Initiatives to normalise relations between the two Korean states traditionally have been greeted with suspicion, and results have been ponderous. The Korean War ended in 1953 with what was meant to be a temporary armistice agreement until a treaty could be for-mally agreed. No treaty has yet been agreed between the two Koreas. Instead, each has relied on their own protector states to insure their security. North Korea turned to the for-mer Soviet Union and China, and South Korea turned to the United States. These relationships evolved as the US entered negotiations with North Korea to halt their plutonium develop-ment programme in exchange for energy sup-ply assurances, and South Korea reached out to Russia and China for military-to-military contacts. Even as outside international security relationships progressed towards enhanced co-operation and transparency, the dynamics of the intra-Korean relationship largely has remained the same. Though there is undoubt-edly a foundation upon which to build better relations between the two states, the years of mistrust that have built up are difficult to per-meate. Military planning on the peninsula seems to echo the point.
The 1954 US-South Korean Mutual Defence Treaty, established as a means for South Korea to defend itself against outside aggression, serves as the basis for the presence of some 37,000 US military personnel in South Korea. Mired in decades of secrecy and political repression during military dictatorship, the South Korean Ministry of National Defence (MND) limited its outside contacts to the United States. Since the election of the first civilian president in 1993, Kim Young Sam, the MND has made a number of efforts to develop contacts with a broader range of countries including Russia and China states whose contacts with North Korea are crucial.
These efforts to diversify sources for defence procurement have focused on attaining tech-nology transfer and industrial development potential. A defence memorandum of under-standing (MOU) with Russia, under negotia-tion for over a year, is projected to be finalised by the end of 1996. This would supplement an earlier military co-operation arrangement signed in 1992 by extending provisions for sales of military hardware and technology, and creating joint-venture projects. The first sales agreement between the two states was finalised in May 1995 and was for US$209 million of military hardware. In July, an MOU was concluded with Indonesia that provided the vehicle for a swap of Indonesian Airtech CN-235 twin turboprop medium transport aircraft for South Korean K-1 MBTs and armoured vehicles in an exchange worth $120 million.
| Estimates indicate that North Korea can produce at least 150 Scud-B and -C surface-to surface ballistic missiles annually |
With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the special relationship that was largely responsi-ble for propping up the North Korean regime crumbled. North Korea has weathered severe financial problems, exacerbated by flooding over the past two summers and consequent food shortages. In addition, fissures between the armed forces and the Workers' Party have become visible especially in light of the absence of a declared head of the North Korean government. Regardless of these con-straints, the North Korean government has proceeded with a continued programme of military expansion and development largely through sales from its missile programme.
Estimates indicate that North Korea can pro-duce at least 150 Scud-B and -C surface-to-surface ballistic missiles with ranges of 300 and 500 km respectively a year. Complete systems, components, and production related technology are reported to have been exported to Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Libya and Syria over the past decade. Also there are indications that they are seeking sales of longer range systems that have been under development. The Nodong missile, that is expected to enter service by the end of 1996 or early 1997, has a range of 1,000km and has been co-financed with Iran. A test firing of the Nodong was conducted into the seas off the Japanese coast this autumn. Exports of this missile to the Middle East are anticipated. The Taepo-dong 1 with a 1,500km range and the Taepo-dong 2 with a 4,000km range are also under development. (Meanwhile the South Korean government has been engaged in talks with the US to revise its long-standing bilateral agreement limiting the range of its missiles to 180km in exchange for US advanced missiles and missile technology. It hopes to pursue a space programme, and enter the Missile Technology Control Regime that allows transfers of missile technology.)
The North Korean nuclear weapon pro-gramme is believed to be frozen and progress has been made in the implementation of the 1994 agreed framework between the US and North Korea. Orchestrated by the US, South Korea agreed to provide new pressurised light-water nuclear reactors with financial sup-port from Japan in order to ensure energy sup-plies, and North Korea agreed to deactivate its plutonium production nuclear reactors. There is, of course, no assurance that North Korea does not already possess a small number of nuclear weapons.
The geometry of the balance of forces on the Korean peninsula has remained the same this year: North Korea continues to support far more military personnel and South Korea con-tinues to spend overall significantly more on defence. North Korea has a total of 1.05 mili-tary personnel under arms, in contrast to a total of 660,000 in South Korea. According to South Korean sources, the North Korean Army gained some 15,000 troops last year raising the number of corps to 20 from 19. The Air Force maintained the same number of military aircraft approximately 1,600 but reorgan-ised into six air divisions in an effort to enhance combat readiness. The Navy added approximately 10 landing ships to make a total of approximately 800 surface vessels.
South Korean defence planning and spending now supports wider objectives for a more comprehensive strategic vision than merely providing a counterweight to the perceived conventional superiority of North Korean forces. Planning for the eventual withdrawal of American forces, the MND is attempting to diversify procurement sources and develop the capability to indigenously produce hard-ware. For example, a new 155mm self-pro-pelled gun, the XK9, that is based on the US M109A2, has been produced under a co-pro-duction agreement and is expected to be deployed in 1999. In addition, a greater emphasis on building naval and air forces seems to indicate planning for a time when the rival-ry on the Korean peninsula has been settled, and possibly, a reunified Korea takes on a regional role. As such, South Korea has estab-lished a programme to develop trainer air-craft, and has announced a request for pro-posals for a second batch of 13 anti-subma-rine warfare helicopters to equip their new fleet of KDX-class destroyers. A decision should be made by the end of 1996 with ini-tial funding in the 1997 defence budget.
The 1996 North Korean defence budget of approximately $2.4 billion is dwarfed by the South Korean defence budget of $15.6 billion, and the proposed budget for 1997 seems to follow that example. The South Korean presi-dent instructed the government to increase the national defence budget for 1997 by 12 per cent and stressed the need to enhance troop morale and streamline the nation's defence.
The North Korean bungled infiltration opera-tion of September 1996 seemed to mock the MND's stance that "many Koreans now understand that well-preparedness is the best way to expedite reunification without prob-lems." Though denied by the North Korean government, the submarine that became stranded on the South Korean shore is com-monly believed to have been the transporta-tion for a crew of spies. The South Korean defence minister eventually was sacked for failing to intercept the North Korean sub-marine before it reached the shore. The incident seems somewhat ironic in light of the strategic vision that has been cultivated in the MND apparently proving that the more the Korean relationship evolves, the more it stays the same.
