The tasks of the NATO peace implementation force (IFOR) in Bosnia are almost complete. IFOR's presence and western diplomatic pressure have forced Karadic and Mladic to abandon their posts. But new Bosnian Serb leaders continue a separatist strategy for Republika Srbska and the nationalist leaders of the Bosnians and the Bosnian Croats have legitimised their power through elections. Thus IFOR is a success in all but the most crucial respect. The ideal of a united and single Bosnian state is giving way to ethnic partition and nationalist dominance. The Dayton agreement sought more, but its full provisions are unlikely to be fulfilled. IFOR will lock in partition unless the west undertakes a programmatic revision to resuscitate the Dayton process. But it would be wrong to blame IFOR for lack of progress, the US and the rest placed inadequate emphasis on the civilian side of Dayton implementation.
Notwithstanding the final outcome, a great deal has been achieved. IFOR has been a military success in four areas. First, it has stopped the war in Bosnia and created an opportunity for implementation of the civilian aspects of Dayton. According to Article l, Annex 1-A, of the Dayton Agreement, the obligations under-taken by the parties to the agreement are "to establish a durable cessation of hostilities...lasting security and arms-control measures." IFOR's mission is to ensure that these obligations are met. By weight of numbers and under robust rules of engagement, IFOR ended the war in Bosnia. The 54,000-strong multi-ethnic force is composed of personnel from all 16 NATO nations, the largest contributors being the US, the UK and France, and from 16 non-NATO countries. IFOR has secured the cessation of hostilities, the separation of forces, and demobilisation and cantonment as required by Dayton for re-establishing normal conditions of life. The four-kilometre cease-fire zones of separation (ZOS) are still under surveillance. Mine clearance and monitoring and removal of checkpoints have aided, but not yet secured, free movement. In addition, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) was successful in forging an agreement on confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs) between the former warring parties. The agreement prohibits large military exercises and the re-introduction of foreign forces to the region and contains an elaborate set of verification procedures. Despite its limitations, it has helped to reduce tension by minimising the risk of a massive pre-meditated attack.1
Arms-control measures encompassing the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), Croatia and the Bosnian parties, have been agreed but responsibility for implementing them remains outside IFOR's remit. The arms-control agreement, signed under the auspices of the OSCE, reduces levels of heavy weaponry held by FRY and Croatia, permits an increase in Bosnian Federation levels and establishes a balance in the region.
| Personnel at four of the 18 consoles aboard the Northrop Grumman joint surveillance target attack radar system E-8C development aircraft |
Secondly IFOR has provided a testing ground for new technologies and operational doctrines. A four-month experimental run for the E-8A and E-8C joint surveillance target attack radar system (JSARS) proved its usefulness in monitoring compliance with withdrawal from the zones of separation and helped complete its operational testing that began during the Persian Gulf War.2 Also, for the first time, ground stations are sharing the acquired data with NATO and non-NATO IFOR participants. Systems introduced in Bosnia include video teleconferencing, real-time UAV video and Internet and worldwide web access.3 Also new to a coalition-organised operation was commercial direct-broadcast satellite technology and a new system of intelligence sharing.
| A Northrop Grumman joint surveillance target attack radar system development aircraft on its way to support the Bosnia NATO peace Implementation Force (IFOR) |
Civil-military operations centres (CMOC)4 that have served in recent operations in Somalia, Rwanda and Haiti are operating in Bosnia as a means of interfacing with non-governmental organisations, humanitarian groups and UN agencies. Hundreds of civilian affairs personnel are employed in civil-military operations teams that liaise with NGO groups on reconstruction, aid-distribution projects and information about land mines.
Thirdly, it has found the alliance's intelligence-sharing arrangements wanting. Bosnia sparked the evolution of NATO's intelligence-sharing and synthesis approach. Before IFOR, the US largely controlled NATO's intelligence apparatus. Out of a concern about compromising US and other national intelligence contributions, NATO established a fundamental principle that states: "Under normal circumstances nearly all NATO intelligence is supplied to the Alliance by nations for the exclusive use of the Alliance as a whole and for its constituent nations. Intelligence provided on this basis cannot be given by NATO to a non-member nation or any international organisation containing non-member nations. Whatever different requirements emerge for peace support operations, this fundamental principle must be upheld." (NATO Military Committee Doc. 327, Annex D).
NATO has managed to work around this to achieve some sharing of information in IFOR by protection of sources and methods. Arrangements have been made to distribute information to NATO and non-NATO commanders and to connect all participating forces to a dissemination system. Information is being prepared as analysis, and non-critical imagery is being shared with coalition partners. The Bosnia C2 augmentation system merges command and control with the functional information gathering and communications technologies in Tuzla. This electronic transfer system connects Pentagon planners to NATO commanders in Bosnia via the joint intelligence distribution system.
Shared information from the US is first sanitised by a national intelligence support team (NIST) of DIA, NSA and CIA elements. French commanders in Sarajevo and British in Gornji Vakauf, among others, also are linked to the electronic image system through a central operating control system called combined air operations control. Allies receive information on the weather, mines and locations of troops as well as the battlefield situation.
Russia and non-NATO partners are more remotely linked to the joint system. What they are supplied from NATO is downgraded and treated to protect methods of collection. It is then co-ordinated by joint military councils.
Fourthly, it has strengthened military ties between NATO members, Russia and the NATO aspirants of central Europe. Russia, with traditional interests in the Balkans, would have been a problem for IFOR if it had been left out. Working in a special command arrangement, IFOR set Russian troops the difficult task of patrolling one of Bosnia's most dangerous areas. Russian troops have operated within the US zone in north-east Bosnia and co-operated in a professional spirit with other IFOR troops. The enthusiasm central and eastern European countries contributed to IFOR is an indication of their desire to join NATO. Practical co-operation on the ground will strengthen the Partnership-for-Peace programme and benefit those countries applying to join the alliance. But still IFOR has failed to re-unite Bosnia.
Meshing force with diplomacy, international economic reconstruction, preparation for elections, refugee resettlement, and prosecution of war criminals, the civilian elements of Dayton were to have gone on in parallel with the IFOR tasks. The OSCE and Carl Bilt are in charge of civilian implementation. In fact, the civilian effort lagged because of the focus on the military, poor co-ordination, lack of command and control structures analogous to those of the military, and donor fatigue. Although everything is behind schedule and municipal elections were postponed, the US pressured the OSCE into certifying that conditions were adequate for elections to be free and fair. Carried out without first wresting power from indicted war criminals, the national elections were neither. They were a rubber-stamping of nationalist leaders and reportedly were marked by fraudulent activity. In adapting itself to the post cold-war, NATO is finding that military effort can go only so far. For example, freedom of movement for civilians remains one of the biggest problems in Bosnia. Although the situation has improved since the arrival of IFOR, most inter-ethnic movement takes place under armed escort.
IFOR spokesmen say the roads between Klujuc and Jajce in the Anvil have a licence plate count showing 2,500-3,000 people cross daily from one side to the other without any hindrance, and that the situation is improving. On several occasions Bosnian Serbs have threatened to require visas for entry into Serb territory and to deny passage to Croat or Muslim men between 16 and 60, a clear violation of Dayton. The international police task force (IPTF) that comprises 1,500 monitors from 32 countries, is entrusted with assisting in the freedom of movement. Although there is close co-ordination between IFOR and IPTF, Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats still obstruct visits by displaced persons to their homes and in some instances this has led to violence and loss of life. IFOR should step up efforts to eradicate illegal check-points and the international community should focus more on the potential of the IPTF to make a lasting contribution to Bosnia. The IPTF mandate could be stronger to assist in repatriating refugees and in protecting all citizens. But first, a substantial increase in IPTF strength is needed.
In a report to the UN Security Council, Secretary-General B. B. Ghali observed: "Under present conditions, refugees and displaced persons can search for security only in areas where their ethnicity is in the majority, further cementing ethnic and political separation along the interentity boundary line and also within the Federation."5 IFOR commanders have been reluctant to become entangled in policing or other civilian roles for which their troops are neither trained nor equipped, but have missed opportunities to prevent violence by patrolling certain areas actively. The clearest example came during transfer of control in Sarajevo when IFOR troops did not prevent the departure of Bosnian Serb families from Sarajevo's suburbs or the looting and burning of homes that followed. IFOR has also refused to protect convoys of Bosnian refugees because it feared instability would be introduced into the Croat-dominated areas if Muslims returned. This illustrates the fundamental contradiction between security as a first priority, and the Dayton commitment to secure refugees their right of return. As a result there are more displaced people and refugees in Bosnia since Dayton.6 Ethnic partition is crystallised and the three national groups represented in Bosnia are becoming distinct state entities.
While IFOR guards against mission creep, circumscribing the mission has shut out a range of activity. For this reason IFOR has been subjected to the same criticism as UNPROFOR, that too little was done to serve refugees, to prevent a turbulent exodus from Sarajevo and to capture war criminals. IFOR's definition of a limited military mandate is based on impartiality. This argument was also employed to explain IFOR's reluctance to apprehend war criminals, especially Bosnian Serb leaders Karadzic and Mladic. Impartiality has not, however, been an overall guiding principle in the implementation of Dayton.
Control of the media rests firmly with the state-run or party-controlled outlets, with just a few independent tv and radio stations. Aside from one radio station in Banja Luka, there is no independent media in the Serb Republic or in the Croat-dominated region. Thus, without access to dissenting views, viable opposition parties have not formed. There is no opposition to the party representing Bosnian Croats who desire integration with Croatia, are recognised as citizens of Croatia and share a common currency.
| The joint STARS medium ground station module proved its usefulness in Bosnia |
The value of the operation and success of the mission may not be recognised unless political will is generated among US and European states to alter the political situation. Steps that should have been taken sooner include applying political pressure to maintain non-nationalist media outlets and the setting up of independent television broadcasts that would have been key to Dayton's success. IFOR has sought to establish a television station, but language and broadcast area limitations are prohibitive.
Many non-nationalist Bosnians wish to live together and in some areas the development of moderate voices has been healthy, assisted by alternative media outlets set up in Bosnian-government controlled areas. In Republika Srbska and Croat-controlled areas, the tightly controlled media has spread the message of extreme nationalism. The structuring of official commissions for refugees, national monuments, public corporations and elections has gone on with the appointment of a member from each ethnic group, with the practical effect of excluding opposition.7
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The joint STARS E-8C system installation Click picture for larger version (207Kb) |
Political developments that would provide for long-term stability have ceased and a surge toward partition has followed elections. The Federation of Bosnian Croats and Muslims, brokered by the US, has 51 per cent of Bosnia's territory, but will not hold together without intense pressure from Washington. Their loose union-of-convenience was used as a basis for military balance with the Serbs and as a foundation of constitutional power-sharing in a weak state structure between the federation and the Serb Republic. Without the strategic necessities forced on them by war, the incentive for Bosnian Croats and Bosnians to co-operate has diminished, as has the potential for a governing body envisaged in Dayton. A common government with a rotating president is a goal that nationalist leaders and a majority of Bosnians have failed to accept as legitimate. Meanwhile, NATO has done little to restore ethnic co-existence, or to bring the Serbs into the process.
The US, in pursuing the policy of arming the Bosnian Federation despite reluctance from many European participants in IFOR, has imposed two conditions: weapons will not be delivered until foreign troops, primarily Iranians, have left and a Bosnian Croat-Bosnian defence law is signed creating a unified federation command. Despite the fact that conditions have not been met,8 the US administration, with Turkey's assistance, has begun the $300-million programme and has asked for an additional $100 million for heavy weapons.
Assuming that the presence of US troops will last well past the declared December deadline, the exit strategy is vital. Unless mechanisms for creating a viable Bosnia get underway, sentry duty is all that has been accomplished. By pushing elections forward, the international community has endorsed ultra-nationalist plebiscites. IFOR will leave three separate armed camps with a deeply divided parliament and little incentive to co-operate and no capacity to govern. There is no shortage of potential quarrels that could re-immerse the parties in conflict leading to renewed war.
BASIC, of Carrara House, 20 Embankment Place, London, WC2N 6NN, is an independent research organisation that analyses international security issues. It promotes public awareness of defence, disarmament, military strategy and nuclear policies to foster informed debate on these issues. BASIC facilitates the exchange of information and analysis across the Atlantic.
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