There were three important determinants in the formulation of defence policy during the first Clinton administration: budget considerations driven by the US budget deficit; the first Republican-held Congress in 40 years; and the Clinton administration's conviction that a re-examination of defence requirements was necessary in the post-cold-war era. The first two set the parameters for the re-assessment of the policy, and initiatives to reduce the budget deficit meant the cost of a restructured military was subject to stringent financial constraints. The Republican's control of both Houses of Congress after the 1994 elections meant the administration could not count on Congressional support for its defence policies, and faced strong opposition and conflicting priorities in drafting plans. Recommendations laid out in the Department of Defense's bottom-up review for a military restructured to reflect new national security objectives was almost realised by the end of Clinton's first term. But attaining these goals has been arduous.
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The B-52 bomber TIM RIPLEY |
President Clinton began his presidency with just a few guidelines relating to national security and defence policy and without the firm backing of the military establishment. Clinton believed the US military should be streamlined and roles and missions re-assessed. Accordingly, the administration ordered an examination of the military's long-term budget needs based on potential security threats in the post-cold-war world. The conclusions were unveiled in September 1993 in the Bottom-Up Review (BUR) and have served as the basis for defence policy goals. BUR outlined a new strategy and force structure to meet four key threats to US security. First was regional conflicts; second, proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction; third, threats to US economic strength; and fourth, failure of democratic reforms in the former Soviet Union. Clinton was offered four policy alternatives for force levels and chose the Pentagon's preferred win-win option. Under this option, sufficient force levels are to be maintained to win two almost simultaneous major regional conflicts (MRC). The US military would fulfil this option by cultivating a high state of readiness, ensuring morale was high, and continuing to deploy technologically superior weaponry.
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The B-2 is considered to be the most survivable aircraft ever built NORTHROP GRUMMAN |
Fulfilling another objective, implementing BUR would mean significant savings in the defence budget. Active army divisions would be reduced to 10, active and reserve fighter wings to 20, and aircraft carriers to 12 (one to be used for reserve and training). The number of navy surface ships would be reduced to 345 and attack submarines to 45-55 as naval forces focused on conventional power. The number of marines would rise to 15,000 to reflect changed mission priorities but other services would face reductions to a total active duty level of 1.4 million by 1999. The future years defense program (FYDP) for 1995 estimated the cost of implementing BUR from 1995 to 1999 at $1.3 trillion.
As a follow-on study to BUR, a nuclear posture review was conducted. Approved by President Clinton in September 1994, it reviewed US nuclear doctrine, force structure, command and control, operations, supporting infrastructure, safety, security and arms control. Five themes emerged: First, nuclear weapons would play a smaller role in US security; second, the US requires a much smaller nuclear arsenal than at present; third, the US must provide a hedge against future uncertainties; fourth, the US has an inter-national posture rather than a deterrent posture and this should be maintained; and fifth, the US should continue to set the highest standards of stewardship. Though the review did not recommend reducing the total number of warheads below START II levels, it did recommend a reduction in delivery systems. Trident SSBNs (each with 24 D-5 SLBMs with five warheads each) would be reduced to 14; B-52 bombers with AGM-86 B ALCMs and AGM-129 advanced cruise missiles reduced to 66; B-2 bombers with gravity bombs and short-range attack missiles (counted as 16 war-heads each) to 20; and Minuteman III ICBMs with one warhead each to 450-500.
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The Advanced Cruise Missile being carried on a US Air Force B-52 US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE |
Almost from the start, the administration drew criticism for selecting the two MRC option from BUR as the basis for defence planning. Charges of deploying a hollow force were levelled as critics doubted that resources would be sufficient to meet the military commitments proposed by this option. A number of operations-other-than-war such as excursions in Haiti, Somalia, and Rwanda, had taken a large portion of readiness funding, risking future preparedness. The discrepancy was highlighted by a government accounting office (GAO) report predicting a shortfall of $150 billion over five years. This led to claims for an increase in the defence budget or a decrease in policy options. The government acknowledged the proposed defence budget would not meet the requirements laid out in BUR and, restricted by budget-deficit constraints and not wanting to back down from the two MRC option, moved $30 billion from procurement and modernisation programmes to operational (readiness) funds. The DOD cancelled the TSSAM missile and delayed other procurement programmes to save $8 billion. Then, to address the $20-billion deficit that the government calculated and Republican attacks on military policy after the 1994 Congressional elections, the administration announced an additional $25 billion for the defence budget for FY 1995-2001. Of this, $6 billion would go towards modernisation programmes and the rest to enhancing readiness, pay rises, and other quality-of-life improvements. By February 1995, the shortfall had been eliminated by lower inflation estimates and increased net savings by cutting low-priority programmes.
The first Clinton administration defence budget for FY 1994 offered no drastic departures from the previous administration's proposals and requested $263.4 billion. Congress agreed $261.7 billion, an eight per cent reduction in real terms over the FY 1993 budget.
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The budget for the 1994 financial year included procurement funds for four C-17s MCDONNELL DOUGLAS |
Much of the administration's budget was kept intact, but Congress did cut $3.9 billion from research and development, $2.1 billion from the operations-and-maintenance account that affected readiness, and ignored a request to freeze military pay by providing a 2.2 per cent military pay rise. Key elements of the FY 1994 defence budget included full $1.7-billion funding of the B-2 bomber and reaffirmation of the decision to cap the programme at 20 aircraft; full $1.2-billion funding of the Trident II (D-5) missile programme provided it remained within START II guidelines; a new $2.3-billion inter-theatre airlift account, including procurement funds for four C-17s in FY 1994; and protection of development funds for two tactical combat aircraft, the V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor transport aircraft, the RAH-66 Comanche scout/attack helicopter, and the Centurion attack submarine.
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The first RAH-66 Comanche helicopter prototype was rolled out in May 1995 BOEING SIKORSKY |
With results from the bottom-up review in hand, the FY 1995 budget provided a clear statement of security priorities. The request highlighted readiness and technical superiority to meet US defence objectives with a smaller force and asked for increased funding for the O&M account. Additionally, to address serious deficiencies in readiness ratings, the army was to take the marine corps' lead and preposition unit equipment packs and logistics stocks afloat for regional contingencies, primarily in the Persian Gulf. Believing that technological dominance meant fewer weapon systems would be required, the procurement account remained the focus of cuts.
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The FY 1995 budget included $2.7 billion for three Arleigh Burke-class destroyers TIM RIPLEY |
The administration submitted a defence budget request of $263.7 billion and, following rearrangement of funds and scraping over funding for the US share of UN peacekeeping operations, Congress passed a defence budget for FY 1995 of $263.8 billion, a one-per-cent decrease in real terms. Serious disagreements arose over US participation in contingency operations. Many Republicans were against US involvement in Bosnia and attempted to limit the President's ability to engage US forces in the conflict.
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The first defence budget for the Clinton administration including funding of $1.2 billion for the Trident II missile programme TIM RIPLEY |
Most of the administration's defence priorities were echoed in the final defence budget but Congress' re-allocation of some funding did alter the package. It allocated $125 million extra to the B-2 bomber programme to ensure production lines were kept open, one per cent extra to the 1.6-per-cent military pay rise and several hundred million dollars more to the Sealift Fund. The budget authorised a third and final Seawolf attack submarine to maintain a nuclear submarine industrial base prior to production of the Centurion, $3.6 billion for a new aircraft carrier (CVN-76), and $2.7 billion for three Arleigh Burke-class destroyers; $400 million to assist Russia and other former Soviet states dismantle nuclear and chemical weapons; continued development funding for two tactical combat aircraft, the V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor transport aircraft, the RAH-66 Comanche scout/attack helicopter, and the Centurion attack submarine; and preferred the short-to-medium-range ballistic missile defence, rather than the national missile defence for US-troop protection during regional conflicts.
| A US Air Force F-16 carrying High-speed Anti-Radar Missiles (HARM) produced by Texas Instruments |
The defence budget that Congress submitted for presidential signature included $6 billion more than the administration's request of $257.8 billion, a firm commitment to develop and deploy a multi-site national missile defense system by 2003; a prohibition of US troops from serving under UN command, Congressional consultation before US troops were deployed in peacekeeping missions, and a reduction of US payments to UN peacekeeping funds; and social provisions including a ban on abortions at military installations and the discharge of HIV-positive soldiers. The president, concerned that a national missile defense system would be an abrogation of the ABM treaty and that prior consultation with Congressional leaders before deploying troops would infringe his constitutional rights as Commander-in-Chief, vetoed the bill.
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One of the key elements of the FY 1996 defence budget included provision for procuring six F-16s TIM RIPLEY |
Eventually the FY 1996 defence budget was signed on February 10, 1996, well into the 1996 fiscal year. The $263.9 billion budget reflects an increase in spending but does not compromise on key philosophical issues. The administration's themes of enhancing readiness and personnel morale were continued while Congressional concern about maintaining the US defence industrial base were acknowledged. Key aspects of the budget included $2 billion dedicated to missile defence with two-thirds of the total for theatre missile defence; $493 million for the B-2 Stealth bomber programme; and provisions for procuring six F-15s and six F-16s; three DDG-51 destroyers; the first LPD-17-class amphibious dock-landing ship; and another LHD-7 Wasp-class amphibious assault ship, accounting for a $4 billion increase in tactical weapons systems funding over the request.
The administration submitted its FY 1997 defence budget request of $255.1 billion on February 5, 1997. This is a six-per-cent reduction in real terms from the 1996 budget, continuing the trend of the past decade. This could be broken with the next defence budgets as increases in the procurement budget of up to 50 per cent are scheduled from 1997. Continued budget constraints may, however, put this plan in doubt.
