What was seen to be a period of international calm in east Asia after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 was more apparent than real. The seemingly benign relationships among the major players in the region needed only a trigger event to prove otherwise. Even in that period of apparent calm there were some irritants to international harmony such as China's actions to oust all other claimants to the islands in the South China Sea or the US charges against the PRC for pirating compact discs and computer software. However, these were dealt with at a low level of tension. But when the US Congress in May 1995 forced President Bill Clinton's decision to grant a visa for Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui to visit his alma mater, Cornell University, the true adversarial situation in the region became clear. Mainland China reacted immediately with harsh rhetoric against the US for granting the visa and, in a military show of force against Taiwan, fired ballistic missiles from the mainland to a target area just north of the island.
China has a population of over one billion and this is increasing in spite of a one-child restriction on families. The country is a rapidly growing economic power and is becoming the salient problem in east Asia and the world. In 1995 a senior Vietnamese diplomat summed up the problem as seen by China's neighbours: "The fear of China is a new glue in Asia."1 His remark was a comment on ASEAN's eagerness to bring Vietnam into its membership; the motive was clearly one of concern about China. Examples of China's nationalism in east and southeast Asia are the naval forces of the PRC that cruise the South China Sea and the staking out of China's claims to the sea area and the islands in this important body of water; China has placed garrisons and built structures on several of the islands. Besides expanding its territorial claims, China wants to secure access to the oil under the South China Sea. The Philippine president's national security advisor Jose Almonte, describes the situation as "ominous...China's growing economic strength will increase its political and military influence in east Asia."2
Chinese missile diplomacy following Lee Teng-hui's unofficial visit to the US is the most visible evidence of China's new nationalism, the successor ideology to dying Chinese communism. As one scholar commented on China's rise to great power status: "Nationalism is the sole ideology that holds the People's Republic together and keeps the CCP government in power." The author says "almost no influential figure in the Chinese government or society believes in communism anymore". Nationalism is filling the vacuum.3
| A Chinese CSS-2 intermediate-range missile. China is expanding and modernising its missile force |
It is clear that China intends to dominate south-east Asia and establish claims to almost all the South China Sea, but the international dimension of China's new assertiveness is in its relations with the United States and Japan. The missiles fired in 1995/1996 into the waters near Taiwan obviously were meant to intimidate President Lee Teng-hui and the people of Taiwan but the message was intended for the United States also. Washington's reaction to the missiles in July 1995 and again in March 1996 was to send carrier battle groups to the vicinity of Taiwan. The USS NIMITZ battle group in December 1995 sailed through the Taiwan Strait; the two battle groups sent in the spring of 1996 approached Taiwan from the east but avoided the Strait. Beijing got the message that Washington was reaffirming its commitment to defend Taiwan, even though Beijing probably had no intention of attacking Taiwan at that time. This show of force was a necessary message from the US because statements from Washington in the summer and autumn of 1995 were less than forthright about the US position regarding threats to Taiwan. In August 1995 there were briefings to ROC officials in Taipei and Washington, the gist of which was that the US would continue to develop relations under the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), the basic US law governing bilateral ties. These briefings were meant to reassure the ROC but they were not wholly comforting because they did not go beyond the words from the TRA that "any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means" would be a matter of "grave concern to the United States."5 A later statement by a US State Department spokesman in October 1995 said that "we would not be in a position to react with force."6 Meanwhile, when queried in late 1995 by senior Chinese military officials on how the US would respond to a military crisis over Taiwan, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Joseph Nye, said that nobody knew. Although this noncommittal response could be interpreted as leaving the door open to China, Nye further reported that he warned the Chinese generally about the dangers of escalation in a crisis.7
| The short-range M-9(DF-15) missile, a variant of the type used in China's threatening missile tests near Taiwan in 1995/96 |
In addition to these statements, when the NIMITZ group sailed through the Taiwan Strait in December 1995, the impact was limited by a statement from Washington that said it was bad weather that caused the transit through the Strait. A firm position would have been that the transit was demonstrating the right of passage through international waters, with no apology, and at the same time sending a message to Beijing. Thus the sending of the two battle groups to the vicinity of Taiwan in the pre-election period in the spring of 1996 was necessary to show that Washington belatedly had taken a firm stance in defence of Taiwan.
An interesting and revealing incident occurred more than a year before the 1995 missile firings at Taiwan, showing a split in thinking within the PRC's high policy levels. In late 1993 a foreign diplomat browsing in a Beijing bookstore came upon a Chinese-language book with the title Can China's Armed Forces Win The Next War? It turned out to be a book intended for Chinese eyes, mistakenly put on the shelf in the bookstore. However, the diplomat bought it and the Foreign Policy Research Institute in the US obtained a photocopy and had it translated. FPRI research found that it was authentic, originating from high levels in the Chinese military and probably written by senior naval officers or civilian naval analysts.8 It was not an official statement of PRC military doctrine or foreign policy but it does appear to be consistent with recent Chinese actions such as the missile firings.
| Taiwan's Ching-Kuo Indigenous Defence Fighter (IDF) |
Translation revealed several significant points:
the Chinese civilian and military leadership see the US as China's principal adversary for decades to come; the PRC will not launch an invasion of Taiwan so long as US opposition is apparent; Chinese armed forces are called to prepare for war to establish total control of the South China Sea before the end of this decade; PRC proposals to put aside territorial disputes over the South China Sea are designed to entice other claimants to acknowledge that the islands are sovereign Chinese territory; the book is the first written evidence in recent times that bluff, bluster and deception are important weapons of the PRC's ruling elite.
The latter point harks back to the military doctrine of the ancient Chinese strategist Sun Tzu, whose dictum was that it is more important to defeat the enemy's strategy than to engage in combat. Deception and bluffing are necessary elements of Sun Tzu's strategy.
Nationalism is replacing communism as China's guiding ideology; China's strategy is to revert to being 'more Chinese'. In China's past, neighbouring states fell into two categories: potential enemies and tributary states that acknowledged Chinese hegemony.9 This concept is evident in the current situation. The United States and Japan fit the potential enemy role and the surrounding smaller countries, although not paying tribute, must in Beijing's eyes accept the hegemonic role of the PRC.
Taiwan should find one message of the translated book somewhat reassuring. The authors take a different position from the recent bluster coming out of Beijing in that they accept the present situation of one China, that is in truth two governments. Although the authors adhere to Beijing's position that the PRC would have no choice but to invade Taiwan were the ROC to declare independence, they do not agree with Beijing's official statements that a prolongation of the present divided status is unacceptable and that it must eventually be resolved by force. A key reason for the willingness of the book's authors to accept the present arrangement indefinitely is that military leaders cannot guarantee Beijing policy-makers that an invasion can be carried out successfully. They see Taiwan's present acquisition of high-performance aircraft as strengthening an already respectable force and they also have a real fear that the US would come to Taiwan's aid if the mainland attempted to capture the island by force.
But despite these pragmatic views of the situation, the authors of the translated book reveal their xenophobia and anti-Americanism when they state that they can see a US design to encourage Taiwanese independence to gain a US "foothold on China's door-step". This is a message for Washington to ponder and analyse the unwanted consequences of success of the pro-independence party of Taiwan.
There are no easy answers to the issues raised by this revealing book. While the message of the authors reveals that the Chinese military does not want to engage in direct conflict with a US that is seen as stronger than China and will remain so for many years, they see the Taiwan situation as one that cannot be avoided if Taiwan takes the dangerous step of declaring independence, encouraged, they believe, by the United States. It seems the thinking in the PRC, political, military and among the people, is that the US is the perpetual enemy, the outside power that the Chinese believe cannot abide the existence of a major and dominating power in Asia. This is not a strategic situation that bodes well for peace and tranquillity.
Because the US is the only remaining super-power at least until the PRC becomes a second superpower in the early 21st century, the Washington-Beijing axis will be the primary strategic factor in east Asian security. The rivalry between these two states will not disappear and it seems certain to increase, especially in the economic dimension. But for the survival of all, it must be managed to prevent overt conflict. Yet while granting the primacy of this two-power face-off, there is another important dimension to Asian security, the one involving Japan.
In some ways the PRC fears Japan more than it fears the US. Chinese military analysts try to be strategic realists and in truth Japan is not a threatening military power because it depends on the US as its protector under the rather one-sided mutual security alliance. But the Chinese cannot forget the record of imperialist Japan in the late 19th and early 20th centuries; ruling Taiwan for half a century after Japan's defeat of China in 1895, annexing Korea after the defeat of Russia in 1905 and the atrocities committed by the Japanese in the invasions of China in the 1930s. The Chinese believe that there is still a militaristic Japanese elite that would like to see Japan become a major military power once again.
Until 1993, Chinese analysts believed that that there still existed a post-Second World War goal of the Liberal Democratic Party to pursue a three-part grand strategy: first, to become an economic superpower; second, to achieve political power through use of economic aid and securing a seat on the UN Security Council; and finally, to acquire sufficient military power to dominate the immediate region and to be able to project power around the world.10 At the same time, the Chinese believed that the US protectorate and the anti-war sentiment among the Japanese after the Second World War pre-vented fulfilment of the LDP long-range goal, so long as the US-Japan alliance remained in force.
But they are of two minds on this issue. They are reassured by President Clinton's and Defense Secretary William Perry's statements that the US will keep 100,000 troops in east Asia for the foreseeable future but they are alarmed by talks between the US and Japan about strengthening or upgrading the US-Japan defence relationship. To the PRC this means greater Japanese military power and eventually an excuse for the US to turn more of the regional defence role over to Japan, a development not welcome in Beijing. And the threat of this is increased as Beijing fears that the budget battle in Washington may lead to decisions that reduce American foreign military commitments overseas.
| FIGURE I | |||||
| CHINA'S BALLISTIC MISSILES (By Range Categories) | |||||
| Name (Alternates) | Range (km) | Payload (kg) | Status | ||
| Maximum | |||||
| Short Range (to 799km) | |||||
| DF-11 (M-11) (CSS-7) | 300 | 800 | In Service | ||
| DF-15 (M-9) (CSS-6) | 600 | 950 | In Service | ||
| Medium Range (800 km-2,399km) | |||||
| DF-21/21A (CSS-5) | 1,800 | 600 | In Service | ||
| Intermediate Range (2,400km-5,499km) | |||||
| DF-3/DF-3A (CSS-2) | 2,800 | 2,150 | In Service | ||
| DF-4 (CSS-3) | 4,750 | 2,200 | In Service | ||
| Intercontinental (range) ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) | |||||
| CSS-N-3 (JL-1) SLBM | 1,700 | 600 | In Service | ||
| JL-2 SLBM | 8,000 | 700 | Development | ||
| DF-31 ICBM | 8,000 | 700 | Tested | ||
| DF-41 ICBM | 12,000 | 800 | Development | ||
| DF-5/5A (CSS-4) ICBM | 13,000 | 3,200 | In Service | ||
This line of thinking obviously favours continuation of the US military alliance with Japan and an American military presence in the region but it runs counter to two other observable clues to the PRC's policy regarding the US. China's senior naval strategists have a realistic regard for US military power and wish to avoid direct conflict with the US but also fear that American presence and influence in the region is designed to push the Taiwanese towards independence and gain "a foothold on China's doorstep". The US suppression of Japan's latent ambitions may be seen as necessary and good for China but this does not reflect what Foreign Minister Qian Qichen said to US Secretary of State Warren Christopher in August 1995 when they met in Brunei. Qian said that the many years of the PRC's welcoming the presence of US forces in east Asia have ended and that it is time for the US to stop regarding itself as the "saviour of the east...We do not recognise the United States as a power that claims to maintain peace and stability in Asia."11
There is an explanation for this apparent contradiction. When it comes to top-level decision-making in Beijing, the advice of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is not always accepted. This is known to be true with respect to Taiwan. At the top of the bureaucracy dealing with Taiwan matters is the Central Leading Group for Taiwanese Affairs headed by Jiang Zemin. Organisationally, this would appear to be the place where high-level decisions are made but power really lies with two other offices, the Taiwanese Work Office (TWO) of the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee and the Taiwanese Affairs Office (TWA). In 1995 and 1996, decisions made regarding the response to the Lee Teng-hui visit to the US and in the attempt to disrupt the 1996 presidential election in Taiwan, the advice of the MFA was rejected. The MFA proposed taking a measured diplomatic response, regarding Taiwan events as making only a minor ripple in cross-Strait relations, but the People's Liberation Army (PLA) used its influence in the TWA to press for a military response and Jiang Zemin agreed. He was not in a strong enough leadership position to go against the military. The Foreign Minister may advise, but his advice may not be taken. When Qian told Secretary Christopher at the Brunei meeting that it was time for the Americans to go home, his supporters in Beijing may not have agreed. In any case, on the US side, the advice to go home may be the best reason to stay. So too was the firing of the missiles. Far from frightening either the US or Taiwan, the result appears to have strengthened the determination of both to stand firm against Beijing's threats.
| The Mirage-2000-5, a further upgrade to Taiwan's defence capabilities |
One manifestation of US determination to bolster regional security in light of Beijing's threats is the emerging consensus that theatre missile defenses (TMD) have a key role to play in deterrence and for the defence of allies and friends in the region. In east Asia, Chinese and North Korean missiles stand out as important sources of potential future instability. North Korea's ballistic missile programme poses threats to South Korea, Japan and US forces in the Pacific. Pyongyang's long-range missile under development, the Taepo Dong 2, has a range estimated at 4,000-6,000km and could be used to threaten Alaska and parts of Hawaii.
China possesses the most diverse and advanced ballistic missile force in Asia, see Figure I. China's missile force is growing and provides regional predominance. The Chinese can use this force, along with growing cruise missile capabilities, as a deterrent, to exact bargaining leverage, or, as they have against Taiwan, for intimidation purposes. The high-visibility theatre ballistic missile (TBM) threats directed at Taiwan provide a glimpse of the serious impact offensive ballistic missiles will have on the future regional security environment.
| The S-2 ASW Tracker flying over a merchant ship |
China's missile diplomacy commenced in July 1995. Between July 21 and 23, the Chinese fired six DF-15 short-range ballistic missiles from Fujian province to an east China Sea impact site 90 miles north of Taipei.12 In the short-term, these firings had an adverse impact on Taiwan's economy, including a one-day 4.2- per-cent-drop in the stock market, but calm was soon restored. Raising proliferation concerns, they also prompted calls in Taiwan's parliament that Taipei build nuclear weapons to counter the mainland's missile threat, a course not likely to be taken.
A second set of missile firings came on the eve of Taiwan's first democratic presidential election. China launched four more DF-15s into two ocean impact zones on March 8 and 13, 1996 that bracketed the island. One zone was 47 miles west of the southern port of Kaohsiung and the other was just 30 miles east of the northern port of Keelung. As in 1995 these tests and related military manoeuvres created economic panic. They also impacted air and sea traffic flowing to and from Taiwan, resulting in a virtual blockade. In the end, Beijing's activities proved counter-productive. President Lee Teng-hui was elected with a solid majority and the international community strongly condemned the PRC's aggressive, destabilising behaviour.
These threats brought the need for regional TMD into greater focus. In the US, Republican Presidential Candidate Robert J Dole called in May 1996 for a Pacific Democracy Defense Program that would extend TMD coverage to Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and other allies. Dole recommended export licensing of the theater high-altitude area defense (THAAD) system when it becomes available and, in the interim, making operational prototypes available for the defence of America's Asian allies. Japan has already committed $5 million in seed money for TMD research, including studying THAAD options. Dole also advocated moving ahead more quickly with Navy Lower and Upper Tier missile defences, the former based on the Aegis radar and the Standard Missile SM-2 Block IVA. At the same time, President Clinton announced his willingness to provide Taiwan with a near-term TMD capability by accelerating delivery of an anti-tactical ballistic missile (ATBM) system already in the pipeline. The US and Taiwanese government have approved an agreement under which the US manufacturer of the Patriot, the Raytheon Company, would cooperate with Taiwanese companies to co-produce a "modified Patriot system for Taiwan, called [the] Modified Air Defense System (MADS)."13 This is "designed to defend against Chinese TBMs and air threats."14 The Raytheon Company also will furnish logistics, spare parts, installation assistance and training.15 According to press reports, MADS will be deployed around Taipei.16 Japan, a major US ally, also currently deploys Patriot. In 1995, US Patriot assets were deployed to South Korea for the protection of US troops and military assets stationed there. Taipei also is said to be working on an indigenous system, the Tien Kung (Sky Bow) III, a missile designed for high-altitude air defence, and that may have some capability to defend against ballistic and cruise missiles.17
| Taiwan's E-2T early warning aircraft |
China's missile diplomacy of 1995/1996 brought into sharp focus the new types of threats con-fronting western interests in the post-Cold War environment. Longer-range missiles, including those armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD), can be used for intimidation, blackmail, or to achieve other objectives vis-à-vis adversaries. China's missile tests reflect the complex political-military challenges that face the US and its allies in the years ahead. Moving forward with TMD programmes is one important element of an overall strategy to help counter Beijing's aggressive impulses in what is shaping up as a long-term competition between China and the US in east Asia.
William M Carpenter and David Wiencek are editors of the recently published book Asian Security Handbook: An Assessment of Political-Security Issues in the Asia-Pacific Region (Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 1996).
Footnotes
