Iran has been a good market for arms exporters for many years. What was once American terrain has become that of Russia and China. The Iranian government's key objective in building up its armed forces is the same now as it was before the revolution in 1979: to secure regional military superiority. Though Iran has been thwarted in attaining this goal by the enormous drain of resources the 1980-1988 war with Iraq exacted, its commitment has not been deterred. Recent naval purchases from Russia and China underline Iranian determination to project a powerful military force.
| The T-72 is among the equipment Iran is taking delivery of by the end of 1996 |
When the Shah's government was overthrown in 1979, the military's source of advanced weaponry was displaced. Several US and UK arms agreements were cancelled and by 1982, Iran's position of military superiority in the Persian Gulf area was crumbling. The Iran-Iraq War devastated Iranian force levels and Iran had to re-arm its air and ground forces almost completely. During the war other Persian Gulf states who, unlike Iran, had access to western markets, built up their armouries with advanced weaponry. The Iranian government's ability to remedy the technological gap has been hindered by financial constraints and severely constricted supplier access. As with other Gulf states, Iran suffered financially when the oil market was flat, especially as oil accounted for almost 90 per cent of Iran's export revenues. The post-war surge of arms purchases from 1989-1992 also affected the economy when payments became due in 1992 and by the end of 1993 Iran owed approximately $30 billion. In 1995 the Iranian defence budget was almost halved from its 1993 total of $4.86 billion to $2.5 billion. By 1995, much of the government's acquisition plans to rebuild its army and air force were in place.
The 1996 defence budget of $3.4 billion placed an emphasis on strengthening naval forces. The acquisition of Russian Kilo class diesel-electric submarines, and Chinese C-802 anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM) and EM-52 rising mines, underlined Iranian plans to control the Strait of Hormuz through which all Persian Gulf oil must pass, and the Persian Gulf in general but the US presence in the Persian Gulf since the end of the Gulf War is a thorn in Iran's side.
Russia emerged as the main arms supplier to Iran in the early 1990s. Traditionally, Russia supplied world-class, high-technology weapons while China supplied less expensive, low-technology weapons to fill out the Iranian force structure. Multi-billion dollar arms deals were negotiated with Russia in 1989 and in 1992. Though financial problems have arisen, MiG-29 multi-role aircraft, Ilyushin-76 early-warning aircraft, T-72 MBTs, air-to-air missiles and launchers, and three Kilo class submarines are among the equipment to be delivered by December 1996. A two-year arms transfer agreement of $1 billion lifts the total for purchases between 1996 and 2005 to $4 billion.
| The Ilyushin-76 early-warning aircraft |
Iran's relationship with China may now eclipse that of Russia in military equipment sales. A $4.5-billion deal was announced in September. It is reported to include combat aircraft, fast patrol boats, multiple rocket launchers, armoured personnel carriers, surface-to-surface missiles, and missile launchers. Iran is to pay China over five years with cash and oil. Equipment that Iran has received already through procurement agreements with China include the F-8 Finback fighter, Hudong missile patrol boats that carry the C-802 ASCM, Silkworm ASCM, EM-52 rising mine, and various MBTs. China also is believed to be Iran's principle source of chemical weapon precursors and production technology, as well as pre-nuclear technology in the form of small research reactors and technical assistance in developing uranium resources.
| Recent purchases from Russia include theMiG-29 multirole aircraft |
Iran also has purchased surplus stocks from former Warsaw Pact states. Tehran reached an agreement with Poland early in 1995 to sell it 100 T-72s. Belarus is reported to be negotiating a sale of defensive weapons. Ukraine has been negotiating with Iran for an oil-for-arms deal consisting of MiG-29s, T-72s, S-300 air-defence systems, and Sunburst ASCMs but this was never realised because of American pressure not to arm what they believe is a terrorist state, Russian pressure not to move in on its market and Iranian financial problems.
| There are an increasing number of Silkworm missile sites along the Persian Gulf coast that pose a significant potential threat |
Resource limitations also have had an impact on Iran's ability to develop its own arms production capability. It has sought dual-use technologies and military know-how from Russia, China, and North Korea. Continued progress will be linked to relationships with Russia and China and the degree to which these states decide to extend their goodwill in the form of resources. Iran has succeded in developing technologies for unsophisticated weapons systems, even though the infrastructure to support such development is inefficient. In June Iran boasted of its self-sufficiency when it test-fired successfully a 122-mm self-propelled gun, the first such weapon Iran has claimed to produce. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard this year field-tested, rebuilt and modernised T-54 MBTs captured from Iraq during the war. Iran claimed all components for the upgrade were made in Iran and that production was imminent. Though Iran has not successfully adapted and maintained combat aircraft sold to the Shah's government by the US, it continues to fly F-14 Tomcats having reverse-engineered critical parts.
Although Iran is using its naval forces as an instrument of defence and foreign policy, it is not clear what might trigger the operation of these forces. Prior to delivery in 1995 of 10 Hudong patrol boats equipped with C-802 missiles, Iran was without a ship-mounted ASCM capability. With the refitting of Iran's Kaman class fast-attack boats, they will have 20 craft carrying this missile and forty C-802 missiles are reported to have been sold. The Iranians test fired a C-802 in early January in the Arabian Sea.
Though less accurate than the C-802, the number of Silkworm missile sites along the Persian Gulf coast, especially near the Strait of Hormuz, poses a potential threat. Iran also has surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missile batteries on Qeshm and Sirri islands, and on Abu Musa, the island claimed by the United Arab Emirates but occupied by Iran.
The EM-52 rising mines are part of a 3,000-weapon stockpile of anti-ship mines. This purchase is significant because, unlike most other mines, the EM-52 is operational in deep water such as the Persian Gulf. When the hull of a ship passes over the device the mine is triggered and a rocket is fired at the hull. Placed in choke points such as the Strait of Hormuz, this device could be devastating.
The delivery of the third Kilo-class submarine will confirm the Iranian intention to dominate the Persian Gulf. Each submarine carries 18 torpedoes and can be used to lay mines. No other Gulf state has this weapon.
The naval exercises that took place between October 1995 and March 1996 leave little doubt about Iranian military preparations. Sabotaging ports and attacking oil platforms and coastal targets, the focus of the 38 naval exercises was to close the Strait of Hormuz.
