It was during the First World War that locating became a prominent asset when early soundranging became so effective that German commanders were forced to issue an order that read: "In consequence of the excellent sound-ranging of the English, I forbid any battery to fire alone when the whole section is quiet, especially in an east wind. Should there be occasion to fire, the adjoining battery must always be called on, either directly or through the group, to fire a few rounds."
In subsequent years, locating rose in prominence with the development of radar, acoustic and electro-optical devices as well as unmanned aircraft and accompanying survey and meteorological systems. During the '70s and '80s major ground armed forces had to build up their ability to deploy modern and effective locating systems in all of these fields to provide the most comprehensive and complimentary assets to ensure that commanders knew the enemy. Systems deployed during this period were capable of locating hostile artillery under most conditions of conflict. Technology was moving forward exponentially and weapons were being developed of a range, power and mobility that was to render many in-service equipments obsolete during the following decades. This was recognised in the early '80s by some armies and programmes were put in place to develop modern replacements to take armed forces into the next millennium.
| A product of international co-operation: the COBRA prototype No 1 in operational mode |
During the Second World War, over 50 per cent of all casualties were inflicted by indirect fire weapons and more recent conflicts have demonstrated a tendency for an increase in this effectiveness. Post-war USSR military doctrine was based on deployment of over 200 barrels per kilometre of front in an attack, a density of artillery that was unmatched, but effective locating assets, it was hoped, could do much to reduce or counter this threat. With massed Soviet artillery posing problems for NATO countries during the mid-80s, Britain, France and Germany formed a coalition to develop a counter-battery radar. The project was named COBRA, (counter battery radar). A commercial consortium of Racal (UK), Siemens (AG) (Germany), Thomson-CSF (France), and US company Lockheed Martin formed EURO-ART GmbH to manage the programme and produce the system. Many factors were taken into account, but the over-riding principle was to evolve a design whose manufacturing cost would be consistent with the military value provided. The Falklands conflict reinforced the need for effective locating and the Gulf War confirmed the essential requirement for modern, flexible and speedy TAS resources. However, the '90s have seen the increasingly important need for an ability to keep the peace, particularly with the example of the former Yugoslavia. And the collapse of the former Soviet Union has reduced the likelihood of opposing massed artillery. However, Soviet principles are still applied in many countries and large quantities of artillery are still in use. Equipment for the future must be designed for a complete and flexible range of operations from a peace-keeping role through limited intervention in defence of a nation up to a major conflict. This requirement has grown more apparent during the development of COBRA and fortunately was inherent in the essential design requirements of the system.
Any professional soldier with combat experience will admit that being on the receiving end of an artillery bombardment is one of the most incapacitating events in war. Physical casualties tend to be high and the uninjured suffer from imposed immobility while the psychological damage cannot be overstated. Fear, stress and fatigue combine to reduce personal effectiveness significantly.
Effective counter-battery is the only method of reducing the capability of an enemy's artillery and radar is the key locating asset in achieving this. It combines speed, accuracy and range with a multiple-targeting capability to provide the most effective wide-area coverage of any technology available. But all existing battlefield radar systems have significant drawbacks that limit their use and make their future effectiveness of dubious value.
The ideal battlefield weapon location radar would possess sufficient range and scan area to enable the detection of all significant tactical battlefield indirect fire weapons while remaining out of the range of enemy fire. It would have accuracy compatible with counterfire capabilities and with minimising the number of counter battery rounds to be fired; speed commensurate with modern battlefield movement; survivability against sophisticated hostile electronic environments; and automation and reliability to minimise expensive personnel requirements. From this list it is clear that there can be no such thing as a perfect system. Range and accuracy can be obtained only through the use of significant power, but high power can be achieved only at the cost of survivability and speed while automation and reliability rarely have been easy bedfellows. Early on in the project, a number of common-sense factors were defined as critical. Of these, the most important were to mount the entire system on a pallet that would be transportable by a single vehicle, to minimise crew requirements by maximum automation and to utilise an active phased-array antenna.
Over the past five decades, a technological revolution has occurred that will continue for the foreseeable future. This is true particularly in the field of electronic systems, and radar and associated technologies are no exception. Therefore it has been an essential part of the COBRA
programme to incorporate the most up-to-date technology available while including growth potential. Nonetheless, decisions have had to be made to include some existing technologies rather than wait for further innovation. In all such cases, the decisive factor has been to achieve the maximum possible performance with '90s technology. The use of state- of-the-art technology has allowed COBRA to achieve remarkable performances in all key characteristics while remaining within the constraints imposed by the critical factors mentioned above. The integration of such technologies along with the development of new and purpose-specific components has posed an exceptional challenge to the project staff and it is only through the international co-operation of leading corporations that out-standing success has been achieved. COBRA provides a good example of the technological and military strengths possible through co-operation between nations.
| The interior of the COBRA shelter |
There is no doubt that COBRA is a major programme. The investment must be considered in the light of a number of factors. First, the development work has advanced significantly the understanding of many technologies in all the participating nations. Secondly, this investment has been spread among several nations with considerable political and commercial effort ensuring a fair spread of both cost and work. Thirdly, and most importantly, COBRA provides an enhancement of the military capabilities of the participating nations that more than justifies the investment.
| The COBRA graphics display showing various artillery locations |
It is worth attempting to take an overview of the most important aspects of the COBRA programme. Artillery provides the most flexible and cost-effective means of disrupting and destroying an enemy. Tanks may be able to move over large distances quickly and infantry may be able to hold ground, but only artillery can influence the actions of an enemy to such a degree over wide areas and in circumstances ranging from single guns used as weapons of terror (as in Bosnia) to their massed use as weapons of destruction.
Billions of dollars have been spent on procurement of weapons and delivery systems such as MLRS and AS90 to equip armies with an indirect strike capability to deal with any situation that may occur over the next 20 years. These systems have enabled a reduction in numbers of equipments while maintaining and improving the destructive capability of artillery.
The only effective counter to artillery is artillery. Effective counter-battery is dependent on accurate and timely target information and only systems such as COBRA can cover sufficient areas to provide such target information.
COBRA has many advantages over similar systems and it is useful to highlight the outstanding features incorporated in its design. First, its total capabilities are incorporated in a design that operates from a single vehicle. Second, shells of a very small cross-section are detected and classified at long ranges over wide sectors, while state-of-the-art processing overcomes interference from birds, weather, ground clutter and aircraft. Next, enemy firing co-ordinates are determined to a high order of accuracy and the powerful data-handling capacity allows direct passage of data from large numbers of such firings to commanders who can control automatically the radar through the C3 system to maximise effective use of battle-field resources. Of equal importance is the system's rapid set-up and breakdown while mounted on a wide choice of prime movers. A single vehicle allows for high tactical mobility and transport over long distances. Also, many features reduce the effectiveness of jamming while short radiation times, low peak power, frequency hopping and narrow beams make electronic detection difficult. Only three people are required to operate and maintain the system and all are protected against battlefield hazards. They are kept aware of system operation and can provide manual inputs to improve efficiency. Finally, high reliability is achieved through the extensive use of redundancy that allows for graceful degradation of performance and also for many repairs to be deferred while maintenance is simplified by the incorporation of automated monitoring and calibration systems.
COBRA is the response to current requirements. It provides the precision, range, mobility and processing power needed in major conflicts and also is suitable for peace-keeping operations where its detection, precision and wide-angle and long-range surveillance capability can be used to identify belligerents.
COBRA furnishes commanders with enemy firing co-ordinates, weapon types and numbers, impact points and weapon density. These data can be used by command and control centres to estimate enemy order of battle, determine unit locations and discern enemy tactics and intentions. This information is essential to allow effective disposition of friendly assets.
Such critical data in detail and quantity cannot be obtained from any other system either fielded or in development. It is this knowledge of the enemy that makes COBRA such exceptional value for money. Any other method of determining such critical information would require deployment of large numbers of smaller and less capable equipments and personnel at a far greater cost.
