few years' time. The US Army already deploys Patriot PAC-2 QRP/GEM and the US Marine Corps will deploy Improved Hawk III in 1997. By the year 2000, the US Army also will deploy Patriot PAC-3 and the THAAD User Operational Evaluation System (UOES). The THAAD UOES will consist of four launchers, two radars, two battle management suites and up to 40 missiles manned by two army battalions, available for rapid deployment to protect US and allied expeditionary forces in a regional crisis. Later, the US Army will deploy the First Unit Equipped (FUE) with THAAD (in 2004), followed by MEADS, while the US Navy will deploy the Aegis/Standard Navy Area Defense (NAD) UOES system, to be followed by NAD FUE and either the Aegis/Standard Navy Theatre Wide System or a marinised THAAD. The marinised THAAD will incorporate a modified THAAD kill vehicle into the US Navy's Theatre Wide System.
| Table 1 | ||||||
| WESTERN THEATER BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE (TMD) SYSTEMS SUMMARISED | ||||||
| U.S. SERVICE OR ALLY OPERATING THE SYSTEM | DESCRIPTION | |||||
| US ARMY Lower Tier | ||||||
| * Patriot PAC-2 | Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC) Level 2 with anti-tactical ballistic missile (ATBM) capability deployed on an emergency basis, from 1990 onwards, and used successfully in the 1991 Persian Gulf War. | |||||
| U.S. allies operating Patriot PAC-2: | The Netherlands, Germany, Israel, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia (Patriot PAC-2 QRP) and Japan. | |||||
| * Patriot PAC-2 | Post-Gulf War Quick Reaction Program (QRP)/Guidance Enhancement QRP/GEM QRP/GEM improvements, also known as Guidance Enhanced Missile (GEM), provide increased lethality and coverage for the defence of large urban areas and large and small military targets against ballistic and cruise missile attacks. U.S. Army Forces in the Republic of Korea are assumed to deploy PAC-2 QRP/GEM. | |||||
| * Patriot PAC-3 | More capable evolutionary development of PAC-2 QRP/GEM for defence against ballistic and cruise missile attacks, with a new fire control radar and some units equipped with a new hit-to-kill interceptor.(1) | |||||
| U.S. allies' interest: | Germany is reportedly interested in acquiring the Patriot PAC-3. | |||||
| Upper Tier | ||||||
| * THAAD UOES | The Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) User Operational Evaluation System (UOES) is a rapidly deployable, air transportable prototype consisting of four launchers, two Ground Based Radars (GBRs), two battle management suites and up to 40 missiles designed for training or use in a crisis. The THAAD missile can intercept ballistic missiles outside and inside the atmosphere (exo- and endo-atmospheric capability) and is capable of taking two shots at attacking ballistic missiles (a shoot-look-shoot capability). This capability would also enable Lower Tier systems (i.e., Patriot, HAWK, and Navy Area Defense) to take additional shots at attacking ballistic missiles. The THAAD missile is a hit-to-kill missile which can neutralise some, or all, of the destructive effects of missiles armed with Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) warheads, that is, nuclear, chemical, biological or radiological warheads. | |||||
| * THAAD FUE | First Unit Equipped (FUE), an improved version of the UOES will militarise the UOES design, and upgrade certain components, such as the infrared seeker, the radar, and battle management/command, control and communications. | |||||
| US MARINE CORPS Lower Tier | ||||||
| * Improved HAWK | Upgraded version of Improved HAWK provides anti-tactical ballistic missile capability by Phase 3 (2) improving the radar, the HAWK missile, and through development of the Air Defense Communications Platform. I-HAWK Phase 3 allows for near-term defense of amphibious points of debarkation and other critical theater targets. | |||||
| US NAVY Lower Tier | ||||||
| * Lower Tier | Consists of Standard Missile (SM)-2 Block IVA interceptors deployed aboard two Aegis (Navy Area Defense) cruisers. The missiles with UOES have a new terminal infrared seeker, fuze, and warhead. | |||||
| UOES | The Aegis SPY-1 radar will receive upgraded software and weapon and command detection system. Navy Lower Tier will provide a mobile, seaborne Patriot-like coverage for ports coastal cities, and airfields. | |||||
| * Lower Tier FUE | First unit equipped | |||||
| Upper Tier | ||||||
| * Upper Tier | Provides coverage similar to THAAD and also offers ascent-phase interceptability in cases (Navy Theater Wide) where Aegis ships can be positioned near the launch point, and between the launch point and the target area, that is, the system can be used to intercept ballistic missiles in the early phases of their flight. Upper Tier involves mating the SM-2 Block IVA missile with a homing kill vehicle to destroy ballistic missiles above the atmosphere. According to Armed Forces Journal International the "kill vehicle will likely be a manoeuvering hit-to-kill warhead called the Lightweight Exoatmospheric Projectile (LEAP).... A 'marinized' THAAD missile is also being evaluated as an alternative to the SM-2/LEAP interceptor." | |||||
| US AIR FORCE | ||||||
| * Airborne Laser (ABL) | ABL Boost Phase Intercept (BPI) system designed to engage enemy tactical ballistic missiles during their boost phase when their rocket motors are still firing and they are still over enemy territory. The ABL will be deployed aboard a modified Boeing 747 aircraft. | |||||
| NATO Lower Tier US-Germany-Italy | ||||||
| Medium Extended | Theater Missile Defense (TMD) system designed to provide US and NATO manoeuver forces Air System (MEADS) with 360 degree defence protection against tactical ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles. A mobile system that is transportable on C-130 aircraft, MEADS would replace HAWK, and ultimately Patriot. MEADS will have greater firepower than Patriot, with three or four times as many missiles per launcher as Patriot. | |||||
| MIDDLE EAST Israel | ||||||
| Arrow 2 | A fixed site, non-transportable TMD system designed to protect Israeli urban and military targets. Arrow is being developed by the US and Israel, with the US paying some 80 per cent of its cost. | |||||
| ASIA Taiwan | ||||||
| * Modified Air Defense | A modified Patriot system designed to defend against Chinese tactical ballistic missiles and air System (MADS) threats. | |||||
| * Sky Bow | Indigenously produced system based on the Patriot design, intended to have an (Tien Kung) III ATBM capability. | |||||
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NOTES (1) According to Armed Forces Journal International (cited below), the new PAC-3 missile was "formerly called the Extended Range Interceptor (ERINT)", and "The...PAC-3 missile will use the existing Patriot launcher and radar... . The launcher will carry 16 ready-to-fire PAC-3 missiles, compared to four Patriot PAC-2 missiles per launcher. The army plans to put PAC-3 missiles on two of the eight launchers in each Patriot battery; one of the other launchers will also be PAC-3-capable but will carry PAC-2 missiles." (2) In addition to the U.S. Marine Corps, the Improved HAWK is in service with some 22 allied countries. These systems could be upgraded, with US assistance, to I-HAWK Phase III anti-tactical ballistic missile (ATBM) capability. Sources: Statement by Paul G. Kaminski, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, before the US House Committee on National Security Subcommittee on Military Research & Development and the Subcommittee on Military Procurement, September 27, 1996 (as reported by Federal News Service); Glenn W. Goodman, Jr., "Theater Protection," Armed Forces Journal International, September 1996, pp. 46-51; and Robin Ranger and David Wiencek, The Devil's Brew II: Weapons of Mass Destruction and International Security (CDISS: 1996), Bailrigg Memorandum 17. | ||||||
Second, there is strong US support for TMD from a bi-partisan consensus in the Legislative Branch (the House of Representatives and the Senate), the Executive Branch (the Presidency) and the uniformed military. As a result, the Fiscal Year 1997 Defense Budget signed by President Clinton included approximately $3.7 billion for missile defence programmes, including TMD and national missile defence (NMD), with the Legislative Branch adding $914 million to the Executive Branch requests. Because the November 1996 election returned another divided government, with a Republican majority in the House and Senate and a Democratic President Clinton, funding for US missile defence programmes is likely to continue at similar levels. (Although there are significant political differences on NMD programmes to defend the US, these are not relevant to this analysis.)
| Table 2 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Availability of Western Theater Ballistic Missile Defence Systems | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Existing deployments and notional deployment dates for First Unit Equipped (FUE) or first User Operational Evaluation System (UOES) plus selected test dates for longer-term systems (as of November 1, 1996) | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | |||||||||||||
| US service or ally operating the system | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| US Army | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Patriot PAC-2 QRP/GEM(1) | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Patriot PAC-3 FUE | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| THAAD UOES | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| THAAD FUE | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| US Marine Corps | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Improved HAWK Phase III(2) | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| US Navy | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Lower Tier (Navy Area Defence) UOES | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Lower Tier FUE | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Upper Tier (Navy Theater Wide) | (FLIGHT TESTS BEGIN) | |||||||||||||||||||||||
| US Air Force | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Airborne Laser (ABL) | (TEST AGAINST THEATER BALISTIC MISSILE) | |||||||||||||||||||||||
| NATO | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Netherlands | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Patriot PAC-2 (3) | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Germany | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Patriot PAC-2 (3) | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Patriot PAC-3(4) | POSSIBLE | |||||||||||||||||||||||
| US-Germany-Italy | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) | (PROJECT BEGINS) | (DEFINITION AND VALIDATION PHASE CONCLUDES) | (INITIAL DEPLOYMENT) | |||||||||||||||||||||
| MIDDLE EAST | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Israel | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Patriot PAC-2(3) | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Arrow 2(5) | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Kuwait | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Patriot PAC-2(3) | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Saudi Arabia | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Patriot PAC-2 QRP (3) | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| ASIA | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Japan | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Patriot PAC-2(3) | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Republic of Korea | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| US Army | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Patriot PAC-2 QRP/GEM(6) | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Taiwan | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Modified Air Defense System (MADS) (modified Patriot) | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Sky Bow (Tien Kung) III (7) | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| NOTES | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
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| Sources: Statement by Paul G. Kaminski, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, before the US House Committee on National Security Subcommittee on Military Research & Development and the Subcommittee on Military Procurement, September 27, 1996 (as reported by Federal News Service); and Glenn W. Goodman, Jr., 'Theater Protection', Armed Forces Journal International, September 1996, pp 46-51 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| © ROBIN RANGER AND DAVID WIENCEK, 1996 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
Third, several US allies have acquired, or are acquiring, TMD systems from, or in association with, the US. These systems can form the basis of regional missile defence systems based on combinations of US and allied TMD systems in NATO, the Middle East and Asia. In NATO, the Netherlands and Germany deploy Patriot PAC-2s and participate with the US in the large annual Roving Sands exercises testing defences against ballistic and cruise missiles. Germany may acquire Patriot PAC-3 and the US, Germany and Italy are collaborating on the development of the MEADS system. In the Middle East, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have acquired Patriot PAC-2s. Israel also has acquired Patriot PAC-2s and is developing, with considerable US assistance, the Arrow 2 TMD for deployment in 1998.
The way in which US, NATO and regional allies' TMD systems can be combined was demonstrated in the last few days of the Gulf War. A Dutch Patriot battalion was deployed to Israel to add to the defences provided by US-manufactured Patriots manned by US Army and Israeli defence force (IDF) personnel. As Tim Ripley noted, "this was the first example of a multilateral missile defence system...deployed by the US and another NATO member, the Netherlands, and Israel, a regional ally."14
In Asia, Taiwan is co-producing, with the US, a modified Patriot known as the modified air defence system (MADS) and intends to develop its own Sky Bow III system with an anti-tactical ballistic missile (ATBM) capability. Also, the US has deployed Patriots to South Korea to defend US military assets there, while South Korea is reported as being interested in acquiring Patriots. During the 1996 US election campaign, Republican presidential candidate Robert J. Dole called for a Pacific democracy defence programme that would extend TMD coverage to Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and other allies. Dole recommended export licensing of THAAD when it becomes available, and in the interim, making operational prototypes (UOES) available for the defence of US Asian allies.15 Already Japan has committed about $5 million in seed money for TMD architecture studies, including THAAD and Navy Area and Theatre Wide options.
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THAAD launcher LOCKHEED MARTIN |
These points suggest that, given the UK's geographical situation, if British policymakers decide to acquire TMD systems they might face a choice of two options. One would be the near-term defence of UK expeditionary forces and overseas territories, or the mid-term defence of the UK homeland. UK expeditionary forces are now, and increasingly will be, at risk from attacks by WMD-armed ballistic missiles. The UK could continue to rely on US-manned TMD systems to protect British expeditionary forces, as they did in the Gulf, on the assumption that UK forces will be deployed overseas only with American and other allied forces. But even if this assumption were correct, reliance on US-manned TMD systems runs the risk that they may not, for whatever reasons, be in the best place to protect British forces. So UK policymakers could decide to acquire air-transportable, land-based, lower tier (short-range) US-manufactured TMD that are, or soon will be, available, such as Patriot PAC-2/PAC-3 and Improved Hawk III. These might be supplemented later by a seaborne TMD system deployed on the Royal Navy's new NATO frigate and comparable, initially, to US Navy lower-tier Aegis/Standard. (This could be developed into a system comparable to the navy upper-tier or marinised THAAD at a later stage.)
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THAAD Upper Tier architecture LOCKHEED MARTIN |
Alternatively, UK policymakers could chose the mid-term option of defending the UK by acquiring upper-tier (systems that intercept Theatre Ballistic Missiles at longer ranges and primarily above the atmosphere) US-manufactured TMD systems such as THAAD and/or the navy theatre-wide system or marinised THAAD. The UK homeland is unlikely to be threatened by attacks from WMD-armed ballistic missiles from the Mediterranean or the Levant for some years. But the most effective defence against such attacks might be provided by a combination of a seaborne system able to co-operate with the US and, if deployed, allied TMD systems in intercepting attacking ballistic missiles over the territory of the aggressor state, or the Mediterranean, plus a land-based THAAD system to intercept any missiles that were able to get past seaborne defences.
However, British policymakers might not have to chose between these two options if the US and the UK could arrange to reduce the costs of the short-term option, perhaps by leasing arrangements, while engaging in the co-operative development of the mid-term options. In strategic terms, British policymakers should not have to chose between these two options because they are complementary. The most rapidly available and effective defence of the key assets of British expeditionary forces against attacks by ballistic and cruise missiles armed with conventional and WMD warheads would probably be the Patriot PAC-3 lower-tier defence system. This is being produced in 1996-97 and could then be upgraded (on US lines for some units) with the new PAC-3 missile. Such leasing arrangements would enhance near-term NATO TMD capabilities while freeing up scarce UK defence resources to collaborate with the US in the development and co-production of mid-term, Upper-Tier TMD systems such as THAAD, Navy Upper Tier and marinised THAAD that would further enhance NATO TMD capabilities. In addition, the most effective defence of both British expeditionary forces and the British homeland would be a combination of lower- and upper-tier defences.
Given the current thrust of UK defense procurement decisions it is likely that the UK's choice of any particular TMD system will be substantially influenced by the scope that the various systems offer for UK industrial participation. Following pressure from the House of Commons Defence Committee, reflecting the past under-performance of offset undertakings, the UK MOD has established a much stronger system of audit. The MOD has also drawn attention to the facts that the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) contract with Boeing has produced business worth some $1.57 billion for some 250 UK companies and that MOD estimate that some 180 UK companies will receive between them business worth £2 billion arising from the Apache helicopter order. The question of "What is in it for British industry?" already counts for more than it did a few years ago under the present Conservative government. A future Labour government will give even more importance to this question and it will see as the proper answer: "There is a lot in it for British industry".
So far this analysis has shown that, on the one hand, increasingly serious strategic threats are being posed to UK and European interests by the proliferation of WMD-armed ballistic missiles. On the other hand, there is a range of missile defences to counter these threats available from US TMD programmes. However, for British policymakers what the US calls TMD systems comprise lower-tier, short-range missile defences (such as Patriot and Navy Area Defense) and upper-tier, long-range missile defences (such as THAAD, navy theatre-wide defences and marinised THAAD).
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THAAD Battle Management, Command, Control and Communications and Intelligence (BMC3I) LOCKHEED MARTIN |
In principle, British policymakers have to decide whether, over the next ten years, the UK should deploy missile defences. As Humphry Crum Ewing has noted, there are two opposing interpretations of a new ten-year rule: "[There is an] explicit view held by some Ministry of Defence officials that as they foresee no threat over the next ten years there is no need to prepare to counter it until then as distinct from the view that, as there is a possibility that there will be a threat in ten years time, we have to be prepared to counter it by then.16
The case for the UK deploying missile defences outweighs the case for not deploying them. In practice, whether the UK can do so will depend on detailed calculations of technical effectiveness and costs. The technical arguments about the effectiveness of defences against WMD-armed ballistic missiles are extremely complex and are explored in The Devil's Brews I and II. However, the basic argument is that rogue regimes are likely to have a relatively limited number of WMD-armed ballistic missiles so that even limited defences may be able to neutralise their missiles in conjunction with other measures such as counterstrikes against missile launchers.
This case for missile defences also draws on one of the lessons from the failures of British strategic policy in the 1930s. Britain was developing an effective air-defence system against Hitler's bombers, but slowly because of Chancellor of the Exchequer Neville Chamberlain's limits on defence spending. But in the 1938 Munich crisis, Prime Minister Chamberlain and his advisers underestimated the effectiveness of Britain's air defences and overestimated the effectiveness of Hitler's bombers. Chamberlain thus allowed Hitler to engage in successful strategic intimidation on an unprecedented scale: Germany annexed Czechoslovakia without fighting.
The basic case for deployment is that missile defences are an effective means of preventing rogue regimes from using WMD-armed ballistic missiles as weapons of strategic intimidation and UK defences added to US and other allied defences would strengthen the barriers to such intimidation. If rogue regimes know that the UK has no defences they will be tempted, as noted earlier, to target UK forces or the UK, for strategic intimidation because the UK is a close ally of the US. But if the UK has its own defences, developed in collaboration with the US, then the UK becomes a much less attractive target.
FOOTNOTES
